Afghanistan: Why we should be there (or not), how to conduct the mission (or not) & when to leave

[PuckChaser]

I apologize for my ignorance, but can't the Afghans not train themselves after a certain point? Why not utilize the cascade effect;

1 Canadian trains 10 Afghans
Those 10 train 100
Those 100 train 1000
Those 1000 train 10000
...and so on.

We can't train them completely to our standard. At a certain point, yes, their Kandaks from Kandahar will be able to run training camps and they will be effective. Right now, they need our expertise.

 

[The Bread Guy]

My only surprise is how long it took for the NDP Party Machine to crank this out:

Stephen Harper’s Conservatives, with help from the Michael Ignatieff Liberals, are turning their backs on a previous commitment to end the military mission in Afghanistan in 2011 and bring our troops home from Afghanistan.

“Stephen Harper made a solemn commitment to bring the troops home next year, but he has again failed to live up to his words. And the Michael Ignatieff Liberals seem happy to join in and ignore their own promises,” lamented Layton. “New Democrats disagree, and we are demanding the Prime Minister bring this new extension to the House of Commons for public debate and a vote.”

Liberals and Conservatives had previously committed to bringing any future military mission extensions to the House of Commons for a vote. Instead, Harper announced from Korea that this time there would be no public debate and no vote.

“Harper waited until MPs left Ottawa and then engaged in a backroom deal with the Ignatieff Liberals to extend the military mission in Afghanistan. This is wrong,” said New Democrat Leader Jack Layton. “A majority of Canadians say they are against extending the military mission – Conservatives and Liberals must start listening to Canadians, not just to each other.”

“What New Democrats are saying is we need an increased focus on diplomacy, development and governance in Afghanistan, in order to build a lasting peace to this region,” said Layton. “Canada’s military has served with honour and done its fair share, now it’s time for Canada’s contribution to be through aid and diplomacy.”

One thing that jumps out at me:  lack of HoC vote =/= "lack of public debate"

 

[Edward Campbell]

I know I'm in this mode:  :deadhorse: but:

1. I suspect this is good politics - the BQ and NDP will gain the most, but they both gain at the expense of the Liberals; but

2. I think it is poor policy.

My policy issue is that we are being used and unless we are going to a helluva lot in return we are also being played for suckers.

I would prefer that the PM go to the nest NATO meeting and say, "We had this thing almost won down in Kandahar in 2006/07 but our allies - especially France, Germany, Italy and, above all, the USA left us hanging out to dry. We did our best, we fought hard - our casualty rates attest to that, but, finally, while we may not have 'lost' we didn't win. We Canadians do not need lessons from anyone in this alliance on how to fight; we liberated many countries in this room - twice, and defeated a few others - also twice. We took our NATO duties seriously but, it appears, too few others did. So we have done our full and more than fair share and the rest, especially those who hung back, can try it on their own. We wish you every success but our forces are coming home in 2011."

Will our NATO allies be hostile? Yes. Should we care? Not a bit. Our strategic future lies across the Pacific, not the Atlantic. What about the Americans? Half will applaud, the other half, the Washington "in crowd" half will get over it fast enough. What about Afghanistan? Afghanistan in 2050 will look a whole lot like Afghanistan in 1950.

 

[GAP]

While my sentiments echo yours there are two niggling little points....

1. No Canadian PM has the balls to do it

2. No Canadian PM has the balls to do it

 

[CombatDoc]

Troops would welcome extended mission in Afghanistan, says Canadian veteran
Article Link
By Matthew Fisher, Postmedia News November 8, 2010

KANDAHAR AIRFIELD, Afghanistan — Reports that Canada is seriously considering taking on a NATO training mission in Afghanistan after current combat operations end next summer have given a jolt of adrenalin to many troops now serving in Kandahar.

After 152 deaths in Afghanistan, many Canadians want the troops to come home. However, among those in combat arms who have borne the brunt of the casualties, there is almost universal interest in being part of a potential, smaller, follow-on mission designed to assist Afghanistan's burgeoning security forces, which are to become responsible for security across the country in 2014.
More on link

When I first read this article by Matthew Fisher, I wondered if the combat arms really wish to continue the Afghanistan mission in a training capacity.  The more that I ponder this, the more I feel that Mr Fisher has overstated the level of interest within the CF rank and file for continuing their involvement. My impression is that the troops are tired, and not just from Afghanistan - Op Podium (Olympics), Op Hestia (Haiti) and Op Cadence (G8/G20) come to mind.  Furthermore, in addition to the infantry, the CS and CSS have been stretched, particularly medical, engineers, log, etc.

Realizing that we are merely an instrument of policy to be used as the government dictates, I'd be interested to hear what others think on this issue.  Particularly interested in those with two or more previous missions to the sandbox.  Cheers.

 

[PuckChaser]

Some of the troops are tired because the Army is doing a horrible job of managing their personnel resources. I know guys who have been dying to get on a tour for 3 years (myself included), that are just getting positions as GD (way out of trade) on the "closeout" tour, while their are guys being thrown into a 4th, 5th or 6th tour.

 

[Journeyman]

To say nothing of the toll taken by pre-deployment training.

It speaks volumes about the weakness of our individual and collective training if work-up training lasts longer than the deployment.

 

[vonGarvin]

To say nothing of the toll taken by pre-deployment training.

It speaks volumes about the weakness of our individual and collective training if work-up training lasts longer than the deployment.

Having gone through the "work up", I can give that portion of the whole cycle a resounding "F Minus".  It was way too long, and even though they called it a "Level 7" ex, it was, in my opinion, just a series of level 5 exercises, done simultaneously.  And there was zero "specific" training.

We had no training on the language, the culture or anything.  It was all "shoot 'em up, Tex!" 

 

[PuckChaser]

To say nothing of the toll taken by pre-deployment training.

It speaks volumes about the weakness of our individual and collective training if work-up training lasts longer than the deployment.

Amen. If you need to catch up on a few missed items from IBTS, by all means do those. But re-qualifying on everything you just qualified on a few months ago is insane. Its not like once you get your CFTPO number, you instantly become a goldfish and forget what you did before.

 

[vonGarvin]

To expand on my previous post, and a post I put up earlier (somewhere), I would offer that for a unit to "train up" for a specific mission in a specific theatre, and let's pretend that our army has been conducting combat operations there for oh, I don't know, four years, then we would need only to train up to level 5 - 7.  Two months, tops.  I mean, going into the hopper, units should be up to level 4 (sub-unit) for collective training.  From there, "unit" could be skipped and units could do level 5 and then 7.  Mix in some real training (eg: culture, language, etc), then we're off to the races.

I still find it hard to believe that after almost 9 years of continual operations in Afghanistan that we don't have a baseline of learning either Pashtun or Tajik as "points" in our PER system.  Oh, French and English are there, but a boy from the Prairies is more likely to have to interact in Pashtun or Tajik than in his second official language.

 

[ModlrMike]

I have to echo the epic failure of the training cycle. I was recently asked to consider going back for a 3rd tour. As a reservist, I couldn't commit to the 9 months of training followed by 7 months of deployment. There's no way in hell that my employer would agree to that much time away. Maybe the 9 months, but certainly not the full bill.

 

[pbi]

As the guy who directly ran the Level 7 training for two years, I'm surprised and disappointed to read these comments.


First, just to be clear, Level 7 means formation level training (Bde/equiv or above). An exercise that has Level 5  and Level 6 training audiences probably isn't really a Level 7, the way we have typically done things. It's probably a Level 5 or 6, or 5/6, with the Level 7 TA acting as some kind of EXCON. I know that this setup was tried at CMTC a couple of times (I visited both), but IMHO it never really worked properly, because the old and sound rule of "one Primary Training Audience" was being tinkered with.

I'm surprised, because in our visits to interview the staff of each JTF(A) HQ after it had been in theatre for a while, and in debriefs from returning JTF(A) HQs, we got the message loud and clear that the Level 7  training was good, useful and most importantly prepared them for the operation. As well, we visited our peer training organizations in the UK (6 Div HQ and Land Warfare Centre) and the US Army (Battle Command Training Programme), and exchanged trainers with them, to benchmark the quality of what we were doing. (And were very pleasantly surprised to discover that we were well ahead of the UK, and in many areas at least as good or better than what US BCTP was doing). We were also visited by our peer organization in the USMC, who were very favourably impressed.

I'm disappointed, because our single focus was to try to do the best we possibly could as trainers to get the men and women in those HQs ready to go, so that the orders and plans that they developed would be useful, effective and helpful. We always believed that we were helping the soldier on the ground by training up the Level 7 HQ as well as we possibly could. On reading your observations, it seems as though the system might be failing the people in these HQs, not helping them.  If that is so, then b y extension it is failing the soldiers on the ground, who will bear the brunt of what these HQs do, or fail to do.

I'm not involved in that particular organization any more, but I'm still interested in how well it works. The model we built will, I hope, more or less stay in place as the way we train our Level 7 HQs from now on.

I really hope that in your debriefs, AARs, discussions with the ALLC guys, etc you will make clear exactly what was wrong, and what should be done to fix it. We used to pay very close and very detailed attention to all of that feedback, all the time.  In fact, we bugged the hell out of people to get it.  The system only gets better when it knows what's wrong.

Cheers

 

[MarkOttawa]

Letter of mine in the Toronto Star plus a bit more:

Afstan: “A training role is possible”
http://unambig.com/afstan-a-training-role-is-possible/

Mark 
Ottawa

 

[CombatDoc]

As the guy who directly ran the Level 7 training for two years, I'm surprised and disappointed to read these comments...

I'm surprised, because in our visits to interview the staff of each JTF(A) HQ after it had been in theatre for a while, and in debriefs from returning JTF(A) HQs, we got the message loud and clear that the Level 7  training was good, useful and most importantly prepared them for the operation. As well, we visited our peer training organizations in the UK (6 Div HQ and Land Warfare Centre) and the US Army (Battle Command Training Programme), and exchanged trainers with them, to benchmark the quality of what we were doing. (And were very pleasantly surprised to discover that we were well ahead of the UK, and in many areas at least as good or better than what US BCTP was doing). We were also visited by our peer organization in the USMC, who were very favourably impressed.

I'm disappointed, because our single focus was to try to do the best we possibly could as trainers to get the men and women in those HQs ready to go, so that the orders and plans that they developed would be useful, effective and helpful. We always believed that we were helping the soldier on the ground by training up the Level 7 HQ as well as we possibly could. On reading your observations, it seems as though the system might be failing the people in these HQs, not helping them.  If that is so, then b y extension it is failing the soldiers on the ground, who will bear the brunt of what these HQs do, or fail to do.

Let me be a bit of a dissenting opinion to the majority opinion expressed here.  Everyone talks about the training cycle being too long and lacking enough added value - to that I would say "yes and no".  Yes, it is long at around 7-8 months of predeployment training for a 7 month mission.  And yes, the value of the training may be inconsistent or not readily appreciated by all.  But from the standpoint of getting all the required IBTS and TMST "ticks in the box" plus obtaining any extra specialist training, 6+ months is barely enough time to fit everything in.  For example, medical folks in addition to  IBTS/TMST also need various recertifications (ACLS, ATLS, PALS, AIME) as well as trade specific training (e.g. joint theatre trauma system, blood banking). The CF senior leadership has set 6 months as the "predeployment training" length, but for the non-combat arms units (e.g. NSE, HSS, MP, ASIC) comprised of folks from across the country, this time period flies by.

The current Maple Guardian level exercises are a good introduction for many HQs to the higher level coord/planning that is required in theatre, complexity that does not exist at the unit level.  Add in the reality that many of the HQ staff (i.e. jnr officers) lack significant time in trade and staff officer experience, and it is my experience that the level 7 trng is vital preparation for theatre.  Is it perfect, no, of course not.  But I would much rather deploy with this shared experience than not.  As one Colonel noted, the best way to "take care of the troops" is to maximize their chances of returning from deployment, even if this means that training requirements will cut  into their family time.  The challenge is to ensure that the training benefit outweighs all the other costs (financial, time away from home, opportunity costs, etc).

 

[a_majoor]

The US administration is expressing a truely frightening lack of perspective and common sense:

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2010/11/14/we-have-to-assemble-a-coherent-narrative-for-afghanistan/

We have to assemble a coherent narrative for Afghanistan
BY HERSCHEL SMITH
16 hours, 13 minutes ago
From The Washington Post:

The Obama administration and its NATO allies will declare late this week that the war in Afghanistan has made sufficient progress to begin turning security control over to its government by spring, months before the administration’s July deadline to start withdrawing U.S. troops, according to U.S. and European officials.

Even as it announces the “transition” process, which will not immediately include troop withdrawals, NATO will also state its intention to keep combat troops in Afghanistan until 2014, a date originally set by Afghan President Hamid Karzai.

The seemingly contradictory messages, in communiques and agreements to be released at NATO’s upcoming summit in Lisbon, are intended to reassure U.S. and European audiences that the process of ending the war has begun.

At the same time, the coalition wants to signal to the Taliban – along with Afghans and regional partners who fear a coalition withdrawal, and Republicans in Congress who oppose it – that they are not leaving anytime soon.

“We have to assemble a coherent narrative . . . that everyone buys into,” said a senior administration official, one of several who discussed ongoing alliance negotiations on the condition of anonymity.

You can read the balance of the report yourself.  Even as a Milblogger, I have grown weary of the strategic narrative(s) coming from Washington.  I focus now on a full court press for more troops, more resources, more support, and patience.  I also focus on the bravery of our men under fire.  I focus mainly now on the tactical level rather than the strategic.  There is nothing to cover on strategy.

Isn’t it sad to see the convolution of words, the twisting of stories, and the belief that if all they do is get the narrative right, everything else will follow?  If you’re looking for leadership in this administration, you won’t find it. Instead, they are working hard to “assemble a coherent narrative.”

 

[Journeyman]

If you’re looking for leadership in this administration, you won’t find it. Instead, they are working hard to “assemble a coherent narrative.”

Wasn't that John Travolta in Basic?  -- "we just have to tell the story right."
Hopefully, that's not where the Obama administration got its public administration education.

 

[MarkOttawa]

A very comprehensive post by BruceR. at Flit with interesting input by real experts--have a look:

Expert feedback on ISAF and Raziq: "Good program, good idea, wrong guy, place and time"
http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2010_11_15.html#006803

A little while ago I wrote a little bit about the decision to rely more heavily on Abdul Raziq and his Spin Boldak-based "police" to keep the peace in the Kandahar City area, and some of the issues that raised.
http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2010_11_02.html#006798
I shopped it around to four people of my acquaintance with real experience with Kandahar, and elicited their responses to this development. None of them were very positive, but some of their reasons might surprise you. It's all after the fold.

Before I forget, also worth reading in this context is Anand Gopal's piece on the history behind the current Kandahar-area violence, which comes strongly recommended.
http://security.newamerica.net/publications/policy/the_battle_for_afghanistan
I think it's a great stab at Part One of the history of the Kandahar Civil War: consider all that follows some rough notes for Part Two some day. The big takeaway, I should think, is how peripheral to the real local power dynamics ISAF frequently has been, and may still remain...

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Journeyman]

Article Link

Tories confirm Afghan mission details
Canadian military trainers to remain from 2011-14 for non-combat work

Last Updated: Tuesday, November 16, 2010 .

At least 950 military personnel will remain in Afghanistan after 2011 to help with training, development and aid, Foreign Affairs Minister Lawrence Cannon said Tuesday in detailing the country's post-combat role.

Not really news, but interesting that the announcement was made by DFAIT (Cannon) and not Defence (MacKay).

 

[The Bread Guy]

Article Link Not really news, but interesting that the announcement was made by DFAIT (Cannon) and not Defence (MacKay).

Cannon's also been taking questions in the HoC instead of MacKay as well - check Hansard here, here and here (meanwhile, MacKay dealt with an F35 question here).  It's been noticed by others:

Peter MacKay was once Canada’s star contender to lead the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a military alliance of Western nations.

He will again head to the NATO summit in Lisbon later this week, but the chastened reality for the defence minister was on display for all to see Monday. He was the one sitting in the shadow of Foreign Affairs Minister Lawrence Cannon.

As Cannon deflected repeated questions on the role Canada’s soldiers will play in a new Afghan training mission from 2011 to 2014, MacKay — reportedly in talks with a Bay Street law firm — poked away at his BlackBerry and shuffled through papers, his trusty Question Period briefing book closed all the while.

Sources say that MacKay, whose experience on the Afghanistan file is unmatched around the Tory cabinet table, was purposely cut out of talks on the new military role from the beginning by Prime Minister Stephen Harper.

However, a spokesperson for MacKay denies he’s been shut out of the decision-making process, saying that Cannon is answering all questions because Canada’s future involvement in Afghanistan is more than just a military effort ....

The government has been "civilianizing" the face of the mission in a number of ways for almost 2 years now - more examples here, here and here.

 

[The Bread Guy]

And the official news release:

The Honourable Lawrence Cannon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Honourable Peter MacKay, Minister of National Defence, and the Honourable Beverley J. Oda, Minister of International Cooperation, today announced a new role for Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan that will build on significant progress in the areas of security, diplomacy, human rights and development.

“Building on strengths and accomplishments over the past years, Canada is committed to helping build a more secure, stable and self-sufficient Afghanistan that is no longer a safe haven for terrorists,” said Minister Cannon. “The combat mission will end in 2011. As we continue to work alongside the Afghan people and the international community, Canada will continue to play an important role in supporting efforts toward a better future for all Afghans.”

Canada’s new non-combat role will focus on four key areas: investing in the future of Afghan children and youth through education and health; advancing security, the rule of law and human rights; promoting regional diplomacy; and delivering humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people.

After 2011, Canadian Forces personnel will be deployed as part of the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) to continue training Afghan National Security Forces in a non-combat role, until March 2014. Canada will provide up to 950 military trainers and support personnel. Canada will work with allies to determine how proven Canadian expertise can further contribute to a disciplined and effective Afghanistan security force, which is essential for the security of Afghans and the rebuilding of Afghanistan.

“Since this mission began, Canada, along with our international partners, has helped to train and mentor about 50,000 Afghan troops. The post-2011 non-combat training mission will further contribute to the goal of preparing Afghans to assume responsibility for their own security,” said Minister MacKay. “The legacy of the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan will endure in a professional Afghan National Security Forces capable of providing a more secure and stable environment for the Afghan people.”

This chapter in Canada’s engagement will also include contributions aimed at improving the lives of Afghan women, as well as support to the G-8 Initiative on Maternal, Newborn and Child Health.

“The future of Afghanistan resides in the hands of women, children and youth,” said Minister Oda. “Thanks in part to our investments, we have achieved significant progress in helping improve life for women and children, but more progress is required, especially in Afghanistan’s education and health sectors. Canada will continue to place an important focus on women in its development work in Afghanistan.”

In making the announcement, the ministers paid tribute to the enormous contributions and sacrifices Canadians have made in all areas of endeavour in Afghanistan over the de

edited to fix link