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Africa in Crisis- The Merged Superthread

This topic was being discussed in the “What Army After A’stan” thread, before it got derailed and locked up.

Here, reproduced under the fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from the Globe and Mail are Canadian historian (and sometimes Army.ca member) Jack Granatstein’s thoughts on why a mission to Congo is doomed to fail:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/defining-canadas-role-in-congo/article1525307/
Defining Canada's role in Congo
Yes to peacekeeping, but only if there's a firm UN mandate, full UN support and a real role to play

J.L. Granatstein

From Wednesday's Globe and Mail
Published on Wednesday, Apr. 07, 2010

In the past two weeks, there have been rumbles in the Ottawa jungles that the Harper government might be interested in sending troops to take part in the United Nations mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Chief of the Defence Staff was said to be telling the troops that Canada's next overseas mission was in Africa; the departing Chief of the Land Staff, Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, was tipped to be the Congo force's commander. There was even a hot rumour that the Governor-General was to visit Kinshasa, the capital.

Certainly, Congo is a disaster – a huge country the size of Europe, with a corrupt government ruling its 70 million people, with genocidal tribal slaughters, rapacious mining companies scooping up everything in sight, and neighbours trying to bite off chunks of territory and population for their own purposes. The UN first went into Congo in 1960, with Canadian signallers providing its communications, and UN forces fought a war against separatist elements. They have been there again for more than a decade, with 22,500 people on the ground, mainly provided by African nations.

MONUC, as the UN force is dubbed in French, is underfunded and undersupplied, and has been neither competent militarily nor effective in halting the violence that is estimated to have killed more than five million Congolese since 1999. Moreover, as so often is the case with UN missions, the mandate is fuzzy, its political support in New York doubtful. Many also consider the UN troops in-country to be part of the problem, and charges of corruption and rape have been levelled against them. And even though MONUC has supported the Kinshasa government, President Joseph Kabila has demanded that the UN leave Congo by mid-2011.

Should Canada involve itself in this horrifying mess? There seems no doubt that Canadians continue to believe that Canada is uniquely gifted in peacekeeping. Lester Pearson's Nobel Peace Prize, the 60-year-long record of service in UN missions, and the popular sense that doing good is what the Canadian Forces should be doing all make UN service hugely popular. And with the Canadian Forces now set to pull out of Afghanistan by 2011 – an unpopular commitment (even though UN-authorized) because it involves killing and being killed and supporting the United States – what better way to re-establish our national bona fides than by taking over a UN peacekeeping force.

An Ipsos Reid poll last September found popular support for Canada's military to be a force that does only peacekeeping. The NDP, the Bloc Québécois, large elements of the Liberal Party and the peace movement speak as one on this: Government funding has made the Canadian Forces capable again, so why not use them for peace in a nation that is bleeding to death?

But hold on a moment. There's no doubt that Congo is a basket case, a perfect example of a failed state ruled for the benefit of a corrupt leadership and the corporations that loot it. But before we jump in, we need to remember a few things. The first is that the Congolese government wants the UN forces out. The second is that UN willingness to finance MONUC is shaky at best, and there's no guarantee that the countries that pay the bill might not accede to Congo's demands and support withdrawal.

Then there are the peculiarly Canadian factors. The members of the Canadian Forces are white, and that's never a plus in Congo. They are a Western force that needs roads and mobility to operate effectively, that requires a high standard of logistical support, and that has small numbers at its disposal. Congo is huge and, in the eastern regions where much of the killing goes on, there's no infrastructure. One Canadian officer who knows the country well says it can take five days to drive 100 kilometres in Orientale province in the rainy season.

What this means is that, if the Canadian Forces go into Congo, they will need fleets of helicopters, potable water and a secure supply line. Where's that to come from? Moreover, there are local armies aplenty operating all across Congo, some well-supplied from neighbouring regimes, and all knowing the terrain better than a bunch of white guys from Come by Chance or Moosonee. They will fight to protect their access to the spoils. In other words, any troops we send are likely to be involved in combat (156 peacekeepers have been killed since MONUC's creation) and will need to be equipped with a full suite of weapons and air mobility. Despite a decade of service in Afghanistan, we still lack sufficient helicopters, and the Canadian Forces won't have them available soon.

So peacekeeping, yes. But only if there's a firm UN mandate, full UN support, and a role that the Canadian Forces can play. Unfortunately, that's not in Congo.

J.L. Granatstein is a historian and senior research fellow at the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute

I agree with Prof. Granatstein, but he knows that the UN cannot, even if it was so inclined, agree to the sorts of common sense ‘terms’ he demands, and he also knows that Canada has no strategy beyond doing whatever might make the polls move in the government’s favour. He must also know that Congo is probably the CF’s next mission and that it will be harder, dirtier and bloodier than Afghanistan, and Canadians will turn against it, too.
 
1)  From the Canadian Press, LGEN Leslie says "I go where they send me":
The soon-to-be-departing commander of the Canadian army isn't about to retire, but Lt.-Gen. Andrew Leslie wouldn't say Wednesday whether his next assignment will involve a peacekeeping mission in the Congo.

Leslie, speaking publicly for the first time since word of his forthcoming departure sparked speculation about his future, said it's up the chief of defence staff and the defence minister to tell him what's next.

"No soldier gets to pick his or her next job," Leslie said in an interview with The Canadian Press following a nearly four-day visit to Kandahar. "When they're ready, they'll let me know."

Leslie also wouldn't bite on questions about just how seriously Ottawa is contemplating a UN request for a peacekeeping force in the African nation, which has been torn asunder by violence since 1996.

"The government of Canada is the sole authority and will decide where their Armed Forces will be used," he said after a tour of front-line Canadian bases, his last as head of the army ....

2)  These monthly summaries of what's up in DRC from the International Crisis Group, a think tank keeping track of conflicts all over the world (one that a lot of OSINT folks seem to find useful).  March 2010's, as an example:
DPKO head Alain Le Roy and President Kabila 4 March discussed timetable for MONUC pull-out; govt 11 March reiterated call for withdrawal before 2011 elections. DRC ambassador to UN Ileka Atoki 19 March demanded SRSG Alan Doss be replaced, calling him “corrupt”. Govt 11 March announced 271 FDLR rebels “neutralised” during Amani Leo operation. Col. Noboka Rashidi of FDLR splinter wing RUD 22 March surrendered to MONUC, announced hopes 400 FDLR/RUD men he commanded in Lubero would follow suit. FARDC 11 March abducted 3 wounded FDLR fighters from MSF-run hospital. Parliament 15 March opened new session: ruling PPRD/AMP advocated extension of president’s term, strongly rejected by opposition. Govt 2 March announced possible trial of FARDC commander Innocent Zimunrinda, accused of mass atrocities in N Kivu. ICC trial of Jean-Pierre Bemba delayed to 5 July after defence lawyers challenged admissibility of case. LRA attacks continued in northeast. Human Rights Watch 28 March reported 321 killed, 250 abducted by LRA in Makombo area, Orientale province, 14-17 Dec 2009; DRC justice minister rejected massacres occurred, said “no more than 25” died.
 
May be PM Harper is waiting for
the NDP, the Bloc Québécois, large elements of the Liberal Party
  and Iggy to stick their oar in, win the vote to committ the CF to this useless mission. Then when the body bags come a lot faster than present, the PM can tell Canadians what we all know: Peacekeeping is a Myth, and The UN is (fill in any derogatory term). The CPC can say to Canadians, see we told you, it's the usual suspects that got us into this mess, not us.

Stay Out of Africa.
 
A bit more background, from the MONUC mission web page:
MONUC remains in Congo because the legacies of a war that claimed some 4 million lives (1998-2003) persist:

    * The illegal expoitation of natural resources continue to fuel internal conflict
    * Ethnic differences and land disputes are unresolved
    * The elected Government has limited impact outside Kinshasa
    * Governance capacity is weak
    * Effective institutions to deliver services and the rule of law are absent
    * Human rights are abused with impunity
    * Corruption is endemic
    * Heavily armed rebels continue to challenge state authority in the east
    * Integration of former rebels into the FARDC is incomplete
    * Root and branch reform of the security services is essential for establishing and maintaining State Authority in all parts of the country.
Deja vu all over again, only in Africa instead of Afghanistan?  :nod:
 
link

By Alexander Panetta, The Canadian Press

GOREE ISLAND, Senegal - First she drew attention in Africa for bluntly declaring that slavery remained widespread, and then Gov. Gen. Michaelle Jean visited a dungeon with a dark past to illustrate her point Friday.


Jean's statement about the plight of children in Senegal was widely reported by media in that country, where an in-depth survey has concluded that at least 50,000 boys are being exploited and frequently beaten at their religious schools.


Her sentiments are supported by a new report from Human Rights Watch, an organization that also describes as "slavery" a common Senegalese custom: Islamic schools that send children out to beg for money all day, then often beat them when they don't return with enough cash.


The country's so-called talibes, boys as young as four, can be seen wandering through traffic in tattered clothes and pleading for money. Because charity is considered a religious duty, people hand over enough donations to make the schoolmasters wealthy by local standards.


Jean's visit made the front page of several newspapers Friday.


"Exploitation of Children In Senegal: Michaelle Jean Calls It Slavery," was one headline in Le Quotidien newspaper, the day after Jean surprised some journalists at the presidential palace by making that assessment at a joint press conference with the country's president.


Human-rights groups estimate that as many as 27 million people live in modern-day slavery - and that there are more slaves in the world now than at any point in human history.


They include unpaid labourers who work for room and board, women forced into the sex trade, underage soldiers, and child workers who are paid a pittance.


The UN's High Commission on Human Rights has suggested a variety of means to fight the problem, including product boycotts and mandatory labelling of goods in industries - like carpet-weaving - where child exploitation has been a problem.


This week's report on Senegal by Human Rights Watch urged the Senegalese government to better regulate religious schools, which are popular because they offer the promise of a free education.



As she visited a former slave-trading centre Friday, Jean used the occasion to illustrate her point for the second day in a row.


She was received jubilantly by dancing and singing locals on Goree Island. Now a pastel-coloured tourist destination and UN World Heritage Site, the French used this island to imprison slaves traded for guns and alcohol.


Jean toured the former prison where slaves were once chained to walls by their necks; where children were crammed, in the words of her tour guide, "like fish in a sardine can," with 150 kids crowded into a separate dungeon half the size of a bowling alley; where men were sold for the price of a barrel of rum, while women fetched the same price if they had attractive physical attributes.


"These captives were not considered human beings," said Jean's guide, Eloi Coly.


"They were considered merchandise."


People had their names taken away, and were assigned a number. They were marched down a stone hallway through the infamous "Door of No Return," then loaded onto ships that carried them on a three-month - often fatal - journey to the new world.


A teary-eyed Jean, after the tour, said descendents of former slaves and former slave-owners can work together today on a common cause: ending modern-day slavery.

"This place is not about the history of black peoples. It's about us all," Jean told Canadian and Senegalese journalists.

"Whether we are of European descent, and probably related to those who committed that crime of slavery and slave trade, or whether we are of African descent, we all belong to that history."

She delivered a similarly contemporary message four years ago during a visit to Ghana. During a visit to a similar prison there, she knelt on the ground and broke into sobs, then waved off a question about what special meaning the place carried for someone like her, the descendant of African slaves.

Jean repeated Friday that it would be a mistake to view slavery uniquely through the prism of African history.

"It's about us all. And it's about how life can triumph over barbarism. And we must stand together today, to really fight every situation that denies rights, dignity and humanity to people in the world today. Slavery is still a fact today, in so many different ways," she said.

"Human-trafficking, injustices, are still a reality today. But we are together - and we can say no to it. It's a responsibility."

On Friday, Jean also addressed a school where Canadian aid money has helped train young Senegalese journalists over the years and, on the second full day of her 10-day trip to Africa, she met with a women's group after touring Goree's House of Slaves.

Just outside that old prison, young Amadou Guisse spends the whole day working. He started three years ago, when he was only 10. Guisse follows tourists onto a ferry and, to earn a few dollars on the ride back and forth from the capital, Dakar, he goes around the boat urging tourists to let him shine their shoes.

Guisse shook his head when asked whether he keeps any of the money he earns.

"It's for my family," he said. "Everything."
 
I read recently that the Jihadis in Somalia banned the playing of music on the radio, and most stations complied (rather than be firebombed or worse). This is very much like the Taliban during their time in power.

It seems we have an opportunity to unleash the West's weapons of  cultural mass destruction to destabilize the Jihadis and win a low cost victory for our side.

Step 1: get a few old ships and outfit one as a pirate radio station with a powerful transmitter, a big music library and a staff fluent in the language to keep the tunes, patter, weather reports and unfiltered news going 24/7. The other ships send supplies and relief crews to the pirate station. Ensure the crews have access to arms in case the Jihadis send real pirates out to stop them.

Step 2: import vast quantities of cheap radios tuned to the pirate station and smuggle them into Somali (by airdrop if necessary). Rugged solar cell radios or the type powered by hand cranks are the best ones to use. (even just highlighting the station on the dial, or engraving the frequency on the radio casing will do)

The Jihadis will be on the horns of a dilemma: they can attempt to find and shut down the broadcast station (which will take time and resources, and alienate listeners), or try to crack down on large numbers of listeners (which will take even more time and effort, and alienate the population). If they do nothing, "our" side will be shifting support away from the Jihadis as time passes.

Who do you send ideas like this to anyway? (For that matter, any radio hobbyists out there with access to a ship?)
 
The real reason Africa is in crisis and we cannot fix things. From FP (first page of a longer article):

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/africas_forever_wars?page=0,0

Africa's Forever Wars
Why the continent's conflicts never end.
BY JEFFREY GETTLEMAN | MARCH/APRIL 2010

There is a very simple reason why some of Africa's bloodiest, most brutal wars never seem to end: They are not really wars. Not in the traditional sense, at least. The combatants don't have much of an ideology; they don't have clear goals. They couldn't care less about taking over capitals or major cities -- in fact, they prefer the deep bush, where it is far easier to commit crimes. Today's rebels seem especially uninterested in winning converts, content instead to steal other people's children, stick Kalashnikovs or axes in their hands, and make them do the killing. Look closely at some of the continent's most intractable conflicts, from the rebel-laden creeks of the Niger Delta to the inferno in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and this is what you will find.

What we are seeing is the decline of the classic African liberation movement and the proliferation of something else -- something wilder, messier, more violent, and harder to wrap our heads around. If you'd like to call this war, fine. But what is spreading across Africa like a viral pandemic is actually just opportunistic, heavily armed banditry. My job as the New York Times' East Africa bureau chief is to cover news and feature stories in 12 countries. But most of my time is spent immersed in these un-wars.


I've witnessed up close -- often way too close -- how combat has morphed from soldier vs. soldier (now a rarity in Africa) to soldier vs. civilian. Most of today's African fighters are not rebels with a cause; they're predators. That's why we see stunning atrocities like eastern Congo's rape epidemic, where armed groups in recent years have sexually assaulted hundreds of thousands of women, often so sadistically that the victims are left incontinent for life. What is the military or political objective of ramming an assault rifle inside a woman and pulling the trigger? Terror has become an end, not just a means.

This is the story across much of Africa, where nearly half of the continent's 53 countries are home to an active conflict or a recently ended one. Quiet places such as Tanzania are the lonely exceptions; even user-friendly, tourist-filled Kenya blew up in 2008. Add together the casualties in just the dozen countries that I cover, and you have a death toll of tens of thousands of civilians each year. More than 5 million have died in Congo alone since 1998, the International Rescue Committee has estimated.

Of course, many of the last generation's independence struggles were bloody, too. South Sudan's decades-long rebellion is thought to have cost more than 2 million lives. But this is not about numbers. This is about methods and objectives, and the leaders driving them. Uganda's top guerrilla of the 1980s, Yoweri Museveni, used to fire up his rebels by telling them they were on the ground floor of a national people's army. Museveni became president in 1986, and he's still in office (another problem, another story). But his words seem downright noble compared with the best-known rebel leader from his country today, Joseph Kony, who just gives orders to burn.

Even if you could coax these men out of their jungle lairs and get them to the negotiating table, there is very little to offer them. They don't want ministries or tracts of land to govern. Their armies are often traumatized children, with experience and skills (if you can call them that) totally unsuited for civilian life. All they want is cash, guns, and a license to rampage. And they've already got all three. How do you negotiate with that?

The short answer is you don't. The only way to stop today's rebels for real is to capture or kill their leaders. Many are uniquely devious characters whose organizations would likely disappear as soon as they do. That's what happened in Angola when the diamond-smuggling rebel leader Jonas Savimbi was shot, bringing a sudden end to one of the Cold War's most intense conflicts. In Liberia, the moment that warlord-turned-president Charles Taylor was arrested in 2006 was the same moment that the curtain dropped on the gruesome circus of 10-year-old killers wearing Halloween masks. Countless dollars, hours, and lives have been wasted on fruitless rounds of talks that will never culminate in such clear-cut results. The same could be said of indictments of rebel leaders for crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court. With the prospect of prosecution looming, those fighting are sure never to give up.

How did we get here? Maybe it's pure nostalgia, but it seems that yesteryear's African rebels had a bit more class. They were fighting against colonialism, tyranny, or apartheid. The winning insurgencies often came with a charming, intelligent leader wielding persuasive rhetoric. These were men like John Garang, who led the rebellion in southern Sudan with his Sudan People's Liberation Army. He pulled off what few guerrilla leaders anywhere have done: winning his people their own country. Thanks in part to his tenacity, South Sudan will hold a referendum next year to secede from the North. Garang died in a 2005 helicopter crash, but people still talk about him like a god. Unfortunately, the region without him looks pretty godforsaken. I traveled to southern Sudan in November to report on how ethnic militias, formed in the new power vacuum, have taken to mowing down civilians by the thousands.

The last time our civilization had this problem was after the close of the "100 years war", when gangs of decomissioned mercenaries and soldiers who decided they didn't want to return to life on the farm roamed France and other parts of Europe in an orgy of rape and pillage. The only effective response at the time was the growth of powerful "royal" forces which could organize and deploy enough military resources to supress the bandidts and impose order (and taxation) again. Of course during the interim while the bandidts were being cleared out, many of these "royal" forces were being used to settle scores or even make an attempt to secure the "royal" banner for the sub commander. In France, the culmination was Louis XIV (the Sun King), who finally managed to stamp out opposition internally and use his Royal armies to subjugate large portions of Europe.

One other alternative based on European history is to encourage the growth of "walled cities", which have the ability through fortification and the use of a citizen militia to protect the city and the local hinterland, but not much more (and usually has little ability to project forces beyond, the Serenìsima Repùblica Vèneta being the most notable exception).
 
Here, reproduced under the fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from the Globe and Mail is an interesting commentary by author/activist and now African politician Ken Wiwa (who, despite the Random House blurb now lives and works in Africa):

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/g8-g20/africa/africas-youth-an-energy-to-liberate-or-detonate/article1560804/
The Africa Century
Africa’s youth: An energy to liberate or detonate

A half-century after much of Africa threw offf its colonial bonds, the continent swells with millions of youth. How leaders channel that potential will determine its future

Lagos — From Saturday's Globe and Mail

Saturday, May. 08, 2010

Like most Africans nowadays, I was not yet born during the colonial era.

By 1968, most of Africa had been liberated from European rule and I entered the world in the middle of Nigeria’s civil war (its first and, to date, only one). Conventional wisdom then had it that once freed of colonial bondage, Africa would use its resource advantage to make a great leap forward. The 2000s would be Africa’s century.

Despite the subsequent decades of underdevelopment, some still believe that this will be Africa’s century.

“Where, I wonder, are the younger, vibrant leaders who can harness the energy of Africa’s increasingly youthful, urban and restless societies? ”

We’ve been here before – we’ve had Africa’s decade (that was the 1980s, I think), rock concerts have been thrown to save the recalcitrant continent, and world leaders have resolved to Make Poverty History. Yet even as India and China surge ahead with their double-digit growth, the likes of Bono, World Bank chief Robert Zoellick and Chevron chief executive officer David J. O’Reilly insist that Africa will be the hard drive of the new world.

This year, the World Cup of soccer will be held on African soil for the first time and 17 African countries celebrate the 50th anniversaries of their independence. These festivals of nostalgia could heighten a collective anxiety among Africans my age, about being remembered as a lost generation. In many countries, the leaders and their cronies – Libya’s Moammar Gadhafi, Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe, Senegal’s Abdullah Wade – have been in power ever since those days of liberation.

Only last year, Gabon’s Omar Bongo died with his presidential boots on at the age of 73. He had been in charge of the central African country for 41 years. By the time my cohort has wrested power from these reluctant fathers, we may no longer be relevant.

Another generation is being mass-produced, surfing on a wave of technological advance, presenting a demographic time bomb that threatens to detonate everything that has gone before them. But where, I wonder, are the younger, vibrant leaders who can harness the energy of Africa’s increasingly youthful, urban and restless societies?

It was not always like this. If I rewind the Pathé Newsreels of African history, I see young Turks such as, yes, Moammar Gadhafi and Robert Mugabe, not to mention the likes of Patrice Lumumba (Congo), Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana), Jomo Kenyatta (Kenya) and Steve Biko (South Africa). There they are, all in their 20s and 30s, daring to stand up to the old order, leading their countries out of the bondage of colonialism, rejecting their parents’ institutionalized passivism and mobilizing moral outrage to separate from a Europe exhausted by the Second World War.

In memoirs such as Wole Soyinka’s colourful Ibadan, there’s a sense of a gilded age: The future Nobel laureate returns sheepishly from postgraduate studies in England, only to land on his feet as the creative director of Nigeria’s independence celebrations. My parents’ generation had it all to live for – access to good education at home (often created by colonial governments) or abroad, then almost invariably returning to take up good jobs in government or civil service. In the newly independent Africa, nations had to be built almost overnight, and young, educated men and women were pressed into exalted positions as generals and ministers, mapping out the future to fulfill their destinies. At the time, my father was a left-leaning provincial government official in his late 20s, a position that enabled him to cultivate a love of travelling as he visited places such as Cuba and Brazil as part of his education in administration.

Yet the seeds of the continent’s future dysfunctions had already been sown. The geopolitics of the postwar world meant that East and West would play chess with the map of Africa, propping up dictators such as Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire (now Congo), Ethiopia’s Mengistu Haile Mariam or the notorious, flesh-eating Jean-Bédel Bokassa in the Central African Republic. The world waged its Cold War and turned its back on the African people.

Corruption and deficits of democracy, infrastructure and human development grew. Many African countries became dependent on a drip feed of aid and toxic loans while foreign corporations plundered Africa’s natural resources under the protection of repressive regime. The continent’s well-trained middle class voted with their feet, going abroad for professional fulfilment.

As a teenager in London in the 1980s, I remember excitedly going to my father with a copy of Guyanese academic Walter Rodney’s influential text How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. He smiled to himself, then checked my righteous fury with the tart observation that Africa had been in charge of its own destiny for some time and that Africa’s problems now were mostly of our own doing. I was deflated, especially when he took the opportunity to remind me that after my studies I needed to return home to help rebuild that failing Africa. At the time, Africa was being “structurally adjusted” by the International Monetary Fund, forced into stringent public-sector cuts in return for debt relief, a medicine some brutal military dictators took pride in force-feeding to their subjects. I was one of the lucky ones to have got out, and I couldn’t picture ever going back.

But Africa is a challenge every one of us, whether at home or in the diaspora, has to face in some shape or form. With time, my father became frustrated by the inability of Nigeria’s leaders to articulate the dreams of its people and he mobilized the Ogoni in Nigeria’s oil rich Niger Delta to protest against Shell Oil’s environmental crimes in the region during the 1990s. For that, he was arrested on trumped-up murder charges by Nigeria’s most repressive military dictator, General Sani Abacha. My father was hanged while the world crossed its arms and watched.

My own return came courtesy of an invitation of Nigeria’s then-president Olusegun Obasanjo. He was like many of his generation who had struggled to save or liberate their countries and then believed that only they had the experience and knowledge to steer the ship of state. As his Special Assistant on Peace, Reconciliation and Conflict Resolution, one of my first unofficial tasks was to try to reconcile the combative president and his equally combustible son. Along the way, Mr. Obasanjo confided in me that it was time “we prepared your generation for leadership.” At this point, he had been at the centre of Nigeria’s affairs for only 40 years.

I have spent the past four years receiving a robust education in the front lines of African government, and while my ideological framework has mellowed with age and experience, I am sometimes dismayed at the size of the task ahead of us.

Africa’s natural and human resources confirm its enduring importance to the world. Sixty per cent of the world’s natural resources reside in Africa. Water, wildlife, natural gas, petroleum, gold, land, uranium, wood, steel, coal – almost every mineral or natural resource is found in abundant quantities. But the real story is hidden in the demographics.

Average life expectancy in Africa is 46 and falling, and that is an enduring shame. But those figures do not tell the whole story. While most of Europe and North America have aging “inverse pyramid” population structures, many African countries exhibit a pyramid population structure: There are hundreds of millions of Africans under the age of 30. In the Republic of Niger, 70 per cent of its 13 million people are under 25 years old. The pattern is most evident in places such as Botswana where HIV has created a country of AIDS orphans, but even North Africa is experiencing the youth bulge, with 65 per cent of its population under 30.

The bald fact is that Africa is underpopulated. About a billion people live on a continent that could easily accommodate the land masses of continental America, China, India and Europe with room to spare. Yet Africans are still eager to get out, to go to Europe, North America or, increasingly, Asia. We are no longer shocked to hear stories of desperate African teenagers frozen to death in the landing gear of aircraft in their desperation to emigrate. After all, opportunities here are often limited to a life of petty crime or migrant labour. A young person can be a recruit to a child army or to any number of crime syndicates that operate drug traffic, diamond cartels, Internet fraud, small-arms trading, oil bunkering or prostitution rackets.

From that vantage point, the dreams of our forefathers or today’s hopes for an African century seem a long way off. But there are optimistic signs.

Until the turn of the new century, Africa was still mostly a communications backwater. In-country phone calls were hard enough, but if I wanted to call Bujumbura, Burundi’s capital, from Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone, the call had to be routed through an exchange in Europe. Information moved at a geriatric pace. Now, speaking to my brothers and sisters in Accra, Nairobi or Cape Town by cellphone is routine. Additionally, the Internet has opened up Africa to Africans and the world. We no longer have to rely on the BBC World Service to tell us what is happening in our own countries.

This morning, I read a Zambian proverb that advises, “The worlds of the elders do not lock all the doors; they leave the right door open.”

I don’t know which of the 70 languages or 72 ethnic groups of Zambia it comes from. And I didn’t imbibe the tribal wisdoms of my own elders from sitting under a tree in my village. Like most Africans today, I didn’t grow up in a village or a rural setting.

“Do any of my colleagues in government have the vision and conceptual tools to channel this youthful energy to the common good? ”

Most Africans now live in cities, making Lagos, Johannesburg, Cairo and Kinshasa among the largest in the world. No, the African proverbs that feed my nostalgia for the calm perspective of the past in contrast to the rush of modern life come in a daily dose from my African cellphone, courtesy of Twitter.

Social media have enabled us to bypass the limitations and biases of traditional media. Here in Nigeria, websites and blogs such as SaharaReporters.com routinely publish stories no newspaper would have printed in the past. As they are everywhere else, the old orders are struggling to contain the shifting shape of this irreverent new movement.

Local distribution networks and channels are piping locally produced music and film into fertile and impressionable minds, through cable providers such as DSTV and stations such as Channel O and Africa Magic, where African actors and musicians are showcased side by side with cultural producers from the West. The film industry here – Nollywood – is only the most celebrated example.

Yet one can get carried away by the vibrant viewpoints these next-generation griots bring to the mix.

The question I keep asking myself is how these cultural networks will engage with the old political order. Do any of my colleagues in government have the vision and conceptual tools to channel this youthful energy to the common good?

One man providing an answer is Senegalese singer Youssou N’Dour, an artist regarded as a conscience of his people. Only last week it was reported that he had fallen out with his long-time friend, 83-year-old President Abdoulaye Wade.

Senegal is one of the success stories of Africa, a cultural hub and a testament to what can be achieved with political stability – Mr. Wade is only its third president, a post he gained after 16 years in opposition. When I was last in Dakar, two years ago, I saw the profile of a modern, confident city, developing its natural gifts along the beautiful Atlantic coastline.

As Mr. Wade nears the end of his second term, however, there are disappointing rumours of nepotism and vanity projects, so much so that Mr. N’Dour has joined the opposition. The government recently denied a television license to his Futurs Médias group, a vehicle for a populist political movement, and the singer was able to assemble a million-strong petition in protest. This is the level of organization, combined with the freedoms afforded by the new technology, that could permit the young generation to make an impact on Africa’s political dysfunctions.

The continent is vast, rich in contradictions, complex yet simple. It is black and white, rich and poor, Muslim and Christian, north and south. It is a place that invites but defies stereotyping. As we like to say here, what you see is what you don’t get. Whether it can fulfill the claims of its boosters, only time can tell. What could be decisive is whether Africa’s leaders, new and old, learn to see the burgeoning young population as a challenge and opportunity, to be mobilized for nation building and economic success, rather than as a threat to self-serving elites.

Author Ken Wiwa is an aide to the President of Nigeria.


Mr. Wiwa’s well known father, Ken Saro-Wiwa, was right: most of Africa’s problems are the result of African actions or inactions, errors and omissions. Many predate colonialism, a few are the results of the colonial experience – some of which was pretty dreadful, but most have a home-grown, post-colonial, African source. If we are looking for a Euro-American scapegoat, however, it is, doubtless, the universities – from Moscow to Monteray – that inculcated budding African leaders with socio-economic nonsense in the 1940s, ‘50s and ‘60s. Lumumba and Mugabe didn’t become stupid without some outside help – from Russia and (White) South Africa, respectively.

Africa has potential, perhaps not as vast as Ken Wiwa suggests, but it also faces a hazardous road. I may be a natural pessimist but I expect that almost all progress will be offset by various calamities – most manmade, by Africans.

 
US Special forces train African armies
AP


By ALFRED de MONTESQUIOU, Associated Press Writer Alfred De Montesquiou, Associated Press Writer – Tue May 11, 1:15 am ET

KATI, Mali – A U.S. Special Forces instructor leans toward a steering wheel, showing some 50 Malian soldiers gathered around an army pickup how a passenger should take control of a car if the driver is killed in an ambush.

The elite Malian troops look on, perplexed. "But what can we do if we don't know how to drive?" asks Sgt. Amadou, echoing many of his colleagues' concern.

There are a few laughs, but the Malians are not joking; most of their unit does not know how. The lack of ability to perform such a basic task illustrates part of the huge knowledge gap the U.S. military is seeking to bridge in Africa as it trains local armies to better face the region's mounting threats.
The exercises Monday in Kita, a shooting range in the savanna near Mali's capital, Bamako, are but one leg of an ambitious program led by the Pentagon's Africa Command, or AFRICOM, to provide top-tier training in six African countries during three weeks this month. Over 200 "Green Berets" from the Special Operations Forces and from the U.S. Marines Special Forces have deployed in Mali, Mauritania and other countries that line the Sahara Desert's southern rims.

The yearly exercise, known as "Flintlock," is being beefed-up to face traffickers and al-Qaida-linked terrorists mounting increasingly brazen operations in this vast region of porous borders and lawless tribes.

Western intelligence officers estimate some 400 heavily armed Islamist militants have made northern Mali their rear-base. A kidnapped French tourist is being held somewhere in the desert, and half-a-dozen were held hostage last year.

More worrying still for authorities, the militants, known as al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM, are now believed to be cooperating with traffickers who increasingly use the desert routes to carry large quantities of South American cocaine to Europe. This brings more weapons and more cash to the region, increasing the militants' potency.

Small forces from several European countries and some 500 African troops are taking part in this year's exercise, including countries that don't directly touch the desert, like Senegal.

"The point is, we've got to start getting ready for al-Qaida if they come our way," said Maj. Cheikhna Dieng, who headed 30 Senegalese soldiers taking part in Monday's exercises. "They recruit from Islamists, and that's a threat we're taking seriously," because over 90 percent of Senegal's population is Muslim, he said. Armies in the impoverished countries that militants and traffickers cross are usually no match for the outlaws' heavily armed columns, and vast swathes of eastern Mauritania, northern Mali and Niger, and southern Algeria are now considered no-go zones.

But Mali's army plans to reclaim its part of the area in the coming months, said Capt. Ongoiba Alou, the commander of the embryonic Malian Special Forces. "The whole purpose of the exercise is for our troops to be able to fight the terrorists," he said.

That most of his unit training Monday can't drive is a sign of Mali's lack of funds, Alou says.

"These are our elite troops," he said, stating they'd proven their worth in combat during clashes with a rebellion of ethnic Tuareg nomads that ended a few years ago in the volatile north.

Most of the Malian Special Forces, formed at the American's prodding, come from paratrooper units. But they lack training, and one paratrooper died last week during a Flintlock parachuting exercise. An investigation is still under way, but Malian and U.S. officers said it seemed the trooper had somehow knocked his head against the plane as he was jumping.

Shooting in live fire exercises and jumping from planes can be challenging for poorly trained and poorly equipped armies in a patchwork of uniforms like Mali's, but U.S. soldiers say they find the troops very motivated.

"Training with them is also an outstanding opportunity to build contact," said Capt. Shane West, the U.S. Special Forces team leader who headed the exercise.

Malian and American authorities have given orders for the U.S. Special Forces to only conduct training, and none will launch real operations during Flintlock, West said.

"We're essentially here to help our host nation handle whatever situation it needs to," he said. "And we're taking it step by step."

link
 
This article, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from the Asia Times, is three years old but it gives a good, American, overview of what China was doing:

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/IF08Ad03.html
Military backs China's Africa adventure

By Susan Puska

Of all the elements of growing national power China now wields to promote its national interests in Africa, its military's role raises the most anxiety. Beijing's Africa strategy to promote China's economic (resource access and trade) and political (one-China recognition) interests explicitly tie in the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to support overall peace and security for its interests in Africa.

The strategy tasks the PLA with conducting high-level and technological military cooperation and exchanges, training African military personnel and "support[ing] defense and army building" in African countries. [1] Additionally, the PLA and police support China's Africa strategy through participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), and non-traditional missions, such as combating terrorism, small-arms smuggling, drug trafficking and transnational economic crimes.

Consequently, the PLA now maintains a growing military presence on the African continent. Estimates range from approximately 1,200 soldiers, including PKO forces, to more than 5,000. [2] Its military-to-military contacts extend throughout the continent, reaching at least 43 countries to provide a network of military relations from which to shape its future role in Africa.

Defense attache representation

Chinese Embassy defense attache offices throughout Africa provide the diplomatic foundation for China's military contacts. Accredited defense attaches link the PLA to host country militaries. Defense attache duties vary, but as a minimum, they report on local matters from a military and/or security perspective and facilitate contacts with local armed forces. China currently maintains bilateral diplomatic military relations with at least 25 African countries, spread across the main regions of the continent.

At least 14 of the 107 Chinese military attache offices worldwide are in African countries. Collectively, these offices hold at least 30 accredited military officers, in addition to support personnel. They are located in Algeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Sudan, Tunisia, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

In Beijing, 18 African countries maintain permanent defense attache offices. [2] Six of these offices were directly reciprocal: Algeria (which has continuously maintained a defense attache in Beijing since January 1971), Egypt, Namibia, Nigeria, Sudan, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The 11 remaining countries that do not have known Chinese resident equivalents in Africa include Burundi, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast (Cote d'Ivoire), Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Mali, Niger, South Africa and Tanzania.

Since 1985, China has almost doubled the number of defense attache offices worldwide from 59 to 107. [4] In Africa, however, the number of Chinese defense attache offices increased quite modestly from only nine to 14, maintaining an average of 15% of all of China's attache offices over the past 20 years. In contrast, China has a defense attache office in practically every capital in Europe.

Reported defense-to-military activities

China divides its primary bilateral military activities with foreign countries into four main categories: [5]

1. Major military exchanges. Between 2001 and 2006, Chinese military leaders visited Africa over 30 times, touring virtually every country that recognizes China. These visits often included more than one country, but several of the countries received multiple stopovers by Chinese military leaders.

Of these, Egypt, by far, welcomed the highest number of Chinese senior delegations - 15 during the course of these six years. Additionally, China's still rare naval ship visits have included stops in Africa. Rear Admiral Huang Jiang led the first PLA Navy (PLAN) ship visit, consisting of the Shenzhen, China's newest Luhai-class guided missile destroyer at the time, and the Nancang supply ship to Africa in July 2000. A 2002 naval ship visit by a fleet composed of a guided missile destroyer, the Qingdao, and a supply ship, the Taicang, included Egypt.

2. Chinese bilateral security consultations. Between 2001 and 2006 China conducted 110 bilateral security-related meetings and consultations. The number of biannual bilateral defense-related talks jumped from 33 between 2003 and 2004, to 46 during 2005 and 2006. Despite this overall increase, South Africa is the only African country that holds security consultations with China. [6] South Africa and China initiated the Meeting of the Sino-South African Defense Committee on April 2003 in Pretoria, where Xiong Guangkai, deputy chief of the General Staff, represented the Chinese. Since then, South Africa and China have had three subsequent meetings that have alternated between South Africa and China. The most recent meeting was held in December 2006 in Pretoria.

3. Joint exercises. Between August 2005 and December 2006, China conducted joint military exercises (including maritime search and rescue and counter-terrorism scenarios) with India, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, Thailand, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the United States. No African states have yet been included in the joint exercises with China, either bilaterally or multilaterally.

4. Peacekeeping operations. China has participated in United Nations PKOs since 1990. [7] As of March, China ranked 13th as a contributor of military and police to UN missions worldwide. Its support includes 1,572 troops, 63 military observers and 174 police. During this same period, Pakistan ranked first with over 10,000 personal; the United States ranked 43rd. [8] China's largest contributions include the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (343), and three of the six African PKO missions:

United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS)  - Established in March 2005 to support the implementation of the January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army. It was expanded in August 2006 to include the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement. UNMIS provides some humanitarian assistance, as well as protection and promotion of human rights. China contributes 446 of the 8,766 soldiers, nine of the 662 police, and 14 of the 599 military observers.

United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI)  - Established in April 2004 to facilitate the implementation of the peace agreement signed by Ivorian parties in January 2003. China contributes seven out of the 200 military observers. UNOCI also includes 7,854 soldiers and 1,187 police.

United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)  - Established in September 2003 to support the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, it protects UN staff, facilities and civilians; supports humanitarian and human rights activities; and assists in national security reform, including national police training and the formation of a restructured military. China contributes 565 out of the13,841 soldiers, 18 of the1,201 police and three of the 214 military observers.

United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)  - Established in November 1999 to support the implementation of the Lusaka Accord, its current mission is to carry out disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration. The final phase of its mission, concurrently in  process, is to facilitate transition to "credible" elections. China contributes 218 of the 16,594 soldiers and 12 of the 713 military observers. The mission also has 1,029 police.

United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)  - Established in July 2000 to verify the ceasefire agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia, brokered by Algeria and the Organization of African Unity. China contributes seven of the 202 military observers. The mission also has 1,594 soldiers.

United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)  - The mission was set up in September 1991 to monitor the ceasefire between the Government of Morocco and the Frente Polisario, and to organize and conduct a referendum on the territory's status. The UN mandate was recently extended until October 2007. [9] China contributes 13 of the 195 military observers. MINURSO also includes 28 soldiers and six police.

Other Chinese military activities in Africa

China's military-military activities in Africa also include working-level professional contacts, such as military aid and assistance to local militaries in the form of "donations" and technical support, training and exchanges; arms-sales related support; and professional education. Military cooperation in Africa has almost exclusively focused on bilateral cooperation, but in 2003 China participated in a multilateral military environmental protection conference hosted by South Africa, which may indicate a future direction for multilateral military engagement in selected areas. [10]

China's military-to-military activities in Africa, including defense attache presence, naval ship visits, arms sales and other missions to support military cooperation can be expected to expand to keep pace with China's growing national interests throughout the region. An increase in its diplomatic military representation and overall presence may inadvertently be encouraged by the establishment of the new United States Africa Combatant Command, if China feels a new combatant command impinges on China's security interests in the region.

If China's limited number of defense attache offices in Africa does grow, the potential list of countries would likely begin among the 11 that have already established offices in Beijing, but lack a reciprocal counterpart in Africa, as discussed above. Resource access and associated security needs would likely influence any expansion of China's defense attache offices in Africa. Four of the six countries that China currently maintains reciprocal, resident defense attache offices with - Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria and Sudan - are among those countries that China has interests in petroleum and other resources. Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, which are among the main producers of petroleum in Africa and already have established defense attache offices in Beijing, would be logical additions.

Military and naval ship visits are also expected to develop. China may enter into agreements with African countries beyond South Africa to establish bilateral defense consultations, and joint exercises under the framework of anti-terrorist or maritime safety scenarios could be an outcome of China's increased military capability and overall interest in Africa.

Finally, China will increasingly be challenged to respond to security threats to Chinese property and personnel in the region that may necessitate a re-evaluation of the role of China's military. The recent kidnappings and killings of Chinese workers in Ethiopia and Nigeria painfully demonstrated that China can no longer depend on local security forces to protect its oil interests (personnel and facilities) in areas such as Ethiopia and the Niger Delta.

Potential attacks by local insurgents, criminals, and even terrorists, demand skilled defense practitioners. The PLA could provide this either directly and openly in tailored military units with or without Chinese police force participation, through quasi-military or "outsourced" rent-a-soldier security entities that would be manned by trained soldiers who may retain loose association with the PLA as demobilized soldiers, or through other mechanisms based on negotiations with the host African countries.

Implications for the US

While China's military-to-military contacts with Africa have been quite modest, anxiety over China's activities in Africa exceeds the present extent of military activities for several reasons. Among these are questions about China's future military capabilities and its intentions in the region. China's arms sale practices, particularly to Sudan, demonstrate its willingness to look the other way when sovereign states commit genocide and persecution of its citizenry, if it serves China's national interests - in this case, access to oil. Even as China has responded to international pressure to nudge the Sudanese regime toward the settlement of the Darfur crisis, it is woefully late.

Furthermore, China's newfound support for the resolution of the Darfur tragedy may be short-lived and ineffective, merely a tactical move to counter the bad press that could overshadow the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing. There is certainly no indication China will fundamentally reassess its indiscriminant arms sale practices in Sudan.

Although China is not alone in placing its national interests and growing demand for resources above the interests of African states, China's modern self-identity as a leader of the developing world moralistically insists it could never exploit weaker states. As its power and wealth grow, however, China will be increasingly judged for its actions.

The implications for United States interests in Africa need not lead to a confrontational competition in response to China's growing military profile. There is plenty of work to do in Africa, and the Africans themselves will ultimately decide what courses to follow. China has a constructive role to play in Africa and provides both a useful model for the successful modernization of a developing country, and also has a long-standing relationship, including military-to-military contacts, with many nations on the continent.

The United States and others will do well to continue to press China on issues of concern, such as Darfur, but also to look for opportunities to work bilaterally and multilaterally with China and its military in the region.

Notes

1. "China's African Policy", Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of South Africa, January 2006.
2. For the high end of this estimate, see Peter Brookes and Ji Hye Shin, "China's Influence in Africa: Implications for the United States", Backgrounder, No 1916, The Heritage Foundation, February 22, 2003. Estimates of 1,200 soldiers are based primarily on UN PKO statistics, as of March 2007, and an estimate of Chinese military attache representation throughout the continent.
3. Information is accurate as of March 2007. Beijing Military Attache Corps in Beijing.
4. China's National Defense in 2006; directory of PRC military personalities, October 2006; Kenneth W Allen and Eric A McVadon, China's Foreign Military Relations, Report No 32, The Henry Stimson Center, Washington, DC, October 1999.
5. The 2004 and 2006 National Defense White Papers provide detailed information on China's military-to-military activities by country and type of contact. Available online.
6. Among African countries, it is highly likely that China also conducts ongoing bilateral defense consultations with Sudan and, possibly Zimbabwe, as a minimum to support arms sales.
7. United Nations Peacekeeping, website and Appendix V, China's National Defense in 2006, Information Office of the Sate Council of the People's Republic of China, December 2006, Beijing.
8. Contribution statistics are accurate as of March 2007. Availableonline.
9. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1754 (2007) adopted by the Security Council on April 30, 2007.
10. Attendee List of the August 4-8, 2003, Military Integrated Environmental Management Conference is available online.

Colonel Susan M Puska (retired) is a former US Army attache. She currently works for Defense Group, Inc, in Washington, DC.[/b]

(This article first appeared in The Jamestown Foundation. Used with permission.)

(Copyright 2007 The Jamestown Foundation.)


Although UN missions come and go, nothing I have heard/read indicates that China is doing any less in Africa. I would be surprised if they are not doing more and more.

My impression is that the Chinese are persuaded by Joseph Nye’s Sofy Power and it appears to me that they are applying a balanced mix of hard and soft power in Africa because Africa matters to them – matters more to them than it does to us, I think.
 
Mods - if you think this works better elsewhere, be my guest to move, and thanks!

This from the Department of Finance:
The Honourable Jim Flaherty, Minister of Finance, today announced the Government of Canada will forgive nearly $24 million owed by the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) through the Canadian Debt Initiative (CDI). With this relief, Canada has now cancelled close to $1 billion of debt owed by the world’s poorest and most heavily indebted countries through the CDI.

“Canada’s debt relief program continues to support nations that have demonstrated a commitment to invest in the current needs of their citizens, even as they struggle with the debt burdens of their past,” said Minister Flaherty. “Today’s debt relief announcement will free up more resources that can be better invested in the health and education of the Republic of Congo’s citizens.”

The Republic of Congo is the 14th country to meet all of the debt relief requirements of the CDI, under which $1.3 billion in debt will be forgiven once all eligible countries have completed the process. The CDI provides 100 per cent cancellation of bilateral debt owed to Canada for countries that have fulfilled all of the requirements of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank-led Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative.

Minister Flaherty also announced that the Government of Canada will stop collecting all bilateral debt repayments from Côte d’Ivoire, in recognition of the country’s efforts towards economic reform under its current IMF and World Bank programs. This moratorium will continue until Côte d’Ivoire reaches the completion point under the HIPC Initiative, at which time all remaining debt owed to Canada will be cancelled.

Today’s announcement is a further example of Canada’s track record of accountability and honouring its international commitments, a key theme of Canada’s G8 and G20 Summit year. Through Budget 2010, Canada fulfilled its commitment to double international assistance from the 2002 level this fiscal year, and has already met its commitment to double aid to Africa. Canada has also boosted by $22 billion its support to international financial institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank, which assist nations still coping with the global economic and financial crisis. This includes Canada’s offer to provide US$2.6 billion to the African Development Bank, which will increase the Bank’s lending capacity by 75 per cent in 2010.
 
It's like the Oprah show.
YOU get a million dollars
YOU get a million dollars
YOU get a million dollars.
 
Reviving this necrothread with a new, more-than-one-country development....

Canada is set to play a leading role in a new anti-terror organization to be launched by President Barack Obama in New York this fall — the 10th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks on the city.

The Global Counter-terrorism Forum is the U.S. President’s initiative to create diplomatic alternatives to military interventions such as Iraq and Afghanistan and strengthen the international consensus in the fight against terror.

As part of the new effort, to be unveiled formally in late September, Canada will co-chair a working group seeking to prevent terrorism in the mid-African Sahel region, one of a number of such groups in the organization. The aim is to share information and improve co-operation in the prevention and prosecution of terrorism.

Representatives from nearly 40 countries met in Istanbul last April to draw up a draft political declaration and devise rules and procedures for the new secretariat, which will be based in Washington.

It will differ from the existing United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee, in that it is expected it will have the resources to build capacity in areas like the Sahel and the Horn of Africa — for example by strengthening criminal prosecution systems and countering violent extremism among potential “homegrown” terrorists.

Neither the U.S. State Department nor the Department of Foreign Affairs would offer any comment on the new organization.

It is not clear whether Canada will increase its spending on anti-terrorism measures — it may simply divert existing money from its $8-million Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building program or from the $78-million Global Peace and Security Fund ....
Source:  National Post, 13 Jul 11
 
Not related to this perhaps?:

Canada considering international bases: MacKay
......
A report in Montreal newspaper Le Devoir said the Canadian Forces is negotiating to set up bases under a program known as the Operational Support Hubs Network. They've reportedly already completed negotiations with Germany and Jamaica, and are in talks with Kuwait, Senegal, Kenya or Tanzania, Singapore and South Korea.
.....

Senegal (Francophonie-Foreign Legion) on the west coast and Kenya (Commonwealth-British Army & RN) on the east coast bracket the SAHEL and the left flank of the Islamic arc - the more Europeanized and Berber end as opposed to the Asiatic Persian Arab end.

How do Leos and LAVs run in soft sand?
 
It seems that things are improving in South Sudan. They are now a part of the UN. Even though there still seems to be a lot of work to be done, it seems other countries need military aide more than South Sudan ex; Somalia, Nigeria, Chad, and Tanzania. Here is an article from the foreign policy institute about radical Islam in Tanzania.

http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201104.glickman.islamismsubsaharanafrica.html

Jim Seggie said:
So when are we headed to South Sudan?
 
sean m said:
It seems that things are improving in South Sudan. They are now a part of the UN. Even though there still seems to be a lot of work to be done, it seems other countries need military aide more than South Sudan ex; Somalia, Nigeria, Chad, and Tanzania. Here is an article from the foreign policy institute about radical Islam in Tanzania.

http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201104.glickman.islamismsubsaharanafrica.html


Oh, yeah! That will help a lot ...  ::)
 
You can't find a map of South Sudan yet because the borders have not yet been agreed.

Totonto Star July 11 2011

....As South Sudan gets ready to stand on its own, it’s faced with several security threats, including rebel attacks against the army, and inter-tribal warfare that can often kill dozens, even hundreds, at a time.

But the biggest concern for the army, still a guerilla force for the most part, appears to be what it calls an expected incursion by the Sudan Armed Forces and their anti-SPLA rebel proxies.

“They are preparing to occupy several areas of the border of South Sudan,” Col. Philip Aguer, the army spokesperson, told the Star. “We expect the SAF to attack us in these areas using militias and their own forces.”

South Sudan is breaking away after decades of civil war with Khartoum, which it fought over discrimination and extreme governmental neglect. About 2.5 million people died. A peace agreement was signed in 2005 that led the way to a referendum and secession.

The attacks, Aguer maintained, could happen anytime, either before or after independence. But he said they’re more likely before Saturday, because the idea would be to capture territory before the proclamation of independence.

“Once South Sudan declares (independence) with its current territory, it will be harder to make territorial claims later. It’s the same mentality they used to occupy Abyei,” he argued.

In May, Northern forces violently entered Abyei, a hotly contested region that borders both North and South. About 100,000 civilians fled for their lives. A recent peace deal signed in Ethiopia plans for Ethiopian peacekeepers to deploy to the region to ensure the two sides remain separated.

Others are more skeptical that the North will launch such a provocation, particularly at this sensitive time, which would lead to a vocal international reaction.

On the other hand, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir’s aggression in Abyei, and more recently, South Kordofan state, suggest otherwise. In that Northern state, the government says it’s trying to disarm SPLA-elements and sympathizers. But several humanitarian accounts point to the bombing and execution of civilians.

Bashir also recently said that war is “likely” with the South.

There are five disputed areas all along the border between Sudan and South Sudan. The North has already occupied three of them since taking Abyei, said Fouad Hikmat, Horn of Africa Project Director for the International Crisis Group.

The SPLA is also “monitoring” the movements of renegade militia leader George Athor, a former SPLA lieutenant-general now fighting the army. The Southern army believes Athor will try to seize the Adar oilfields in Upper Nile state, or perhaps even the state capital of Malakal.

The Southern government believes the North is arming the militias. The North denies this......

And the contiguous Darfur problem has not been resolved.
 
Interesting report from Somalia:

http://news.ca.msn.com/world/somalia-famine-has-killed-tens-of-thousands
 
What could Canada do in South Sudan?
.... Canada has much to offer. Its recent lead mediation role in the “Dubai Process” supporting peace-building in Afghanistan stands out as a future potential Canadian contribution to international peace operations. This experience has also demonstrated the contribution Canada can make to complex mediation, a process that will no doubt be required to underpin many of the challenges facing the newly independent state.

Canada’s active and influential role in the Commonwealth of Nations is also significant. The Commonwealth provides a strong foundation that could serve as the basis of any mediated discussions; a foundation that clearly articulates and represents the core values of its member states that, not surprisingly, include a number of South Sudan’s close regional neighbours, such as Uganda and Kenya. Indeed, one could argue that South Sudan should be a contender for Commonwealth membership. Its roots and future speak to what Commonwealth values of democracy, rule of law, development and capacity building could mean. The Commonwealth Secretariat in London and neighbouring African Commonwealth partners should be on this file ....
Source:  National Post, 12 Aug 11
 
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