what if you were the power to be

[Teddy Ruxpin]

But you got to admit you are dressing up 'old ideas' in new clothes.

Ahhh, that's better.

Yes, my ideas are - to an extent - old ones.  However, I'm going by the adage "if it ain't broke, don't fix it".  Moreover, I should think that provision of attack aviation, medium lift, new guns, UAVs, 4th rifle companies, a Special Operations group, leasing of aircraft, etc., etc.. is hardly "old think", although others have said the same thing before.

If you're looking for a complete restructure as was attempted with the DFS Regiment, I don't feel that we have such a significant problem with Army structure that the abandonment of current battalion-level institutions is required.  In fact, I often think that we're engaging in restructure initiatives just to be seen to be doing something, rather than attempt to find real solutions to tactical problems.  The DFS Regiment (IMHO) is a perfect example - unusable in any rational tactical sense.  I've personally seen no evidence that the traditional structures (battalions, regiments, etc.) are incapable of operating in the current tactical enviornment - if properly resourced and trained.  The Brits seem to do pretty well.  Again, if it ain't broke, don't fix it.  In Canada, we often attempt to "fix" things by rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic rather than address the underlying problem - the provision of adequate resources.  Sort that out and I suspect you'll find that the Army functions pretty well.

Cheers,

TR

 

[Old Sweat]

TR,

As a long-retired officer, I have rerained from dabbling in force structures, organizations and tactics. However, the last sentence of your above post summed the whole thing up. IMHO it is an exercise in futility to design forces or produce wish lists or theorize on better ways of doing things, if these solutions can not fit within any realistic resource envelope. Indeed, to fiddle for the sake of fiddling or to embrace untested concepts without a lot of serious thought and testing is worse than counter-productive.

As the Chief of the General Staff of the Canadian Army put it in 1927, when faced with a proposal to mechanize the army, "I am strong on sympathy, but short on cash." That surely has to be the motto of the Canadian peace time soldier.

 

[Unknown Factor]

In fact, I often think that we're engaging in restructure initiatives just to be seen to be doing something, rather than attempt to find real solutions to tactical problems.  

I believe this is a point we both agree on.  Further more the structuring and employment of a DFS Regt (IMHO) is exactlly that a perfect example.  But a lot of these ideas, rarely incorporate (if at all) the restructuring of Comd, and I am talking in the sense that an Inf Officer does not have a clue when it comes to armour capabilities outside of the 'known' and the same can be said for all.  But I would also argue that just because a capability may be 'new' to this Army, does not make it so.  Not one person in command has employed a Battle Group at the level that is suggested by the equipment on the 'wish list'.  I just wish that along with all the wish lists someone, like yourself, will openly admit that in order for any of this to work the whole process of leading at command level will have to change. What is so difficult that Officers are so unwilling to accept, that your training is not sufficent for what you propose and without accepting to change or improve this equipment will never be put to its full potential.  I would suspect that though the budget may have passed and equipment will be forth comming it will not alter much else other than moral, as leadership and field training will continue to be overlooked due to time, quality of life and unwillingness to accept inadequacy.

- "Pride is a dangerous trait and proven more often than not will lead to disaster, because nothing has happened does not give credit to the contrary."

I personally belive that if they want restructuring to work and implementation of new capabilities they improve the ability of an officer to command regardless of structure.  But, though I harbor a great respect for those who's command I have followed, I've yet to seen one who would be capable of what the Army is proposing and no matter how much change the ranks are told to go through to compensate, the problems will always be within the command structure.

 

[ArmyRick]

Getting topic back on thread, I would purchase the following
-Black Hawks and Chinooks (I beleive we need these more than new armored vehicle)
-If MGS fails and the US scrap it, then pick up the latest demo version of the XM8 by United Defense (120mm sounds fairly good).
-Pick up the general dynamics LTV with protected weapon station for light recce (can be built in Canada)
-Cheers

I would not pick up the CV90 (even though it is a great vehicle) because we have invested so much in LAVIII already. As the original post said, politics will play a part in procurement.

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

that your training is not sufficent for what you propose

Veering off-topic again, I find myself wondering what leads you to such a sweeping conclusion.

There are only a couple of nations that have operated at the BG level in combat operations - and we are not one of them.  Actual operations are the only "test" of the system.  Thus far, I have seen little indication that the training of officers at the Major/LCol level is deficient to the extent that command of a square battle group (which is still our doctrine and which is still what we train to) is beyond the "typical" unit commander.  Our training still mirrors (to a decent extent) that of our major allies in this regard - although as I said earlier, resource constraints have gutted our live-fire and collective training at all levels.  That's about to be fixed - in a big way - at CMTC.  Then we shall see...

I'm having trouble seeing where you feel the training is deficient - live fire combined arms exercises aside - or where your argument is going without specific examples.  All combat arms officers receive fairly extensive training in command of combined arms groupings and are expected to be fully familiar with the traits of all the weapons systems under their command.  Senior officers - even in this resource-constrained setting - will also have a passing (albeit often - but not always these days - theoretical) knowledge of the employment of UAVs, attack aviation, divisional level artillery, SF, air assault, etc..  So, given that, what would you change?

Frankly, I still have some faith in our training but neither you nor I can "win" this argument unless the concept is tested during actual operations.

We're off topic again, and I hate doing this (going off topic, that is) - I suspect we'll have to agree to disagree and leave it at that.

 

[a_majoor]

Back on topic and looking at time lines (and resurrecting an older thread, to save some time  )

Make the SEV prototype the basline vehicle for the ENTIRE CF fleet. This is an armoured hull with hybrid diesel electric drive and electric motors in the wheel hubs. The lower hull is armoured and mine resistant, providing protection for the utility and logistics fleet, while the hybrid drive provides fuel economy and electrical power for various uses (powering sensors, tools and accessories or weapons systems like turret drives). Everything from G-wagons, mud recce vehicles,  MLVWs, LAVs and so on could be built from variations of the SEV hull. We could start with SEV lower hull and wheel assemblies to create the MLVW replacement, then build on that experience to replace other elements of the fleet, ideally without any pause in the assembly line production of components (which would otherwise increase the costs).

The primary problem with deployment is the size of the logistics train, if all vehicles had common power systems, high fuel economy, wheels, lower hulls etc, then the size of the logistics train shrinks, and the entire force package is much easier to transport. For more details see: http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/27679/post-188549.html#msg188549