Altenative Ideas on "I see a Role for MGS"

[warrickdll]

We can talk about the role that the MGS may have found in the WoT and in Afghanistan, but we also have other options to the MGS and who should employ/crew it.  I don't believe it is an Armour role to crew and deploy the MGS if its' main role in life will be to support the Infantry in mostly a Defensive role.
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I can't see the MGS or any other DFS vehicle having, as its main role, supporting Infantry in the Defensive. The DFS vehicle will be used like the LAV-III would be used once the infantry dismounted - but with a more powerful weapon and with more versatility. And in all aspects of operations, after all, the LAV-III isn't restricted to a static defensive role. The DFS vehicle would also provide the same weapon support to any Armoured recce mission that required it.

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I can not see it being used by Armour in the Advance as an option in Tank on Tank scenarios. 
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No, but who does? However, as the DFS vehicle for the Infantry in the Advance (a much more likely scenario as we currently have no Tanks overseas), or as the DFS vehicle for Armoured recce on the flanks or out front during the Advance

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I look at it as being an Infantry Wpn, much the same as the TOW, Assault Gun, and Anti-Tank Gun were in the past.  The use of it in Convoy Escort, does not automatically make it an Armour role, just as a Section or Platoon of Infantry in the Escort does not make them Armour.  The MGS is more in line of what the TOW was to the Infantry Bn than what a Tank was to an Armd Regt. 
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Sure, both the Infantry and Artillery have, in the past, crewed AT guns, but the Armoured hasn't always crewed only MBTs. Even now the Armoured crew the Armoured recce (hardly the Iron Fist role of the MBT), and previously the Armoured crewed the Infantry/Close Support Tanks. I don't think Infantry should be fighting vehicle specialists; an infantryman will need to know whatever vehicle their battalion uses, but it doesn't change their core competency.

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Currently there is a Turreted 120mm Mortar version of the LAV III.  It has a very high profile, and perhaps serious 'roll-over' concerns.  What is to say we can't have a 120mm Mortar version, without turret, along the same lines as our former 81mm Mortar Bisons?  With the improved munitions for the 120 mm Mortar, it has become a very versatile tool.  It could offer more to an Infantry Bn, and in fact an Armour Regt, than the MGS ever could.  They would be just as deadly, if not more so, than the MGS in a Convoy Escort in Afghanistan.  They would be able to drop rounds in behind the enemy in the hills.  They would be able to provide "Guided" Munitions to troops equipped with Laser Designators.  They offer good Range.  They could provide illumination, both White Light and IR, at night.  All things that the MGS is incapable of doing effectively.
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A 120mm has a couple of other drawbacks in this role, the first being that it has an extremely limited DF AT ability when turreted (and none when not turreted), the second being that the exotic rounds are not exactly main stream at the moment. I like the idea of a mobile 120mm mortar to complement the DFS vehicle (or any mobile force).

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In Suffield during RV 85, all the Canadian Armour Regiments passed their Cougar Trained people through our C Sqn Tanks for a Live Fire Ex.  They had done Leo Dvr and Gnry Courses and now had the opportunity to put those skills to work.  They had all of Suffield to spread out and do the Trace, but most insisted on parking bumper to bumper to each othe in the advance, keeping a frontage of about 250 m max instead of 2.5 km as they could easily have done.  They also had problems with judging distances in their shoots and taking very short bounds, closing the Ranges to Tgts to much less than they required.  They picked up a lot of bad habits on the Cougars.  They also did not have the feel for where a Track could go and where Wheels shouldn't go.

Perhaps that is part of the problem - as I understand it, the Cougar was a trainer that evolved into DFS - but the MGS is not a training vehicle, it is meant for DFS. A crewman would have no more bad habits than they would crewing a Coyote.

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In the end, are we creating a role for a piece of kit that could easily be replaced by better kit, and crewed by more appropriate troops?

The role was always there but, like the Grenade Launcher, it was on vacation from the CF (or at least wrapped up in the almost never deployed MBT). To have a 90/105/120 mounted on a LAV-III type chassis is not a bad idea (whether the MGS or not). And crewed by more appropriate troops? - even though the Infantry has shown its versatility in the past - so has the Armoured. Would it really be that difficult to see Armoured DFS troops deployed to support Infantry Tasks given that Armoured recce squadrons already do?

Alternatives? Anything wheeled and carrying a 105 gun.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I envision the MGS for engaging soft targets as well as hard targets.  Especially soft targets.

I am trying to focus on figuring out how best to employ the kit that we have or are likely to get.  Cutting off one's nose to spite one's face is not, perhaps, the best response to MGS.  This is not to say that I as a tanker I was enthused with the idea of MGS.  While I have certainly voiced doubts about MGS and DFS (its all searchable), I have also tried to keep an open mind.  I now do see a viable role, and I also see a role for the Armoured Corps in that.

In the case of MGS and this theatre, I actually see it as a pretty good fit.  The LAV III/Coyote/Bison deal is certainly working out.  Adding the 105mm gun for direct fire would give the team some additional punch for a variety of situations.  I'd also like an 81mm mortar carrier back in the mix, but the M777 is doing great so far.

Cheers,

2B

 

[George Wallace]

2Bravo

Remember, this is not the "I see a Role for MGS" thread, but the "Alternative" thread.

The MGS has several rather serious limitations.  We have covered them in detail in other Topics on the subject.  Some of our concerns were the limited number of rounds it carried, the problems with the carousel and auto-loader, the lack of an AA gun up top and the actual ability to have one due to turret design, and probably the most important the lack of 'Situation Awareness'.  'Situation Awareness' is a serious concern.  If the only thing that the Commander and Gunner can both see is a target directly to the front, there is a very serious problem.  With the Commander's visibility being less than 180 degrees on one side of the Gun and the Gunner's being less than 180 degrees on the other, plus the fact that there probably is a 10 to 60 degree arc to the rear that is all 'Dead Space' to them, we do not have a good vehicle for Armour type of movement in a Combat Zone.  A better alternative would be one of the alternatives put forward by a_majoor with the CV_CT family of turrets.

The problems with the MGS turret, are why I see it more as a DFS vehicle for the Infantry.  I see it being more of a static vehicle, with an observer in an OP or outside of the vehicle on a "Tank/Infantry Telephone" directing fire and giving situation awareness to the crew.

I see the 120 mm Mortar with it's improved munitions as actually being a vehicle for Artillery, Infantry and Armour to be employed by all in their DS roles.

When it comes to Convoys, we are already seeing the introduction of 'Gun Trucks' which are being crewed by Loggies and MPs. 

The MGS has not been purchased yet.  Like many other DND purchases, it too can be turned off before it goes into production, even after, and replace it with a better piece of kit.  I won't get into how often that has been done in the past, but I am sure everyone has a prominent piece of kit in their mind that we were going to get and never did.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Seen.  I shall try to refrain from discussing the MGS in a positive light in this thread.

 

[DG-41]

I don't think that's the intent of this thread; bash MGS.

I hear that you think that there's a place for a LAV-based, large-gun, direct fire platform.

The fact that you are in theatre (yes?) and so 1) can accurately assess LAV mobility in theatre conditions and 2) know the sort of fire support you want better than any of us keyboard jockeys carries a lot of weight with me.

The questions I have are:

1) Given that what you are asking for sounds a lot like a "King Cougar" (Cougar on a LAV chassis, 105mm gun, better fire control) does MGS actually fulfill those requirements?

2) If not, what are the alternatives?

3) Can the experience with Cougar teach us anything?

I *think* that the LAV chassis "solves" Cougar's mobility problems - certainly LAV is a better platform than AVGP, mobility-wise. But are there other lessons to be learned from Cougar? Particularly, operationally-deployed Cougars?

DG

 

[George Wallace]

I wonder if an Engineer varient with a 152mm gun/launcher can fire Shillelagh Anti-Tank Missile, along the lines of the M60A2 ( http://www.battletanks.com/m60a2.htm ) would be a move in the right direction for FIBUA/MOOT?  Capable of firing HE or missiles. 

 

[Armymatters]

I wonder if an Engineer varient with a 152mm gun/launcher can fire Shillelagh Anti-Tank Missile, along the lines of the M60A2 ( http://www.battletanks.com/m60a2.htm ) would be a move in the right direction for FIBUA/MOOT?  Capable of firing HE or missiles. 

The Shillelagh missile and the 152mm gun that fired it was an expensive failure. It was big, which prevented large loads of ammunition in the related M551 Sheridan. Typical loads consisted of only 8 missiles and 20 M409 HEAT rounds. In addition the missile proved to have a very long minimum range due to the layout of the vehicle, the missile didn't come into the sight of the gun/tracker system until it was 2400 ft from the vehicle, at which point it could start to be guided. Since the M409 had a maximum range of about 2000 ft, the system was left with a fairly large "dead zone".

For the M60A2 platform, the turret proved to be overly complex, and prone to failure. Troops who were fielded the M60A2 for the brief time it was in service (between 1973 and 1981) sarcastically referred to the design as the "Starship". The turrets were immediately scrapped, and the hulls were reconfigured to the A3 standard, with the normal L7 105mm gun.

I am thinking more of the Israeli LAHAT missile that can be fired out of MGS or any other 105mm or 120mm tank gun. It also fits well with low pressure systems fitted in vehicles like the Centauro, or the AMX-10RC. The modifications to the vehicle are fairly basic, as the laser rangefinder needs to be replaced with LRF/laser designator module, and you need to program the fire control computer with the LAHAT programming. The missile is stored and handled like any other round.
http://www.defense-update.com/directory/lahat.htm

 

[George Wallace]

Actually a large bore gun system for the Engineers or as a 'Specialty' item for Armour would come in handy for 'Bunker Busting' and fighting in Urban Areas. 

Seeing as you have brought up the Sheridan, we have come a long way since its' first inception, and we have seen improved munitions, missile systems and technology that could be put into production cheaply.  The Sheridan, in fact came back into service with the Airborne Forces Recon Bns. 

With the loss of the Badgers, Bibers, and other heavy Engineer assets, the Engineers are without much of their former capabilities.  They need their LAV III variants to be robust and versatile.  A large bore gun/launcher would be an asset to them.  Think of what a system like this could do if it had Thermobaric Rds.  http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2002/020826-thermobaric.htm

 

[a_majoor]

Our manoeuvres across the Internet have brought us in a big circle, even to the point of passing threads on regimental reorganization, combined arms units, Should the LAV III be Canada's sole armoured vehicle etc.

I will suggest that vehicles (of any sort) be manned by the employing unit, so Infantry units with Fire Support Vehicles (FSVs), missile carriers and SP mortars have them in the combat support company (or integrated in the rifle companies). In an armoured unit, FSVs might find a role in the Recce squadron (overwatch of the mud recce vehicles), while the mortar carriers would be in the assault troop. A Cavalry Regiment would have a mix of FSVs, LAV III, and mortar carriers (maybe missile carriers) in each "Cavalry Team", and engineers would use LAV IIIs as section carriers, and light engineer vehicles (maybe with a low velocity cannon or rocket launcher for breaching and demolition work).

The only common denominator is the crews of these vehicles all wear the same cap badges inside the unit. There is no reason to say a FSV (or mortar carrier or missile carrier or troop carrier) is Corps specific, these are tools which can be used in differing proportions for differing jobs. The strength of the unit lies in unity of command and the strength of interpersonal relationships forged through common experiences, not the particular tools they use. I will submit a battlegroup built around a unified battalion (or Armoured or Cavalry regiment) will be far stronger and more effective than a "mix n match" battlegroup built around disparate company sized sub units, even if they show up equipped with more powerful weaponry.

I have read examples of British units in WW I disintegrating because they were reconstituted from individuals (the principle of the "Full Breakfast Table") while Dominion (Canadian and Australian) units were far more cohesive because members of a unit always returned to a unit (paraphrased from "Haig's Command : Earl Haig and the Background to the First World War" by Denis Winter). Reading "Not a Good Day to Die : The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda" by Sean Naylor showed the same story almost a century later, the Americans, even equipped with the most powerful weapons and advanced communications gear available to anyone, had a difficult time pulling off an operation in the Sha-i-kot valley since their troops were drawn from all kinds of different units and commands, used multiple SOPs and TTPs and ultimately had a fragmented chain of command, preventing them from applying their combat power effectively.

So in the end, the issue isn't so much what the troops are using, but rather the organizational model which allows them to use the tools to the maximum effect. (Shameless self promotion: read this for a full explanation of the thesis: http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_06/iss_3/CAJ_vol6.3_12_e.pdf).

 

[Infanteer]

The only common denominator is the crews of these vehicles all wear the same cap badges inside the unit. There is no reason to say a FSV (or mortar carrier or missile carrier or troop carrier) is Corps specific, these are tools which can be used in differing proportions for differing jobs. The strength of the unit lies in unity of command and the strength of interpersonal relationships forged through common experiences, not the particular tools they use. I will submit a battlegroup built around a unified battalion (or Armoured or Cavalry regiment) will be far stronger and more effective than a "mix n match" battlegroup built around disparate company sized sub units, even if they show up equipped with more powerful weaponry.

That is the key to any piece of kit.  The above paragraph is, in my opinion, bang on.

 

[warrickdll]

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I will suggest that vehicles (of any sort) be manned by the employing unit,
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The only common denominator is the crews of these vehicles all wear the same cap badges inside the unit. There is no reason to say a FSV (or mortar carrier or missile carrier or troop carrier) is Corps specific, these are tools which can be used in differing proportions for differing jobs.
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It's a good idea, but keeping in mind that even if maneuver units were fully badged there would still be different trades - a battalion's medics and mechanics are not going to be infantry - what I'm getting at is that even within Armoured or Infantry units there is no reason for not finding infantry, armoured, artillery, or engineer personnel.

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The strength of the unit lies in unity of command and the strength of interpersonal relationships forged through common experiences, not the particular tools they use. I will submit a battlegroup built around a unified battalion (or Armoured or Cavalry regiment) will be far stronger and more effective than a "mix n match" battlegroup built around disparate company sized sub units, even if they show up equipped with more powerful weaponry.
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Reading "Not a Good Day to Die : The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda" by Sean Naylor showed the same story almost a century later, the Americans, even equipped with the most powerful weapons and advanced communications gear available to anyone, had a difficult time pulling off an operation in the Sha-i-kot valley since their troops were drawn from all kinds of different units and commands, used multiple SOPs and TTPs and ultimately had a fragmented chain of command, preventing them from applying their combat power effectively.
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Deploying the preset Battle Groups has few detractors - yet this seldom happens. But even a well balanced Battle Group will not have one of everything organic to it. There are reasons why some subunits are affiliated instead of organic - flexibility, training.

Given the variety of formations the Army ends up deploying it would be in the CF's best interests to ensure there aren't conflicting SOPs or TTPs and that CoC can be maintained even in an ad hoc environment.


And back to the alternatives...

Engineer vehicles with specialty weapons are another system that has taken a vacation from the CF and should be returned, but would not fill the role an MGS type vehicle could.

The TUA covers a significant slice of the AT pie, and would be useful for some anti-emplacement work, but it has obvious limitation once the terrain (or urban area) starts to close in on you.

A gun system is the best option for quick response and cost effective ammunition in the DF role. When the MBT is not around to provide DF then the platform for the gun should be something similar to whatever APC is in use.

Is the MGS too heavy? Does it carry too few rounds? Possibly. But how much more could be done to lower the weight and gain more stowage? Probably these exact same issues are what have led to so many open topped vehicles historically filling this role. Too bad the Recoilless never progressed - or hasn't progressed enough to have an available hyper velocity rocket option - but even then the 105 still would be preferable.

I guess another way this could be approached is with a wheeled 105 artillery vehicle with an enhanced AT capability. It could be rolled up to take care of any DF needs or provide indirect fire support.

 

[a_majoor]

Deploying the preset Battle Groups has few detractors - yet this seldom happens. But even a well balanced Battle Group will not have one of everything organic to it. There are reasons why some subunits are affiliated instead of organic - flexibility, training.

Given the variety of formations the Army ends up deploying it would be in the CF's best interests to ensure there aren't conflicting SOPs or TTPs and that CoC can be maintained even in an ad hoc environment.

The examples I found do not give me a good feeling about the possibility of maintaining a positive CoC in an ad hoc environment. Indeed, based on Sean Naylor's book, the only reason anything was getting done in the Sha-i-kot was many of the senior Army officers knew each other from Ranger training or staff college, which allowed them to use their personal links to overcome difficulty. Note that although virtually ALL American officers go to Ranger training and staff college, the links that were being used were the ones forged between officers who had served together, not mearly been to the same school.

[/quote]
A gun system is the best option for quick response and cost effective ammunition in the DF role. When the MBT is not around to provide DF then the platform for the gun should be something similar to whatever APC is in use.

Is the MGS too heavy? Does it carry too few rounds? Possibly. But how much more could be done to lower the weight and gain more stowage? Probably these exact same issues are what have led to so many open topped vehicles historically filling this role. Too bad the Recoilless never progressed - or hasn't progressed enough to have an available hyper velocity rocket option - but even then the 105 still would be preferable.[/quote]

There are lots of solutions out there, ranging from modifying the MGS, replacing the MGS with a LAV III hull mounting a CV_CT turret, putting some other turret on a LAV hull (for example, the GIAT 90mm turret), or going to an entirly new vehicle like the Rooikat. I am not so sure about recoiless rifle technology, large bore weapns like the old "106" or the British 120mm "Wombat" could pack a huge punch, but were essentially "pumkin launchers" with fairly low muzzle velocities that translated into low(er) range and less ability to attack a moving target. The huge firing signature is a definite minus as well. Maybe developing exotic ideas like the WWII era "High Low pressure gun (PAW 600)" could overcome this.

I guess another way this could be approached is with a wheeled 105 artillery vehicle with an enhanced AT capability. It could be rolled up to take care of any DF needs or provide indirect fire support.

There is a prototype LAV-SP with a 105mm howitzer by Denel which would fit the bill very nicely, but would have the same limitations of any LAV in the DF role (lack of protection)