Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ship AOPS

[FJAG]

I call it the Army delusion.

It's not their fault, nobody is communicating clearly what the threats to Canada are. And a mass landing/invasion is NOT, repeat NOT one of them.

I'm not sure what others think, but I read things like this occasionally.

DOES CHINA POSE A CREDIBLE SECURITY THREAT TO CANADA’S ARCTIC?Lieutenant-Commander Valérie Allard https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/22/305/Allard.pdf

I doubt that anyone here foresees a Normandy-style landing by a Chinese army group in Churchill, but there is a non-zero possibility that Chinese or Russian challenges to Canadian border claims and resource exploration can happen. It's also a non-zero possibility that someone will try to park missile systems in that region in order to cut down the travel time to North American targets and other military assets to "protect" their incursions into our low hanging fruit terrain.

One of the problems we soldiers see with our navy in the Arctic is that it is mostly seasonal albeit that is changing. We also see the current air force air defence scheme is entirely built around jet fighters and drones. They gave up using nuclear missiles for continental air defence a long time ago.

Notwithstanding NSF highlights Arctic vulnerabilities up front,

"All of this points to the need for greater investment in our domestic defences, particularly in our Arctic. Alongside our diplomatic, security, and intelligence capabilities, a strong military protects Canada's ability to make sovereign, independent decisions in our best interests and limits our adversaries' ability to coerce or shape our courses of action."

there is nothing in the lengthy list of upcoming Liberal success stories that hints at more than the usual lip service nor a coherent joint program. There may be a new AWACS, there will be maritime patrol aircraft which generally face left and right and not up, F-35s and a fairly vulnerable MQ9s all of which, together with our limited ships, leave gaps in the defence envelope in time and space.

The army certainly isn't planning on having a northern brigade group, but it has roles. It could, for example, in times of heightened tensions or incursions fly in long range rocket systems and air defence systems which could provide persistent hard points around which navel and air forces could manoeuvre. That's over and above land forces to clear up incursions, hopefully heavily degraded by joint fires systems. The point is that even in the Arctic, there will be times when one needs to hold ground and form fire bases. Neither ships nor aircraft do that. We need to show the ability to provide a robust and credible response.

But the issue here isn't to argue for a bigger army presence. It's to say that us ground pounders recognize that there are too few ships and air assets to guard the Canadian coastlines properly in light of the potential threats that there are. Any existing vessel (and a system to sustain them) that could augment the anti-ship and anti-air envelope around the country would be of immense value.

We all understand that it isn't easy to modify a ship once constructed. To be honest, siting here on the outside, the fact that that capability wasn't built into the AOPS in the first place smacks of lack of foresight and vision on the part of the navy. I mean if the guys on Twitter consider that a handicap then you have to wonder what the discussion around the design team's table of the AOPS was. (Incidentally I had the same issue about the MCDV (a 40mm Boffin for gods' sake). When you can only afford a few ships then you have to make use of every hull that you have. What part about "armed" in Canadian Armed Forces are we missing here.

So sure, I'm a non-sailor questioning the navy's lack of vision. At least that shows that I'm even handed as I haven't hesitated to consider the army short of vision on its approach to heavy forces and the reserves and the air force's tepid dedication to aviation and tactical UAVs.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

To be fair I was stoked when I first saw the MCDV, they were quite a step up from the old Gate vessels. The fact that they were armed at all got a thumbs up from me.

 

[Stoker]

To be fair I was stoked when I first saw the MCDV, they were quite a step up from the old Gate vessels. The fact that they were armed at all got a thumbs up from me.

The original requirements for the Kingston Class wasn't to have any main gun apparently. The original requirements would normally be a several billion dollar project, they had $750M and was told to make it work. The head of the project Bob Mustand took it upon himself to ensure a gun was provided through weapons already in inventory. Truth of the matter was the guns were labour intensive to maintain, with little utility. One ship managed to shoot their brake handle for the stbd anchor over the years. I was stoked when they were removed, too much trouble.

 

[Rainbow1910]

Any existing vessel (and a system to sustain them) that could augment the anti-ship and anti-air envelope around the country would be of immense value.

We all understand that it isn't easy to modify a ship once constructed. To be honest, siting here on the outside, the fact that that capability wasn't built into the AOPS in the first place smacks of lack of foresight and vision on the part of the navy. I mean if the guys on Twitter consider that a handicap then you have to wonder what the discussion around the design team's table of the AOPS was. (Incidentally I had the same issue about the MCDV (a 40mm Boffin for gods' sake). When you can only afford a few ships then you have to make use of every hull that you have. What part about "armed" in Canadian Armed Forces are we missing here.

So sure, I'm a non-sailor questioning the navy's lack of vision. At least that shows that I'm even handed as I haven't hesitated to consider the army short of vision on its approach to heavy forces and the reserves and the air force's tepid dedication to aviation and tactical UAVs.

I wouldn't take the opinions of random commentators on Twitter as being worth much, they could tell me that the sky is blue and I'd still check to make sure it hadn't changed.

The capability was not built into AOPS in the first place due to a lack of foresight/vision, it was not built into the design because it is an excess and wasteful capability. AOPS is not designed to function as a combatant as its role does not demand it, the more space/crew/weight/stability that is put aside for weaponry that will not be used in 99% of scenarios, the less space/weight/stability is available for the duties and requirements that the ship is actually designed for. The RCN has been grappling with personnel issues for years, loading a design not suited to combat down with combat systems exacerbates the issue on a per ship basis. These additional personnel need berthing space as well, weapon control stations need space/weight, ammunition storage needs space/weight, radar/fire control requires space/weight, etc.

You get into a situation where design creep can utterly destroy a program. When you fixate on adding more and more on excess capability, the design bloats in size, complexity and cost while the initial goals of the program suffer. A 57mm gun turns into a 76mm gun, which turns into a 127mm gun which also needs a full fire control radar to make use of its capabilities, then somebody suggests a Phalanx for self defense which eventually morphs into a SeaRAM launcher and eventually full ESSM stuck aboard. Decoys turn into a full electronic countermeasures system suite from a frigate, a compact surveillance radar turns into a full frigate radar system and anti-ship missiles are thrown on there for good measure.

The best way to keep these issues in check is to slap your requirement in place and not budge. As AOPS is built for constabulary work, the 25mm accomplishes this with minimal wasted tonnage and space. If the RCN wants anti-shipping and anti-air capability in the Arctic, bring in the platforms purposefully designed for such a role instead of effectively forcing a beat cop to carry around an RPG-7.

 

[Maxman1]

The original requirements for the Kingston Class wasn't to have any main gun apparently. The original requirements would normally be a several billion dollar project, they had $750M and was told to make it work. The head of the project Bob Mustand took it upon himself to ensure a gun was provided through weapons already in inventory. Truth of the matter was the guns were labour intensive to maintain, with little utility. One ship managed to shoot their brake handle for the stbd anchor over the years. I was stoked when they were removed, too much trouble.

The fact they were WWII leftovers probably didn't help.

 

[KevinB]

I wouldn't take the opinions of random commentators on Twitter as being worth much, they could tell me that the sky is blue and I'd still check to make sure it hadn't changed.

The capability was not built into AOPS in the first place due to a lack of foresight/vision, it was not built into the design because it is an excess and wasteful capability. AOPS is not designed to function as a combatant as its role does not demand it, the more space/crew/weight/stability that is put aside for weaponry that will not be used in 99% of scenarios, the less space/weight/stability is available for the duties and requirements that the ship is actually designed for.

As an outsider looking in, given the # of vessels the RCN has, I question having non combatant ships, other than supply vessels.

The RCN has been grappling with personnel issues for years, loading a design not suited to combat down with combat systems exacerbates the issue on a per ship basis. These additional personnel need berthing space as well, weapon control stations need space/weight, ammunition storage needs space/weight, radar/fire control requires space/weight, etc.

You get into a situation where design creep can utterly destroy a program. When you fixate on adding more and more on excess capability, the design bloats in size, complexity and cost while the initial goals of the program suffer. A 57mm gun turns into a 76mm gun, which turns into a 127mm gun which also needs a full fire control radar to make use of its capabilities, then somebody suggests a Phalanx for self defense which eventually morphs into a SeaRAM launcher and eventually full ESSM stuck aboard. Decoys turn into a full electronic countermeasures system suite from a frigate, a compact surveillance radar turns into a full frigate radar system and anti-ship missiles are thrown on there for good measure.

The issue I have is the Halifax’s seem to be well on their way to self divestment before the CSC will be at sea. Did Canada need AOPS in these numbers?

The best way to keep these issues in check is to slap your requirement in place and not budge. As AOPS is built for constabulary work, the 25mm accomplishes this with minimal wasted tonnage and space. If the RCN wants anti-shipping and anti-air capability in the Arctic, bring in the platforms purposefully designed for such a role instead of effectively forcing a beat cop to carry around an RPG-7.

Hey, the Afghan National Police often had officers at traffic circles with solely an RPG…
Probably kept them less chaotic than they would have been

 

[FJAG]

The capability was not built into AOPS in the first place due to a lack of foresight/vision, it was not built into the design because it is an excess and wasteful capability. AOPS is not designed to function as a combatant as its role does not demand it, the more space/crew/weight/stability that is put aside for weaponry that will not be used in 99% of scenarios, the less space/weight/stability is available for the duties and requirements that the ship is actually designed for. The RCN has been grappling with personnel issues for years, loading a design not suited to combat down with combat systems exacerbates the issue on a per ship basis. These additional personnel need berthing space as well, weapon control stations need space/weight, ammunition storage needs space/weight, radar/fire control requires space/weight, etc.

I understand all of that. Kevin's viewpoint is exactly mine.

As an outsider looking in, given the # of vessels the RCN has, I question having non combatant ships, other than supply vessels.

The army has for years thrown absolutely necessary hardware under the bus due to lack of funding. The reason for this is to protect what it considers the core combat capabilities. IMHO, the navy has far too few combat capable vessels. It has thrown all of its eggs into a single and very expensive vessel.

Any military force has to work under the presumption that war will come and that combat systems will be necessary. Will they have peacetime missions in the interval? Of course they will but those can be performed by ships built for war. To save money during peacetime they can deploy without the ammunition and additional crew needed. A ship built for war can perform peacetime duties; a ship built for peaceful activities cannot easily be converted to a war time function.

The AOPS is a reasonably large, and from what I hear, a comfortable ship. Much smaller ships have impressive combat functions.

It takes me back to the fundamental issue of whether or not Canada is building its military for war or peace. And its not just a question for the navy but for all of the service. A military can be built which is designed for war but operated, during peacetime, at a reduced and less expensive personnel and O&M cost. Such a service can be easily ramped up in time of need. A force that is built and staffed as a full on "force in being" can't be ramped up. You go to war with what you have. If many of those assets are non combatant - and by that I include enormous central headquarters, unarmed ships, and unarmed reserve forces - then all you have done is create a large, expensive force for peacetime with limited ability to be expanded for war.

The sine quo non of a modern military is equipment and the personnel trained to use it. We completely underspend on equipment. Not only do we not meet the NATO GDP % but within what we do meet, we underspend the NATO equipment % component. If the money that we do spend is not spent on combat capable equipment and the logistics systems to allow it to function at full capacity then we are misspending the little we do have. Do we need an AOPS - absolutely. I think we need more than we are getting, but they need to be dual-purpose, combat capable vessels.

 

[YZT580]

I understand all of that. Kevin's viewpoint is exactly mine.

The army has for years thrown absolutely necessary hardware under the bus due to lack of funding. The reason for this is to protect what it considers the core combat capabilities. IMHO, the navy has far too few combat capable vessels. It has thrown all of its eggs into a single and very expensive vessel.

Any military force has to work under the presumption that war will come and that combat systems will be necessary. Will they have peacetime missions in the interval? Of course they will but those can be performed by ships built for war. To save money during peacetime they can deploy without the ammunition and additional crew needed. A ship built for war can perform peacetime duties; a ship built for peaceful activities cannot easily be converted to a war time function.

The AOPS is a reasonably large, and from what I hear, a comfortable ship. Much smaller ships have impressive combat functions.

It takes me back to the fundamental issue of whether or not Canada is building its military for war or peace. And its not just a question for the navy but for all of the service. A military can be built which is designed for war but operated, during peacetime, at a reduced and less expensive personnel and O&M cost. Such a service can be easily ramped up in time of need. A force that is built and staffed as a full on "force in being" can't be ramped up. You go to war with what you have. If many of those assets are non combatant - and by that I include enormous central headquarters, unarmed ships, and unarmed reserve forces - then all you have done is create a large, expensive force for peacetime with limited ability to be expanded for war.

The sine quo non of a modern military is equipment and the personnel trained to use it. We completely underspend on equipment. Not only do we not meet the NATO GDP % but within what we do meet, we underspend the NATO equipment % component. If the money that we do spend is not spent on combat capable equipment and the logistics systems to allow it to function at full capacity then we are misspending the little we do have. Do we need an AOPS - absolutely. I think we need more than we are getting, but they need to be dual-purpose, combat capable vessels.

Without sitting on the fence there is room to both fully agree with your rationale whilst disagreeing with your conclusions. An ice breaker will never, be suitable as a war ship. they are too slow and too bulky. Regardless of the things to tack on to the hull for defense, in the end you are hanging a massive piece of steel out as an easy target. Those in the know, not me, have stated that the weapon systems would only serve to complicate things. So designing the AOP as a warship should have been a non-starter as it is. As an ice breaker though it can provide the lead for the hulls that are designed to carry the arms and be defended by the same in much the same manner as a supply ship is guarded with the added bonus that it can serve as a constabulary vessel during peace-time. What is needed is not more weapons on the AOP but Ottawa to get off its butt and start building those other required components.

 

[GR66]

In my opinion you don't need to turn the AOPS into a Frigate in order to make it useful during heightened tensions or an actual conflict.

As other have noted we're not about to see a Chinese or Russian invasion armada appearing over the horizon any time soon. However, enemy submarines and covert surveillance vessels are certainly a possibility. There are a number of ways that the AOPS could be useful in helping to counter those threats:

• Serve as a mothership for UUVs to help monitor our vast maritime domain (including the ability to recharge XLUUV's without them needing to surface)
• Deploy a containerized towed sonar to add another node to our maritime sensor net.
• Deploy UAVs to monitor suspect shipping. There's even an MQ-8C Firescout variant that's been tested with a sonobuoy dispenser.
• If there were concerns about a missile threat in our Arctic AO then a containerized AD missile system could be placed on the deck (@Kirkhill has posted many variants of these).

None of these would require any major modifications to the AOPS but they would be capabilities we'd need to purchase in advance and train for in order to be effective.

As @Rainbow1910 mentioned up-thread, you could replace the current 25mm with the same 30mm as the CSC (and gain air-burst ammo as an option) and the .50 mounts could be replaced with a RWS.

Constabulary vessels are definitely required and no, they don't have to be seriously up-gunned to be useful, but in these times of increased tension and risk of conflict I think the RCN needs to look at finding ways to increase its combat power. To my mind this could be done with things like UUV's and unmanned/minimally-manned arsenal ships, etc. rather than be radically re-building the AOPS.

 

[childs56]

As an outsider looking in, given the # of vessels the RCN has, I question having non combatant ships, other than supply vessels.

Remember the Great Prime Minister said "Canada's back" These unarmed/ lightly armed vessels may be part of his humanitarian mission program to bring us back.......

The issue I have is the Halifax’s seem to be well on their way to self divestment before the CSC will be at sea. Did Canada need AOPS in these numbers?

That is a great question and one that should have been asked before the program went forward. I dont think this government ever intended to build the CSC. They were hoping the AOPs would quell the Navy with fancy new shiny ships.

What we should do is keep two of them for training and turn the rest over to the Coast Guard/ Fisheries/ RCMP.

Hey, the Afghan National Police often had officers at traffic circles with solely an RPG…
Probably kept them less chaotic than they would have been

Failure to stop at the stop sign results in my RPG stopping you right away.

 

[Underway]

With 500,000+ fishing vessels, we don't have enough P-8's

So you're saying China has half a million anti ship missiles to arm every fishing vessel? No

I doubt that anyone here foresees a Normandy-style landing by a Chinese army group in Churchill, but there is a non-zero possibility that Chinese or Russian challenges to Canadian border claims and resource exploration can happen. It's also a non-zero possibility that someone will try to park missile systems in that region in order to cut down the travel time to North American targets and other military assets to "protect" their incursions into our low hanging fruit terrain.

There is a non-zero possiblity that someone challenges border claims, there is a 100% possiblity of that just from the US. There is a zero probability that someone tries to extract resources that are not fish from the Canadian Arctic. I would almost include Canada in that considering there is not much resource extraction going on right now.
And there is a negative probablity that someone would risk North American defence by Cubaing up soveriegn Canadian territory in the North. Might park a nuke armed boat that close but really that is completely contrary to Russian and Chinese nuclear deterant doctrine. You hide those boats behind your own attack subs, within range of your own air cover to protect them in the case of a second strike requirement. To leave those waters is to invite USN to sink the boats and remove your second strike capability.

One of the problems we soldiers see with our navy in the Arctic is that it is mostly seasonal albeit that is changing.

If RCN presence in the arctic is seasonal guess what else is seasonal. Everyone else's naval presence.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

The 500,000 is to show the extent of the issue. They can arm some of them and you would not know which. 100 of those vessels with nets between them could be quite the obstacle.
If a combined Chinese/Russians landing took place in the Canadian arctic archipelago, it would be under the guise of a civilian "research team". Keeping in mind they could start at it while all our ships are still waiting for the ice to lessen.

This is one way China harasses Taiwan, I have no doubt they use all sorts of non-military assets to achieve their goals

 

[Edward Campbell]

It's important to recall that BOTH the MCDV and the AOPS were political ships - both the requirement and the money came from came from the political centre (PMO, PCO, TB). We, the CF, tried to use the $$$ as wisely as we, engineer in the main, could. I was in the room for the MCDV discussions and decisions; I have heard that the4 AOPS discussions were not dissimilar.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

IMHO, the navy has far too few combat capable vessels. It has thrown all of its eggs into a single and very expensive vessel.

Any military force has to work under the presumption that war will come and that combat systems will be necessary. Will they have peacetime missions in the interval? Of course they will but those can be performed by ships built for war.

Somehow, I see these two statements as contradictory, FJAG.

If I went by the apparent logic of the second statement, I would think you would want an Army made up of MBT's only, because jeeps, G-Wagons, logistics trucks and Hummers are all not capable combat systems. Not every ship in the navy has to be a front line combatant. All ships in the Navy are to be built and armed according to their intended purpose - no more.

As for the first statement, the Navy may have put all its eggs into a single design, as expensive as every body else's ships of similar type, but we are getting 15 such ships, which is not, repeat, not an insignificant number of front line ships for any navy, baring the US or China. In fact, Russia only has 20 ships of similar capability or more, the Royal Navy itself only has 15 such ships and the French Navy 10.

 

[dapaterson]

It's important to recall that BOTH the MCDV and the AOPS were political ships - both the requirement and the money came from came from the political centre (PMO, PCO, TB). We, the CF, tried to use the $$$ as wisely as we, engineer in the main, could. I was in the room for the MCDV discussions and decisions; I have heard that the4 AOPS discussions were not dissimilar.

Precisely. AOPS was a political decision to give a political presence in the Arctic. With the added bonus of helping to ramp up ISI in advance of the CSC.

 

[suffolkowner]

In my opinion you don't need to turn the AOPS into a Frigate in order to make it useful during heightened tensions or an actual conflict.

As other have noted we're not about to see a Chinese or Russian invasion armada appearing over the horizon any time soon. However, enemy submarines and covert surveillance vessels are certainly a possibility. There are a number of ways that the AOPS could be useful in helping to counter those threats:

• Serve as a mothership for UUVs to help monitor our vast maritime domain (including the ability to recharge XLUUV's without them needing to surface)
• Deploy a containerized towed sonar to add another node to our maritime sensor net.
• Deploy UAVs to monitor suspect shipping. There's even an MQ-8C Firescout variant that's been tested with a sonobuoy dispenser.
• If there were concerns about a missile threat in our Arctic AO then a containerized AD missile system could be placed on the deck (@Kirkhill has posted many variants of these).

None of these would require any major modifications to the AOPS but they would be capabilities we'd need to purchase in advance and train for in order to be effective.

As @Rainbow1910 mentioned up-thread, you could replace the current 25mm with the same 30mm as the CSC (and gain air-burst ammo as an option) and the .50 mounts could be replaced with a RWS.

Constabulary vessels are definitely required and no, they don't have to be seriously up-gunned to be useful, but in these times of increased tension and risk of conflict I think the RCN needs to look at finding ways to increase its combat power. To my mind this could be done with things like UUV's and unmanned/minimally-manned arsenal ships, etc. rather than be radically re-building the AOPS.

probably going to be pressure to use the AOPS for more and more as the years count down to the first couple of CSC's coming online in the 30's as well as maybe resistance to do so out of worry that the CSC project will be curtailed

Also wasnt the Svalbard designed to have a 57mm?

 

[FJAG]

Somehow, I see these two statements as contradictory, FJAG.

What I was suggesting was that one can build an AOPS which, for example, is designed from the start fitted for air defence but not necessarily having the missiles deployed nor the weapons systems operators deployed during peacetime. However, the missiles can be held in inventory and trained crew held in reserve to be deployed to the ships when required. Regardless of the role of the ship, once badged RCN it becomes a viable target and should be able to add firepower to the fleet.

I have zero argument with the CSC.

Incidentally I don't disagree entirely with what you say about the army's vehicle fleets. While there is clearly a need for a B vehicle fleet for logistics and various other administrative functions, the army has also invested in too many vehicles which are not suitable for the assigned combat/near combat function - The TAPV is a prime example and the LUVW (in it's pseudo recce role) is another.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

What I was suggesting was that one can build an AOPS which, for example, is designed from the start fitted for air defence but not necessarily having the missiles deployed nor the weapons systems operators deployed during peacetime. However, the missiles can be held in inventory and trained crew held in reserve to be deployed to the ships when required. Regardless of the role of the ship, once badged RCN it becomes a viable target and should be able to add firepower to the fleet.

I have zero argument with the CSC.

Incidentally I don't disagree entirely with what you say about the army's vehicle fleets. While there is clearly a need for a B vehicle fleet for logistics and various other administrative functions, the army has also invested in too many vehicles which are not suitable for the assigned combat/near combat function - The TAPV is a prime example and the LUVW (in it's pseudo recce role) is another.

That is a very army centric view of how warships and naval warfare works.

 

[KevinB]

My question is more on the ‘constabulary’ role, and given the size of the RCN fleet. I would think that maybe in times of limited budget and crews, that role is perhaps not necessary to be held by the RCN.

I’m not disagreeing with AOPS, but I see that role is probably best held by the CCG.

Given that the RCN has issues crewing the CPF’s that can put to sea, and with the two JSS and 15 CSC coming down the pipe, I just cannot understand how the RCN will crew all these ships.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Non-RCN person here, but the AOPS strikes me as a useful ship. The RCN is an important aspect of maintaining our arctic sovereignty. I was working on the Arctic file for the Army, and one way to view our arctic is indeed as an archipelago. All the services have an important role to play and that is one reason why we have Joint Task Force North (JTFN). Ships and aircraft are the main methods of operational movement, and the AOPS design is quite good for that. Op NANOOK has four related activities, one of which is RCN-focused. Op NANOOK TUUGAALIK demonstrates the RCN's capability to maintain presence and surveillance in the arctic, and the AOPS have begun to be incorporated into that. The assets of our allies are also incorporated into the NANOOK series.

The AOPS can, though, patrol our arctic archipelago for more time of the year than was possible before the introduction of the class to the RCN. Having a bigger gun or a missile suite would not materially contribute to fulfilling the role of the ship. Capabilities that increase the surveillance and presence reach of the ship, though, would likely be worthwhile investments.

Anyhoo.