Air Mobile Army

[Kirkhill]

This may be a tangent to the intent of this thread.

Airmobility - A capability of airmobile forces which permits them to move by air while retaining the ability to engage in ground combat. (NATO AAP-6. 1977-12-01)

Air movement - Air transport of units, personnel, supplies, equipment and materiel. (NATO AAP-6, 1994-11-01)

To focus on this half of the equation for a moment:  Strategic Mobility

In the debate about projecting power we keep running up against Big Honking Ships as we try to recreate the capabilities of June 6 1944.

What happens instead if we were to focus on the period of 24 June 1948 to 12 May 1949 - The Berlin Airlift?

Instead of building floating warehouses for a Billion dollars a pop, or having to find them, charter them, deliver them, load them, move them, unload them, inventory the contents, distribute the contents......

How about using the money to buy an additional 2 to 4 CC-177s at around $200,000,000 a piece?  I assume that we have already bought the infrastructure necessary to support them.

Additionally we could also convert the FWSAR budget into additional CC-130s.  Again I assume we already have the infrastructure.

With a fleet of even 6 CC-177s flying 10 hours a day we would get a conveyor that could shift some 40 loads a week on a 10 hour round trip. 40 loads equates to some 240 160 (Edit to manage the unintentional overload) Bisons or 120 CH-146s.

Equally with a fleet of 32 CC-130s (17 Js and 15 FWSAR Js) also flying 10 hours a day the conveyor would shift over 200 loads a week.  Even at 10 tonne loads (half loading) that moves 2000 tonnes of material.

The existing fleet of 5 CC-150s carrying 194 troops a time would only require 8 round trips of 10 hours to stage 1500 troops forward - leaving 20 to 25 trips available for moving cargo.

I think I am in the ballpark here and perhaps some of the lurking Loadmasters and Pilots can straighten out my numbers.

But.....

If you take those conveyors in conjunction with our new hubs (Jamaica, Spangdahlem, Dakar, Kuwait, Mombasa, Singapore, South Korea) and add to them Trenton and Comox as fixed bases..... see what Barnetts Gap looks like when you draw a 5 hour circle round each of them.

Staging an intervention force forward to a secure Forming Up Point within, let's say, 1000 km of a crisis zone should be well within our capabilities.  From that point on it becomes a question of tactically delivering troops, CH-146s and Bisons into the theatre, possibly contested.  I don't think the risk to Canadian troops would be greater than that experienced during an amphibious assault.

And yes, I am back to having fun with numbers  ;D >

On the other hand somebody just recently commented on the folly of commenting without being able to do arithmetic.....

 

[Journeyman]

There are problems in the system.

But is it the training system, or the need for every layer of command to ass-cover for every remotely conceivable contingency?

 

[dapaterson]

But is it the training system, or the need for every layer of command to ass-cover for every remotely conceivable contingency?

Yes to both.

We under-train in the right things, requiring remedial pre-deployment training to get to where our skills should have been in the first place (this applies equally to the Reg F and the Res F).  We over-train doing IT instead of reducing the IT burden to permit soliders to hone and develop those skills in a collective traiing environment.

We engage in CYA for low-probability instances and ignore lower cost, higher pay-off training becasue it's different from what we've historically done.  We'll continue sending officers on Korean language courses to go to the Korean staff college; we've sent no-one on year-long intensive Dari or Pashto courses in the decade we've been in Afghanistan.

 

[a_majoor]

The question is still "what do we really want to do?"; once that is answered then everything else fall into place.

The strategic mobility of airborne forces provides the ability to reach out and touch someone half a world away; we have demonstrated that this is the preferred option since the 1990's by deploying battlegroups and humanitarian response to places as varied as Africa, former Yugoslavia, Haiti, Indonesia and Afghanistan. (as well as shuttling around Canada for fires and floods).

The upside is you can get large numbers of light troops in quickly for any of the "three block war" deployments, the downside is these troops are "light" and getting the logistics and enablers to bulk them up or sustain them for prolonged deployments is a long and drawn out process. Still, the ability to deploy a battalion suddenly across the lines of communication or a vulnerable flank, or insert into a humanitarian disaster within hours or days of the event can still be a very potent addition to the commander's toolbag.

If we would rather concentrate on tactical mobility and flexibility, then airmobile forces are the way to go, with all the various issues that arise from taking that option. In the ideal world, we would be able to deploy airmobile forces directly from Canada (Globemasters filled with helicopters?), but this would require allocating resources on a scale far beyond our willingness and ability to pay; consider the United States only has two airborne divisions and the former USSR had six; this is with all the resources that superpowers can muster.

Based on this rather limited assessment; I personally would consider the recreation of a capability like the CAR Battlegroup to be the desired endstate, the ability to project forces across strategic distances seems to be much more useful and in line with the Government's demonstrated preference over the last two decades.

 

[McG]

The strategic mobility of airborne forces provides the ability to reach out and touch someone half a world away; we have demonstrated that this is the preferred option since the 1990's by deploying battlegroups and humanitarian response to places as varied as Africa, former Yugoslavia, Haiti, Indonesia and Afghanistan. (as well as shuttling around Canada for fires and floods).

What is the "this" that has been demonstrated as the preferred option?  We did not use Airborne operations in any of these places.

 

[GnyHwy]

I think he is using G2G's post above,  the NATO definition of airborne.

Airborne - An adjective used to describe troops specially trained to carry out operations, either by paradrop or air landing, following an air movement.  (NATO AAP-6, 2001-10-01)

Airmobile operation - An operation in which combat forces and their equipment manoeuvre about the battlefield by aircraft to engage in ground combat. (NATO AAP-6, 1992-11-01)

Airmobility - A capability of airmobile forces which permits them to move by air while retaining the ability to engage in ground combat. (NATO AAP-6. 1977-12-01)

Air movement - Air transport of units, personnel, supplies, equipment and materiel. (NATO AAP-6, 1994-11-01)

Those definitions are pretty loose.  One could even read them as, transporting a rifle squad by Cessna to a fight would qualify by those definitions.

I think the reality is, we will not see a BG size air mobile or airborne force unless WWIII breaks out.  We are more likely and hopefully going to see Cbt Tm size elements, which I believe is in reach.

I question our policy though.  Understanding that the Airforce is already tasked, but if they weren't, would an Army Comd be able to task them anyway?

Bde Comds have aviation wings right on their bases, doctronally part of their Bde,  maybe even a few 100 metres away from the office, but I doubt they could task them.  The doctrine supports it, but our current situation and policy does not.

Can an Army Comd even accept responsibility for aviation or does that lie with 1 Can Div?

If we were ever to have an effective airmobile force, policy and command relationships would have to be adjusted.

 

[Good2Golf]

I think he is using G2G's post above,  the NATO definition of airborne.

Those definitions are pretty loose.  One could even read them as, transporting a rifle squad by Cessna to a fight would qualify by those definitions.

GH, yes they are indeed rather "loose", but that's what you get when you need to get agreement amongst all nations within an alliance, and to be honest, there's no reason to have a doctrinal definition any more precise, as the specifics of the execution of such capability will necessarily depend upon the specifics of the operation.  Yes, a rifle squad dropped into a battle on a Cessna Skymaster would indeed be an airmobile operation, as would be the discrete insertion of a long range patrol by helicopter somewhere within the battlespace.

I think the reality is, we will not see a BG size air mobile or airborne force unless WWIII breaks out.  We are more likely and hopefully going to see Cbt Tm size elements, which I believe is in reach.

I agree. 

For the foreseeable future, we would likely never see a full-size BG airmobile using our own assets, and even if we were operating in a theatre with more airmobility assets, the likelihood of a situation requiring the specific benefits of air mobility weighed against the risks of doing so, would be pretty rare indeed...Div-level deliberate crossing?  Maybe.  What would be the odds of that?

I question our policy though.  Understanding that the Airforce is already tasked, but if they weren't, would an Army Comd be able to task them anyway?

Bde Comds have aviation wings right on their bases, doctronally part of their Bde,  maybe even a few 100 metres away from the office, but I doubt they could task them.  The doctrine supports it, but our current situation and policy does not.

Can an Army Comd even accept responsibility for aviation or does that lie with 1 Can Div?

Indeed, they (most Bde Comds) can task Tac Hel units.  The respective G3 Avn's at each brigade can task the associated Tac Hel Sqn directly (less 2 CMBG which cannot task 427 SOAS directly), per existing command relationships between 1 Wing and its units and the Army's brigades.

If we were ever to have an effective airmobile force, policy and command relationships would have to be adjusted.

I'm not sure it has to, to be honest.  With the upcoming stand-up of the Chinook squadron in Petawawa, the return of a conventional aviation unit into the brigade direct tasking chain will close the circle on airmobility availability/development within the Canadian Army, and "that's a good thing!"


Cheers
G2G

 

[SixFishSticks]

From what I've seen 2CMBG is really on the lead/pushing the Airborne/Air Mobile piece - 2CER and 2RCHA each have XX amount of pers jump qualified/tasked with supporting the 3RCR Jump Coy. I know C Bty 1RCHA is tasked with supporting 3VP Jump Coy, not sure if 1CER has a specific troop tasked with supporting 3VP Jump Coy though

So C-bty in 1 RCHA is tasked with supporting 3VP eh... The STA bty lol you might want to double check your facts.
I suppose on paper maybe. But as for it actually happening haha

p.s. I really wish it was though maybe i could get a decent course haha

 

[MikeL]

So C-bty in 1 RCHA is tasked with supporting 3VP eh... The STA bty lol you might want to double check your facts.
I suppose on paper maybe. But as for it actually happening haha

p.s. I really wish it was though maybe i could get a decent course haha

OK so my info was a bit outdated it looks like, when I was with 1 Bde(atleast last I heard about C Bty) and before you were a Gunner, C Bty 1 RCHA did have casual jumpers and did work with the Jump Coy.
http://www.mdn.ca/site/commun/ml-fe/article-eng.asp?id=2579

If it's not C Bty now, does 1RCHA have any troops within a Bty that are jumpers to support 3VP Jump Coy?  I know 1RCHA is still sending guys on Basic Para, I would assume they still want/need guys qualified to jump in with the Jump Coy when needed, but I guess it could be just to allow guys to get their wings and nothing more.

Although the majority of candidates were from 3 PPCLI, there was still a great deal of representation from within 1 CMBG including 1 CER, 1 RCHA, and 1 Fld Amb, due to the fact that there is a push to qualify a great deal of enablers for Ex Arctic Ram,

http://www.army.gc.ca/iaol/143000440001977/143000440001978/index-Eng.html

 

[McG]

What is the "this" that has been demonstrated as the preferred option?  We did not use Airborne operations in any of these places.

I think he is using G2G's post above,  the NATO definition of airborne.

It does appear he is talking about Airborne forces, but that cannot be what "this" referrs - it would be axiomatically wrong if his statement were re-written to insert "Airborne" in place of the pronoun "this."

The strategic mobility of airborne forces provides the ability to reach out and touch someone half a world away; we have demonstrated that Airborne is the preferred option since the 1990's by deploying battlegroups and humanitarian response to places as varied as Africa, former Yugoslavia, Haiti, Indonesia and Afghanistan. (as well as shuttling around Canada for fires and floods).

Having not used airborne operations in any of the identified palces, they have not been demonstrated as the prefered option.  Even where we have used air movement as the reach into a theatre of operations, there has always been a significant amount of staging that takes place at the air head.

 

[GnyHwy]

I'm not sure it has to, to be honest.  With the upcoming stand-up of the Chinook squadron in Petawawa, the return of a conventional aviation unit into the brigade direct tasking chain will close the circle on airmobility availability/development within the Canadian Army, and "that's a good thing!"

Cheers
G2G

Yes, that is a good thing, and good to hear.

So C-bty in 1 RCHA is tasked with supporting 3VP eh... The STA bty lol you might want to double check your facts.
I suppose on paper maybe. But as for it actually happening haha

p.s. I really wish it was though maybe i could get a decent course haha

Don't just hack him.  Give him the right answer.  I'm sure there are plenty of jumpers/helops guys kicking around.  What Bty are they in?

OK so my info was a bit outdated it looks like, when I was with 1 Bde(atleast last I heard about C Bty) and before you were a Gunner, C Bty 1 RCHA did have casual jumpers and did work with the Jump Coy.
http://www.mdn.ca/site/commun/ml-fe/article-eng.asp?id=2579

If it's not C Bty now, does 1RCHA have any troops within a Bty that are jumpers to support 3VP Jump Coy?  I know 1RCHA is still sending guys on Basic Para, I would assume they still want/need guys qualified to jump in with the Jump Coy when needed, but I guess it could be just to allow guys to get their wings and nothing more.
http://www.army.gc.ca/iaol/143000440001977/143000440001978/index-Eng.html

You are correct with the above statements.  I am not sure about the current capabilities of 1 RCHA to support 3VP, but I am sure there a few guys kicking around that are qualified and at least thinking about it.

 

[rampage800]

What Skeletor mentioned was absolutely correct but that was a little while ago (6 years or so). Z Bty provides the jump FOO/JTAC capability now for 3VP (and almost all the jumpers for the exercises and cas-para events) and the Mortar Tp is going to be a combined effort from A and B Bty much in the same context as C-Bty did before.

 

[Loachman]

Bde Comds have aviation wings

Squadrons

right on their bases, doctronally part of their Bde,

They are not doctrinally parts of brigades, although they exist to support them with one notable exception: 427 Squadron has belonged to SOFCOM for the last few years, and support to 2 CMBG is rarely provided by 427 Squadron. Even under older and better doctrine of the mid-eighties, there was only a dotty line between Tac Hel Squadrons and Brigades. 444 Squadron was the sole exception, as it was actually a 4 CMBG unit.

If we were ever to have an effective airmobile force, policy and command relationships would have to be adjusted.

Yes. Tac Hel would have to be liberated from the a** f**ce and restored to the Army.

Indeed, they (most Bde Comds) can task Tac Hel units.  The respective G3 Avn's at each brigade can task the associated Tac Hel Sqn directly (less 2 CMBG which cannot task 427 SOAS directly), per existing command relationships between 1 Wing and its units and the Army's brigades.

Not anymore. CMBG submissions for support come to 1 Wing HQ for tasking.

With the upcoming stand-up of the Chinook squadron in Petawawa, the return of a conventional aviation unit into the brigade direct tasking chain will close the circle on airmobility availability/development within the Canadian Army, and "that's a good thing!"

Under mid-eighties doctrine, Chinooks were a Corps-level resource, and would not have been employed in airmobile operations in the sense of delivering troops into combat - they would not have survived near the FEBA. Even our Twin Hueys were restricted to administrative moves on our side of the FEBA due to lack of AH and CAS support.

In a permissive environment, such as Afghanistan, Chinooks were obviously extremely valuable in the airmobile role. In a future conventional war, against a country/alliance with a significant military capability, they would not be.

They were, unfortunately, bought for "the" war rather than for "a" war.

 

[Good2Golf]

Not anymore. CMBG submissions for support come to 1 Wing HQ for tasking.

Okay, the CMBG G3 Avn passes the HELQUEST direct to 1 Wing HQ which failing any reason to say no to using the CMBG's allocated YFR, says yes.

Under mid-eighties doctrine, Chinooks were a Corps-level resource, and would not have been employed in airmobile operations in the sense of delivering troops into combat - they would not have survived near the FEBA. Even our Twin Hueys were restricted to administrative moves on our side of the FEBA due to lack of AH and CAS support.

Using doctrine a third of a century old, yes, MTH = Corps asset.

Using current Army and Aviation doctrine, however, the MTH is a formation-level resource that can be assigned to unit-level operations.

In a permissive environment, such as Afghanistan, Chinooks were obviously extremely valuable in the airmobile role. In a future conventional war, against a country/alliance with a significant military capability, they would not be.

Airmobility has a place in all parts of the spectrum of operations, up to, and including major combat operations (MCO).  Where required, the appropriate enablers would be assigned/coordinated to support an airmobile operation.

They were, unfortunately, bought for "the" war rather than for "a" war.

Totally unfounded statement.  Not the case at all.


Regards
G2G

 

[Tuna]

In a permissive environment, such as Afghanistan, Chinooks were obviously extremely valuable in the airmobile role. In a future conventional war, against a country/alliance with a significant military capability, they would not be.

I am not sure about that statement, however from my knowledge of how the Chinooks have been used in Afghanistan they are somewhere between a mini Hercules and a flying LAV. If this is true  then we shouldn't have much of a problem finding a use for them in the future.  :2c: ... please correct me if I am wrong on that one

 

[aesop081]

If this is true  then we shouldn't have much of a problem finding a use for them in the future. 

He didn't say we wouldn't have a use for them, just that we likely would not be able to use them in the way we have in Afghanistan. There is a difference there.

 

[Zoomie]

Plenty of use for Hooks in Canada.  We are trying to expand our use of the Arctic - heavy helo lift will be in short supply up there.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Plenty of use for Hooks in Canada.  We are trying to expand our use of the Arctic - heavy helo lift will be in short supply up there.

I'm pretty sure that heavy helis will be the main reason why we can claim to 'own' our own piece of the arctic. Without them, there's precious little else to get enough of us, with our gear, into remote places from distant bases at short notice.

 

[a_majoor]

I'm pretty sure that heavy helis will be the main reason why we can claim to 'own' our own piece of the arctic. Without them, there's precious little else to get enough of us, with our gear, into remote places from distant bases at short notice.

Getting there from remote bases like Trenton or Edmonton reqires the range and speed of fixed wing aircraft; another squadron of C-130j's or C-17's and enough infrastructure to at least land, offload and fly out.

The Chinooks would be a great addition to existing formations/bases already in the arctic, and to provide tactical and operational mobility to units operating in theater, but they do not have the sort of range to self deploy from southern Canada on a timely basis.

 

[Zoomie]

but they do not have the sort of range to self deploy from southern Canada on a timely basis.

I don't think that QRF Hooks are in the future - especially out of Pet.  But....  we tend to plan our Ops well in advance, it would only take 2 days to get a fleet of Hooks flown up to Resolute (maybe three). 

In the case of MAJAID - the initial onslaught of HE and crunchies from Trenton and other SAR MOBs would be enough to sustain the effort until follow-on Hooks (and Shags) made their way north to help.  Op Hurricane (Op Nevus?) originally used Hooks when we had them, they would be a welcome sight back in Eureka no doubt.