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US Election: 2016

So they paid off...194,000,000/16,600,000,000...~1.2% of their settlement using this method. "Whoop Dee Doo"...

Further, the article on lists 3 organizations that it claims are "Friendly Liberal Groups": National Council of La Raza, the National Urban League, and the Neighborhood Assistance Corporation of America. The total donated to these groups equates to ~$3.4 million. So, where did all of the other $80.6 million go?

Did they only donate to "Friendly Liberal Groups"? Was any money given to politically neutral, or friendly "conservative" groups? The article doesn't say, but their lack of any comment on the matter makes me curious.

And "Legacy Media" is ignoring the story because it's a non-story to begin with, and isn't even all that interesting or exciting even if it was.
 
Seems that history is repeating itself, and there are lessons to be learned.

How an Outsider President Killed a Party
The Whigs chose power over principles when they nominated Zachary Taylor in 1848. The party never recovered.


http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/06/history-campaign-politics-zachary-taylor-killed-whigs-political-party-213935

It was summer, and a major U.S. political party had just chosen an inexperienced, unqualified, loutish, wealthy outsider with ambiguous party loyalties to be its presidential nominee. Some party luminaries thought he would help them win the general election. But many of the faithful were furious and mystified: How could their party compromise its ideals to such a degree?

Sound like 2016? This happened a century and a half ago.

Many have called Donald Trump’s unexpected takeover of a major political party unprecedented; but it’s not. A similar scenario unfolded in 1848, when General Zachary Taylor, a roughhewn career soldier who had never even voted in a presidential election, conquered the Whig Party.

A look back at what happened that year is eye-opening—and offers warnings for those on both sides of the aisle. Democrats quick to dismiss Trump should beware: Taylor parlayed his outsider appeal to defeat Lewis Cass, an experienced former Cabinet secretary and senator. But Republicans should beware, too: Taylor is often ranked as one of the worst presidents in U.S. history—and, more seriously, the Whig Party never recovered from his victory. In fact, just a few years after Taylor was elected under the Whig banner, the party dissolved—undermined by the divisions that caused Taylor’s nomination in the first place, and also by the loss of faith that followed it.

Born in 1784 into a prominent Southern slaveholding family, Taylor was commissioned as an army officer at age 23. He first distinguished himself as a captain in the War of 1812 and gained even greater fame in the Second Seminole War, for which he earned the nickname “Old Rough and Ready” by bravely crossing a treacherous swamp with his men during the Battle of Okeechobee. The moniker suited this stocky, stern, undisciplined slob, who shared his men’s battlefield hardships and rarely dressed in military finery. With his signature straw hat, “he looks more like an old farmer going to market with eggs to sell,” one officer muttered.

It wasn’t until the Mexican-American War that Taylor, by then a major general, became a beloved national hero. Just days before Congress officially declared war on Mexico in May 1846, Taylor led U.S. troops to two victories over much larger Mexican forces at Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma. And in February 1847, Taylor’s force defeated Mexican troops despite being outnumbered 3 or 4 to 1 at the Battle of Buena Vista. After the victory, Taylor was toasted from Maine to Georgia. Americans sang, “Zachary Taylor was a brave old feller, Brigadier General, A, Number One/ He fought twenty thousand Mexicanoes;/ Four thousand he killed, the rest they ‘cut and run.’”

Members of both major political parties at the time—the Democrats and the Whigs—started holding public celebrations lauding Taylor with elaborate toasts to George Washington, the republic and their new hero. They often culminated with formal resolutions amid loud “huzzahs” endorsing Taylor’s nomination for president in 1848. As the booze-fueled, red, white and blue political excitement grew, one Kentuckian exclaimed, shortly after Taylor’s Buena Vista victory, “I tell ye, General Taylor is going to be elected by spontaneous combustion.”

As an active soldier, Taylor demurred at first. All his life, Taylor had proudly refused to enroll in a political party, boasting that he never voted. As late as 1846, Taylor insisted the idea of becoming president “never entered my head … nor is it likely to enter the head of any sane person.” His wife was ill and he felt unqualified. And he preferred to tend to his vast landholdings and slaveholdings in Kentucky, Louisiana and Mississippi—an inherited fortune augmented thanks to goodies showered on him after his war victories that made him one of the wealthiest Americans of his day.

Eventually, however, the political fervor swept up Taylor, too. In various letters that were quickly (and intentionally) publicized by the recipients, Taylor began explaining how “a sense of duty to the country” forced him to overcome his “repugnance” and permit people to advance his name. He might defer to the “spontaneous move of the people” but “without pledges” to stay true to any specific platform plank. He would only accept a nomination to be “president of the nation and not of a party.” A genuine nationalist who recognized how much Americans disliked professional politicians, Taylor placed himself above the “trading politicians … on both sides.”

Despite all this talk of staying away from one party or another, Taylor began inching toward the Whig Party, and the Whigs inched closer to him. At first glance, a general seemed to be a strange choice for the Whigs. Founded in the 1830s as a strained coalition of Southern states’ rights conservatives and Northern industrialists united mostly by disgust at Andrew Jackson’s expansion of presidential power, the Whig Party considered the war a disastrous result of presidential overreach. In fact, the popular backlash they stirred against Democratic President James K. Polk was so great that the Whigs seized control of Congress during the 1846 midterm election. But once America’s victory over Mexico triggered such enthusiasm, some Whigs calculated that running an extremely popular war hero like Taylor would prove to voters that the Whigs were patriotic, despite their anti-war stance.

Taylor also appealed to the Whigs’ founding fear of presidential power. In the letters he wrote, he invoked Whig doctrine, justifying a passive president who deferred to the people and the Congress.

And then, there was the slavery issue: Taylor’s ambiguous status as a slaveholder who dodged questions about the escalating slavery debate seemed to be a clever choice for a party increasingly divided over the South’s mass enslavement of blacks. The territory the U.S. acquired during the Mexican-American War only escalated the feud, sparking a major political debate over whether slavery would be allowed in the new territories. Both parties (each awkwardly uniting Northerners who disliked slavery with Southern slaveholders) had reason to seek safe candidates that year.

Still, many Whig loyalists mistrusted Taylor. He was crude, nonpartisan, unpresidential. Ohio Senator Thomas Corwin wondered how “sleeping 40 years in the woods and cultivating moss on the calves of his legs” qualified Taylor for the presidency. The great senator and former Secretary of State Daniel Webster called Taylor “an illiterate frontier colonel who hasn’t voted for 40 years.” Webster was so contemptuous he refused backroom deals to become Taylor’s running mate (unknowingly missing a chance to become president when Taylor died during his first term). Indeed, the biographer Holman Hamilton would pronounce Taylor “one of the strangest presidential candidates in all our annals … the first serious White House contender in history without the slightest experience in any sort of civil government.”

By the spring of 1848, now hungering for the nomination, Taylor tried mollifying these partisans. He professed his party loyalty in a ghostwritten letter that his brother-in-law John Allison knew to leak to the public. Still wary of making “pledges,” and boasting of his ignorance of political “details,” Taylor declared, “I am a Whig, but not an ultra Whig” in his first “Allison Letter” of April 22, 1848.

Taylor’s dithering annoyed the legendary ultra-Whig Henry Clay, who had lost a heartbreaking contest in 1844 to Polk and expected the 1848 nomination. “I wish I could slay a Mexican,” Clay grumbled, mocking celebrity soldiers not Hispanics. “The Whig party has been overthrown by a mere personal party,” he complained in June, vowing not to campaign if the party nominated this outsider. “Can I say that in [Taylor’s] hands Whig measures will be safe and secure, when he refused to pledge himself to their support?”

With Polk respecting his promise to serve only one term, at their convention in May the divided Democrats settled on General Lewis Cass, a former congressman, secretary of war and senator. The lumbering Michigander was considered a “doughface,” too malleable, a Northern man with Southern principles. His support for “popular sovereignty,” letting each new territory decide for itself on whether it would permit slavery, pleased the Democratic Party’s pro-slavery majority but infuriated abolitionists.
That June, during their convention at the Chinese Museum Building in Philadelphia the Whigs were torn over Taylor. On the first ballot, Taylor won 76 percent of the Southern vote, but 85 percent of the Northern delegates opposed him. A rival Mexican War hero, the Virginia-born General Winfield Scott, appealed to antislavery Whigs who hated Clay and Taylor because they were both slaveholders. On the fourth ballot, Taylor secured the nomination, beating Clay, Scott and Webster.

Taylor claimed he won on his own nonpartisan terms, without any promises. This victory signaled “confidence in my honesty, truthfulness and integrity never surpassed and rarely equaled [since George Washington],” Taylor boasted, 98 years before the originator of Trump-speak was born.
But the sectional animosity this outsider stirred was discouraging, especially since he was supposed to be capable of uniting the party and the nation. In the end, 62 percent of Taylor’s votes still came from Southern Whigs, who calculated that Taylor’s nomination would kill the abolitionist movement: “The political advantages which have been secured by Taylor’s nomination, are impossible to overestimate,” cheered one Southerner.

The nomination left many other Whigs dissatisfied. Even though the convention nominated the loyalist Millard Fillmore as vice president, many lamented that Taylor’s popularity had trumped party loyalty and principles. The party had not even drafted a platform for this undefined, unqualified leader. Horace Greeley of the New York Tribune pronounced the convention “a slaughterhouse of Whig principles.” The Jonesborough Whig did not know “which most to dispise, the vanity and insolence of Gen. Taylor, or the creeping servility” of the Whig Convention that nominated him.

Resisting pressure to run as an independent, but refusing to stump for Taylor, Henry Clay exclaimed, “I fear that the Whig party is dissolved and that no longer are there Whig principles to excite zeal and simulate exertion.” A New York Whig, claiming the convention “committed the double crime of suicide and paricide,” mourned, “The Whig party as such is dead. The very name will be abandoned, should Taylor be elected, for ‘the Taylor party.’”

And the party did indeed begin to dissolve. Almost immediately after the nomination, the self-proclaimed “Conscience Whigs” (anti-slavery Whigs) bolted, refusing to support a slaveholding candidate. Joining various other anti-slavery factions, including those that defected from the Democratic Party, the rebels formed The Free Soil Party and nominated former President Martin Van Buren.

Heading into the general election campaign, things didn’t look so good for Taylor. He started writing more and more letters crowing about his independence, disdaining party discipline, even saying he would have accepted the Democratic Party’s nomination too in his quest to be “president of the whole people.” His vanity and recklessness further dampened Whig enthusiasm.

But Fillmore’s desperate pleas to mollify alienated Whigs compelled Taylor to release a “Second Allison Letter” on September 4. In this missive, Taylor insisted he was following “good Whig doctrine” by saying “I would not be a partisan president and hence should not be a party candidate.” Taylor again hid behind his Army service, saying a soldier had to be nonpartisan, but also insisting everyone knew of his Whig inclinations. The letter “is precisely what we wanted,” Fillmore rejoiced. More important than Taylor’s words, the timing gave some Whigs an excuse to declare themselves satisfied. Even the New York Tribune’s Greeley eventually endorsed Taylor.

Meanwhile, in critical states like Ohio, Whig bosses and officeholders stressed “state matters” to stir local loyalties. And when it came to the divisive slavery issue, what the Democrats called the Whigs’ “two-faced” campaign worked: The Whigs in the South insisted that no slaveholder would abandon slavery, as Northern Whigs whispered that the passive Taylor would never veto a bill banning slavery in the new territories if it passed.

Blessed by an even more unpopular Democratic opponent whose party suffered more from the antislavery defections than the Whigs did, Taylor won—barely. He attracted only 47 percent of the popular vote, merely 60,000 more popular votes than Clay had in 1844, despite a population increase of 2 million. Turnout dropped from 78.9 percent in 1844 to 72.7 percent in 1848, reflecting public disgust with both candidates. Cass won 43 percent of the vote, and Van Buren won 10 percent. Taylor’s Electoral College margin of 36 was the slimmest in more than two decades. As hacks said the results “vindicated the wisdom of General Taylor’s nomination,” purists mourned the triumph of Taylor but not “our principles.” Greeley said losing in 1844 with a statesman like Clay strengthened Whig convictions: The 1848 election “demoralized” Whigs and undermined “the masses'” faith in the party. Greeley mourned this Pyrrhic victory: Whigs were “at once triumphant and undone.”

Greeley turned out to be right. Taylor was the last Whig president. His nomination had attempted to paper over the sectional tensions that would kill the party, but ultimately exacerbated them. Running a war hero mocked the Whig’s anti-war stand just as running a slaveholder failed to calm the divisive slavery issue. And, as a nonpartisan outsider, Taylor proved particularly unsuited to manage these internal party battles once elected.

Most dispiriting, Taylor, who made no pledges and had no principles, gave rank-and-file Whig voters nothing to champion, while alienating many of the most committed loyalists. In The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party, the historian Michael Holt notes that Taylor’s victory triggered an “internal struggle for the soul of the Whig party”: was it more committed to seizing power or upholding principle? Underlying that debate was also a deeper question, still pressing today, about the role of fame, popularity, celebrity, in presidential campaigning—and American political leadership.

Unfortunately for the wobbling Whigs, Southerners then felt betrayed when Taylor took a nationalist approach brokering what became the Compromise of 1850. As a result, Holt writes, “Within a year of Taylor’s victory, hopes raised by Whigs’ performance in 1848 would be dashed. Within four years, they would be routed by” the Democrats. “Within eight, the Whig party would totally disappear as a functioning political organization.”

Neither destiny nor sorcery, history offers warning signs to avoid and points of light for inspiration. America’s modern two-party system is remarkably resilient. Republicans have recently enjoyed a surge in gubernatorial, congressional and state legislative wins. Still, Trump and the Republicans might want to study 1848 to see the damage even a winning insurgent can both signal and cause. And many Republicans might want to consider what is worse: the institutional problems mass defections by
“Conscience Republicans” could bring about—or the moral ruin that could come from the ones who stay behind, choosing to pursue party power over principles.
 
Trumps latest tirade against the judge overseeing the class action suit against Trump university raises some serious concerns regarding his view on constitutional limits and separation of powers. When viewed along with some of his other stated views on domestic policy, alarm bells really should be going off.

Donald Trump Could Threaten U.S. Rule of Law, Scholars Say

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/04/us/politics/donald-trump-constitution-power.html?_r=0

WASHINGTON — Donald J. Trump’s blustery attacks on the press, complaints about the judicial system and bold claims of presidential power collectively sketch out a constitutional worldview that shows contempt for the First Amendment, the separation of powers and the rule of law, legal experts across the political spectrum say.

Even as much of the Republican political establishment lines up behind its presumptive nominee, many conservative and libertarian legal scholars warn that electing Mr. Trump is a recipe for a constitutional crisis.

“Who knows what Donald Trump with a pen and phone would do?” asked Ilya Shapiro, a lawyer with the libertarian Cato Institute.

With five months to go before Election Day, Mr. Trump has already said he would “loosen” libel laws to make it easier to sue news organizations. He has threatened to sic federal regulators on his critics. He has encouraged rough treatment of demonstrators.

His proposal to bar Muslims from entry into the country tests the Constitution’s guarantees of religious freedom, due process and equal protection.

And, in what was a tipping point for some, he attacked Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel of the Federal District Court in San Diego, who is overseeing two class actions against Trump University.

Mr. Trump accused the judge of bias, falsely said he was Mexican and seemed to issue a threat.

“They ought to look into Judge Curiel, because what Judge Curiel is doing is a total disgrace,” Mr. Trump said. “O.K.? But we will come back in November. Wouldn’t that be wild if I am president and come back and do a civil case?”

David Post, a retired law professor who now writes for the Volokh Conspiracy, a conservative-leaning law blog, said those comments had crossed a line.

“This is how authoritarianism starts, with a president who does not respect the judiciary,” Mr. Post said. “You can criticize the judicial system, you can criticize individual cases, you can criticize individual judges. But the president has to be clear that the law is the law and that he enforces the law. That is his constitutional obligation.”

“If he is signaling that that is not his position, that’s a very serious constitutional problem,” Mr. Post said.

Beyond the attack on judicial independence is a broader question of Mr. Trump’s commitment to the separation of powers and to the principles of federalism enshrined in the Constitution. Randy E. Barnett, a law professor at Georgetown and an architect of the first major challenge to President Obama’s health care law, said he had grave doubts on both fronts.

“You would like a president with some idea about constitutional limits on presidential powers, on congressional powers, on federal powers,” Professor Barnett said, “and I doubt he has any awareness of such limits.”

Republican leaders say they are confident that Mr. Trump would respect the rule of law if elected. “He’ll have a White House counsel,” Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, the majority leader, told Hugh Hewitt, the radio host, on Monday. “There will be others who point out there’s certain things you can do and you can’t do.”

Senator John McCain, Republican of Arizona, who has become a reluctant supporter of Mr. Trump, said he did not believe that the nation would be in danger under his presidency.

“I still believe we have the institutions of government that would restrain someone who seeks to exceed their constitutional obligations,” Mr. McCain said. “We have a Congress. We have the Supreme Court. We’re not Romania.”

“Our institutions, including the press, are still strong enough to prevent” unconstitutional acts, he said.

Mr. Post said that view was too sanguine, given the executive branch’s practical primacy. “The president has all the power with respect to enforcing the law,” he said. “There’s only one of those three branches that actually has the guns in its hands, and that’s the executive.”

Republican officials have criticized Mr. Obama for what they have called his unconstitutional expansion of executive power. But some legal scholars who share that view say the problem under a President Trump would be worse.

“I don’t think he cares about separation of powers at all,” said Richard Epstein, a fellow at the Hoover Institution who also teaches at New York University and the University of Chicago.

President George W. Bush “often went beyond what he should have done,” Professor Epstein said. “I think Obama’s been much worse on that issue pretty consistently, and his underlings have been even more so. But I think Trump doesn’t even think there’s an issue to worry about. He just simply says whatever I want to do I will do.”

Mr. Trump has boasted that he will use Mr. Obama’s actions as precedent for his own expansive assertions of executive power.

“He’s led the way, to be honest with you,” he said in January on “Meet the Press,” referring to Mr. Obama’s program to spare millions of immigrants in the country unlawfully from deportation. “But I’m going to use them much better, and they’re going to serve a much better purpose than what he’s done.”

But Mr. Post said there was a difference between Mr. Obama’s view of executive power and that of Mr. Trump. “Whatever you think of Obama’s position on immigration, he is willing to submit to the courts,” he said. “There is no suggestion that he will disobey if the courts rule against him.”

Several law professors said they were less sure about Mr. Trump, citing the actions of another populist, President Andrew Jackson, who refused to enforce an 1832 Supreme Court decision arising from a clash between Georgia and the Cherokee Nation.

“I can easily see a situation in which he would take the Andrew Jackson line,” Professor Epstein said, referring to a probably apocryphal comment attributed to Jackson about Chief Justice John Marshall: “John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it.”

There are other precedents, said John C. Yoo, a law professor at the University of California, Berkeley, who took an expansive view of executive power as a lawyer in the Bush administration. “The only two other presidents I can think of who were so hostile to judges on an individual level and to the judiciary as a whole would be Thomas Jefferson and Franklin Roosevelt,” he said.

Both of those presidents chafed at what they saw as excessive judicial power. “But they weren’t doing it because they had cases before those judges as individuals,” Professor Yoo said. “They had legitimate separation-of-powers fights between the presidency and the judiciary. Trump is lashing out because he has a lawsuit in a private capacity, which is much more disturbing.”

Other legal scholars said they were worried about Mr. Trump’s commitment to the First Amendment. He has taken particular aim at The Washington Post and its owner, Jeff Bezos, the founder of Amazon.

“He owns Amazon,” Mr. Trump said in February. “He wants political influence so Amazon will benefit from it. That’s not right. And believe me, if I become president, oh do they have problems. They’re going to have such problems.”

More generally, Mr. Trump has discussed revising libel laws to make it easier to sue over critical coverage.

“I’m going to open up our libel laws so when they write purposely negative and horrible and false articles, we can sue them and win lots of money,” Mr. Trump said in February. “We’re going to open up those libel laws. So when The New York Times writes a hit piece which is a total disgrace or when The Washington Post, which is there for other reasons, writes a hit piece, we can sue them and win money instead of having no chance of winning because they’re totally protected.”

On one hand, Mr. Trump seemed to misunderstand the scope of presidential power. Libel is a state-law tort constrained by First Amendment principles, and a president’s views do not figure in its application.

On the other hand, said Ilya Somin, a law professor at George Mason University, Mr. Trump’s comments betrayed a troubling disregard for free expression.

“There are very few serious constitutional thinkers who believe public figures should be able to use libel as indiscriminately as Trump seems to think they should,” Professor Somin said. “He poses a serious threat to the press and the First Amendment.”

Many of Mr. Trump’s statements about legal issues were extemporaneous and resist conventional legal analysis. Some seemed to betray ignorance of fundamental legal concepts, as when he said in a debate that Senator Ted Cruz of Texas had criticized Mr. Trump’s sister, a federal appeals court judge, “for signing a certain bill,” adding for good measure that Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr., while still an appeals court judge, had also “signed that bill.”

But bills are legislative rather than judicial documents. And, as it happened, Judge Alito had not joined the opinion in question.

Asked on “Good Morning America” in March about whom he would name to the Supreme Court, Mr. Trump said he would “probably appoint people that would look very seriously at” Hillary Clinton’s “email disaster because it’s criminal activity.” In the constitutional structure, however, Supreme Court justices are neither investigators nor prosecutors.

When Mr. Trump recently released a list of his potential Supreme Court nominees, conservative and libertarian scholars were heartened, but only to a point.

“It was a tremendous list, a great list,” said Mr. Shapiro, from the Cato Institute. “Who knows how much you can trust the list?”
 
cupper said:
Trumps latest tirade against the judge overseeing the class action suit against Trump university raises some serious concerns regarding his view on constitutional limits and separation of powers. When viewed along with some of his other stated views on domestic policy, alarm bells really should be going off.

Donald Trump Could Threaten U.S. Rule of Law, Scholars Say

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/04/us/politics/donald-trump-constitution-power.html?_r=0

If the system works then it will counter the threat.  That is what it was designed to do.

It's not always a good thing just to acquiesce to the system based on your own suppositions of what your limits are.
 
That brings up a good point about something I have been considering since the Trump Phenomenon took hold, the importance of who you choose to have as your advisors.

If all you select are yes men who agree to everything you put forth, and are unwilling or unable to challenge you when you are about to go down a dangerous path, then it is your own failing, but also the failing of the people around you to give sound and reasonable advice.

George W. Bush ran into this situation in his first term when he allowed Cheany and his staff to put forth positions on torture which were clear violations of international law and conventions. John Yoo and David David Adlington stretched the legal concepts past the breaking point, and a price was paid.

The same with the various surveillance programs developed under the patriot act. Fortunately in that case there was push back by the AG's office when it came time to renew. It lead to a minor constitutional crisis which was resolved in a manner favorable to the public interests and constitutional constructs.

Agreed. Ultimately if Trump does go rogue, the system does have checks and balances as the framers of the Constitution meant there to be. But what the US does not need at this time (or any time for that matter) is a major constitutional crisis which would be detrimental for the economy, and the country's place on the world stage.
 

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Interesting point about advisors.

I've have a bee in my bonnet about corporate legal and financial (and even engineering) advisors for years.

Most successful companies that I know of have been started by people that do not have a legal, financial or technical background.  When they grow investors invariably lumber management with all of the above.  When the original entrepreneur dies, retires, sells out or is forced out the investors then put the "professionals" in charge.  The company then goes into decline.

For some time now it has been my opinion that a good advisor is not one who declares "you can't do that!" but rather one that says "here are the consequences of that action" and lets the boss man decide whether he is comfortable with the risk.

Too many of the advisors are the opposite of Cheney - they are risk averse to a fault.

Another argument in favour of Trump is the perception of irrationality.  I don't know if he is irrational or not or if he just strives to appear that way.  Either way, I believe, it is necessary pre-condition for a leader in a dangerous world.

I just read an article in the Telegraph.  The author was commenting on an incident in Japan where mum and dad chucked their son out the car and drove off.  He got lost in the woods for seven days.  The author, who grew up in the 70s, was commenting that her kids don't give her the same respect she gave her parents precisely they don't believe her when she tells them she is going to chuck them out if they don't behave.  They know she is rational and would never commit such a heinous act.  On the other hand she knew that both her mum and dad were quite capable of acting irrationally and doing exactly as they threatened.

Ronald Reagan knew that, I believe, and he played the part of the irrational man with the button so well that the Russians believed he was capable of pushing it.  Just like Stalin, Kruschev and Brezhnev.  Everybody in the West believed they were irrational.

Maybe it is time to put the fear of god back in people and buy a pit bull and trust the system to keep it caged.
 
Chris Pook said:
I just read an article in the Telegraph.  The author was commenting on an incident in Japan where mum and dad chucked their son out the car and drove off.  He got lost in the woods for seven days.  The author, who grew up in the 70s, was commenting that her kids don't give her the same respect she gave her parents precisely they don't believe her when she tells them she is going to chuck them out if they don't behave.  They know she is rational and would never commit such a heinous act.  On the other hand she knew that both her mum and dad were quite capable of acting irrationally and doing exactly as they threatened.

When I heard about that story I said to myself, there is a kid who got ultimate payback against his parents. "Dump me on the side of the road will you?" "Well let's see who gets the last laugh when I disappear for a while."  ;D
 
I just read an interesting analysis by Ian Bremmer about just what could go wrong with Trump as President. Bremmer was the person who coined the "America First" description of Trump's views on foreign policy. He makes some good sound arguments that things aren't  the whole end of the world as we know it, but there is substantial risk to the US standing and its economy.

Trump and the World: What Could Actually Go Wrong
The definitive guide to the global risks of a Donald Trump presidency.


http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/06/2016-donald-trump-international-foreign-policy-global-risk-security-guide-213936

To hear Hillary Clinton tell it, letting Donald J. Trump anywhere near the Oval Office would be tantamount to inviting a nuclear apocalypse. The address she delivered from San Diego Thursday opened up a new front in the 2016 campaign: whether Trump can be trusted as leader of the free world. Calling Trump’s ideas “dangerously incoherent,” she presented herself a sure-handed, sober-minded alternative to the erratic billionaire. “He is not just unprepared,” she said, “he is temperamentally unfit to hold an office that requires knowledge, stability and immense responsibility.”

It’s powerful political rhetoric, and Trump is certainly an unknown quantity—perhaps even a radical disruption to the current order. But what are the actual global risks that a Trump presidency would pose?

His campaign has already raised any number of potentially destabilizing questions. Might President Trump send U.S. ground troops after ISIL? Confront Vladimir Putin, or let him run loose? Sanction Mexico or Japan? Bomb China’s artificial islands in the South China Sea? Wage trade war on China? Attack Iran or North Korea? Would he tear up existing trade deals? Pull the U.S. out of NATO if allies don’t pay more? Use U.S. debt as negotiating leverage? What risks might any or all of these actions pose for Americans?

My firm, Eurasia Group, specializes in analyzing large-scale global hazards, and each year we publish a list of what we see as the top geopolitical risks of the year. This year, there is so much uncertainty surrounding a Trump presidency that I’ve worked with Politico Magazine to apply this model to the specific question of a Trump presidency, with the goal of separating sound arguments from hype, and looking at the full-risk implications of a Trump foreign policy.

Mapping those implications is a challenge, in part because Trump’s habit of issuing contradictory statements on the campaign trail make it tough to predict what he would actually do in office. Both Trump and Clinton are shrewdly evasive candidates, but Clinton’s tenure as Barack Obama’s secretary of state gives her a clear track record we can study. She also has a campaign website that offers detailed foreign policy proposals. Trump has no foreign policy history and few clearly stated plans. It’s also much easier to guess whom Clinton might invite to join her team, and who might accept. Not so for Trump on either count; he has alienated much of the Republican foreign-policy establishment, depriving him of a reservoir of expertise he would normally be able to rely on.

Compounding the problem, Trump’s positions change pretty quickly. Clinton flip-flops as well, but her shifts develop more slowly than Trump’s and involve carefully crafted, if sometimes convoluted, justifications. Trump’s are a magician’s quicker-than-the-eye sleight of hand, and they often come with little or no explanation. Would Trump really try to ban all Muslims from entering the United States? That was a pledge, and then it was a “suggestion.” How could this ban be legal? How would it be enforced? He hasn’t said, and his supporters don’t seem to care.

That said, we have to assume that Trump’s “America First” philosophy will guide his choices. That’s a term I bear some responsibility for: When I observed earlier this spring that Trump’s worldview amounted to an “America First” foreign policy, I didn’t mean it as a compliment, and I was startled to see him grab that label with both hands. In addition, Trump prides himself on being a tough negotiator, and he wants to show U.S. taxpayers and foreign governments that he’s no chump.
What would a Trump presidency mean for the world?

He won’t be guided by ideology. He doesn’t appear to have one. He’s a gut-feel guy, a zero-sum strategist, and a bottom-line businessman. He won’t approach problems as if the world’s sole superpower can afford to be generous, to do more so that others can do less. He sees no special responsibility to be magnanimous, or even patient. Being No. 1 doesn’t mean playing the role of provider. It's about winning. It means being the toughest, smartest son of a bitch at the table. In short, Trump will probably try to remake U.S. foreign policy in his own (self-)image.

One caveat: I think Trump is unlikely to be president. A Democratic Party more unified after its convention will probably generate enough votes to lift Hillary Clinton to victory. And the nuclear threat, though it tops many people's list of visceral fears, is the ultimate red herring: Trump himself may be reckless, but we're well past the days of the Cold War and Cuban Missile Crisis. That's well outside what even he would be willing to gamble on.

But that doesn’t mean we can afford to dismiss the risks of a Trump foreign policy. He has hit on a message that resonates with millions of Americans, and it won’t be easy for future presidential candidates, of either party, to ignore the electoral potential of this formula. Even if Trump falls short, his America First approach to foreign policy deserves a close look because it will survive his candidacy. And if he does manage to pull of the upset, the implications of an America First foreign policy directed by Trump himself will be far reaching.

Here are the “Trump Top Risks,” the most worrisome implications of a Trump foreign policy, and a few red herrings we won’t need to worry about.

1. The Bolt from the Blue

Despite their best-laid plans, all presidents face storms they didn’t expect. For Bill Clinton it was the war in Yugoslavia. George W. Bush had 9/11. Barack Obama got the Arab Spring, a civil war in Syria, and the conflict in Ukraine. What’s the best way to handle the unexpected? In an off-the-record briefing with reporters in 2014, President Obama described his foreign policy doctrine as “Don’t do stupid stuff,” a “first, do-no-harm” approach to crisis management. “Don’t do stupid stuff is not an organizing principle,” as Hillary Clinton later noted, but it can help presidents avoid making a bad situation worse.

With Trump, the biggest risk comes from the way he’d handle a crisis that no one saw coming, whether from China, Putin, North Korea, a cyberattack, terrorists, or something else. As a candidate, he thrives on surprise. Restraint and strategic patience don’t figure among his strengths, and Trump might well respond to a bolt-from-the-blue crisis with a shot of bravado, a threat of escalation and tactics designed to keep antagonists, and maybe U.S. allies, off guard.

In addition to the risk of what will actually happen in a crisis, his approach creates another kind of risk, one that exists even without a crisis to trigger it. An improvised foreign policy based on maintaining the element of surprise might make policymakers and a few citizens feel more powerful, but it invites rivals and enemies to test U.S. intentions to find out what Washington will and will not defend. A clear policy, and predictable outcomes, help shape the behavior of the world’s bad actors. Mixed signals and big surprises, on the other hand, increase the risk of miscalculation on all sides—and increase the chances the U.S. will be provoked.

2. The Dollar

The U.S. benefits enormously from the dollar remaining the world’s reserve currency, the vital asset for central banks and commercial transactions of all kinds around the world. The dollar remains the safest port in any storm, because investors and other governments have confidence that it’s a reliable store of value. That keeps international demand for dollars high, holds inflation in check, and keeps U.S. interest rates relatively low, despite the expansion of the U.S. national debt.
An unpredictable foreign policy, the product of either an administration that likes surprises or a temperamentally erratic commander in chief, will undermine that confidence quickly. Worse, any hint from the president that the U.S. might deliberately default on its debt, for any reason, will inflict damage that can’t be undone, and it will push foreign governments to look more urgently for an alternative. Trump appeared to learn that lesson a few weeks ago when he had to quickly reverse course after hinting he might want to renegotiate debt. But that sort of threat is consistent with the brash and impetuous image Trump has cultivated throughout the campaign, and these sorts of doubts, once raised, are hard to erase. It’s damaging for a presidential candidate to say such a thing, much more so for a president.

This risk is unprecedented for a credible presidential candidate: No one else has said the things Trump is saying about debt and America’s global relationships. The impact has been mitigated for the moment by the reality that there is no viable dollar alternative. Investors in sovereign debt aren’t ready to bet more heavily on the longevity of the euro. China’s financial system is still too underdeveloped, its economy too opaque, and its military power too much in question to support the growth of the yuan as a global reserve currency. Even within a well-diversified basket of currencies, there aren’t yet other viable options. Demand for dollars will remain high for now, but the search for alternatives will continue, and a Trump presidency would sharply accelerate the process.

3. U.S.-led alliances and institutions

The Obama administration has confused a lot of U.S. allies, who no longer know what sort of leadership Washington is willing and able to offer. European allies aren’t clear on what role the U.S. will play in the Middle East or how far it will go to face down threats from Russia. Both Israel and Saudi Arabia are unsure how the U.S. will respond over time to security threats in the Middle East, particularly from Iran. Many of China’s neighbors were heartened by Obama’s “pivot to Asia” and his push for the Trans-Pacific Partnership, an enormous trade deal, but U.S. staying power in the face of China’s expansion remains very much in doubt, and Trump’s views on trade are now well-known around the world.

In today’s more volatile world, the U.S. needs allies. Many of Trump’s campaign pledges will make it harder to regain the trust Obama has lost. Some of them will inflict still more damage. Trump’s charge that NATO allies are freeloaders won’t improve relations with European governments or voters. His threats to impose tariffs on Mexico and Japan will antagonize citizens and lawmakers in those countries. A promise to eject 11 million undocumented workers from the U.S. and build a wall along the southern border will antagonize millions of Latin-Americans. His “suggestion” that all Muslims should be banned from entering the country won’t improve U.S. relations with the world’s Muslims or their governments, both of whom are critical for the daily struggle against terrorism.

Whether or not he follows through on these campaign pledges, the uncertainty President Trump will create will leave many allies unsure how much responsibility they can afford to accept as part of collective action. Some will take risks, expecting U.S. support that isn’t coming. Others will question U.S. intentions, and the Trump administration’s refusal to make clear which commitments it will honor and which it won’t will strip allied governments of the domestic support required to spend the money and accept the risks needed to take more responsibility for their own security. U.S. allies deserve to know whether the United States intends to lead, whether it will fight only for its core interests, or whether they must now adapt to the reality that the Americans aren’t coming. And U.S. voters are likely to remain divided over the value of American leadership. Does an active international role make the United States safer and more prosperous? Or poorer and less secure? Trump hasn’t offered a clear answer to that fundamental question.

One clear beneficiary of Trump-generated uncertainty will be China. Allies in Asia will hedge their bets on American staying power with a stronger embrace of China. To protect their economies and promote their flagship companies, Britain and Germany will do the same. Trump has already offered a preview of the future of the “special relationship” by contradicting Prime Minister David Cameron’s call for Britons to vote to remain within the European Union, by warning that he and Cameron are “not going to have a very good relationship” after Cameron called his proposed ban on Muslims “stupid,” and by challenging London’s newly elected Muslim mayor to an IQ test. The mayor of Paris has a similarly low opinion of Trump’s intelligence, and France will turn to Russia for help in the Middle East. Putin will then feel freer to test a weakened NATO, confident that European governments will balk at Trump’s insistence that they pay a much higher share of NATO’s bills. Japan will move toward a more assertive defense policy, heightening tensions and the risk of conflict in the region that is more important than any other for the future of the global economy. Doubts about Trump’s commitments will undermine the ability of institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, in which Washington has considerable influence, to function.

4. Trade

For long-term peace and prosperity, America’s commercial partnerships are as important as its military alliances. Trump’s abrasive approach to trade negotiations will push potential partners around the world, including traditional U.S. allies, toward China. If Trump wins the election, Speaker Paul Ryan probably won’t have support from enough House Republicans to pass the TPP, the largest free-trade agreement ever negotiated by the U.S. Both Bernie Sanders and Trump have anchored their campaigns on the claim that trade kills U.S. jobs. Opposition to trade from pro-labor Democrats is nothing new, but the growing chorus of conservative anti-trade voices has drowned out traditional support from the business community. The Transatlantic Partnership, a still nascent U.S.-European deal, is already on a slow boat to nowhere. U.S. public support for it has fallen from 53 percent in 2014 to 18 percent today. Given his hard-line comments on the campaign trail, it’s unlikely that any government will want to invest political capital in trying to bargain with President Trump on trade.

Trump probably wouldn’t follow through on threats to impose 45 percent tariffs on goods from China and 35 percent on imports from Mexico. No need to start trade wars that would inflict heavy damage on all sides. But given his campaign complaints that China, Mexico, Japan and others are dumping cheap products into American markets to harm U.S. companies, we should expect his administration to be hyperactive in launching cases against dumping, theft of intellectual property, and accusations of cyberattacks. Mexico would be especially vulnerable since this is the culprit with whom the U.S. has greatest leverage. It’s important for any U.S. administration to insist on fair trade practices from other governments, and the Obama administration recently slapped import taxes of more than 500 percent on imports of Chinese cold-rolled flat steel. But Trump’s campaign rhetoric suggests that his administration will pursue these cases much more often and more aggressively—and probably sometimes for political, rather than commercial, reasons.

5. Terrorism

Finally, a Trump presidency would make the United States, its citizens and its assets the single most attractive target for Al Qaeda, ISIL, and other Islamic militant groups. There is obviously nothing new about terrorist attacks, and would-be attacks, on American targets. The Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations have all faced this problem. But Trump’s intensely anti-Muslim rhetoric will encourage a lot more militants to look beyond softer and more accessible targets in Europe toward the “big score,” a deadly attack on Trump’s America. U.S. military personnel, businesspeople and tourists are more likely to be targeted abroad. Trump’s rhetoric will also make it easier for militant organizations to recruit and raise money, and a more aggressive intervention in the Middle East’s various conflicts would only amplify this effect. It’s impossible to know where and when terrorists will strike, but Trump’s anti-Muslim vitriol will make America less safe, not more.
 
Pt. 2

RED HERRINGS: WHAT NOT TO WORRY ABOUT

1. U.S.-China relations

There is considerable fear that Trump’s anti-China rhetoric will ratchet up tension with a nation that could be our most dangerous rival, militarily and economically. But this doesn’t pose the risk you might think. The next president, Trump or Clinton, will have two advantages in U.S. relations with China, the world’s most important bilateral relationship. First, China’s leaders are now focused on a complex, high-stakes economic reform process, one designed to transition from an inefficient export-based economy to a more innovative and resilient model powered mainly by domestic consumption. Success depends on Beijing’s ability to avoid conflicts that are bad for business, even those concocted by a U.S. president who wants to shake things up. Second, the expected slowdown in Chinese economic growth looks to be under control, and President Xi Jinping appears confident in his hold on power. Trump’s campaign assertion that Japan and South Korea should take greater responsibility for their own security will increase that confidence. This gives him less incentive to create an artificial foreign policy emergency to divert public attention from domestic problems.

President Trump will make a point of antagonizing China, particularly on trade and investment relations, but Chinese officials can afford to respond by taking the high road on most points of potential conflict to try to convince other governments that Washington, not Beijing, is the cause of trouble in U.S.-China relations. Trump will sometimes spoil for a fight, but Xi appears unlikely to give him one under any but the most extraordinary circumstances.

2. Asia’s geopolitics

China isn’t the only country in the midst of a delicate and dangerous domestic economic reform process. Japan’s Shinzo Abe and India’s Narendra Modi are hoping to avoid confrontations with China that undermine efforts to stoke growth. The South China Sea remains a hot spot worth watching, but Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia can’t afford a direct confrontation with Beijing. Leaders of all these countries will sometimes saber-rattle for short-term political gain, but actual conflict is in no one’s interests. President Trump and newly elected President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines have enough in common to build a solid relationship. The loss of the TPP would hurt Japan and a number of South Asian countries, but that will make stable relations with China only that much more important for them. Asian leaders will watch President Trump closely, but the risk that any of them will allow push to come to shove is lower than many fear.

3. Iran

Will Trump provoke conflict with Iran? In April, Trump told AIPAC, America’s most powerful pro-Israel lobby organization, that his “No. 1 priority is to dismantle the disastrous [nuclear] deal with Iran.” That pledge would be more credible were it not a direct contradiction of other comments he’s made on this subject, and if, as with his ban on Muslims entering the country, he hadn’t already established a pattern of backing away from other (apparently) deeply held convictions. Criticizing the Iran deal allows him to attack the president—and, by extension, Hillary Clinton—on a signature issue. But when he’s not in front of AIPAC, Iran hasn’t figured prominently among the list of adversaries he wants to corner.

Donald Trump presents himself as the man uniquely qualified to “remasculate” U.S. foreign policy, to sweep aside those who believe leadership depends as much on patience, discipline, generosity and imagination as on military muscle and an iron will. He wants to reassert American power without a mature understanding of the basis for that power. He lives in a zero-sum world, one divided between winners and losers, good and evil, doers and freeloaders, us and them.

But America First won’t strengthen America. It will alienate friends and embolden rivals. In the process, it will badly damage U.S. commercial interests. It will undermine the institutions that the U.S. and its allies created from the ashes of World War II and which continue to extend U.S. international influence into the future. It will cast grave doubt on what America stands for.

A Trump foreign policy will undermine U.S. exceptionalism, the consensus-based conviction that America will fight for more than its self-interest and is therefore worthy of emulation. That idea has sustained plenty of damage in recent years. It will sustain more. But the biggest risk posed by a Donald Trump foreign policy is that he will destroy this worthy aspiration once and for all.
 
Here is what to not worry about: everything Trump says.  He isn't making policy statements; he is pandering to get elected.  What has establishment politicians riled is that he is doing what they do - tell lies to get elected - but he dialed it up to a level they lacked the courage to try.

Importantly with respect to foreign relations: between Clinton and Trump, Trump seems to be the less interventionist.

Rule of law has been strained in the US for four full presidential terms now.  Trump is the lesser risk.  Many establishment Republicans and conservatives are critical of Trump; congressional Republicans and Democrats may be expected to push back against Trump.  Congressional Democrats will not push back against a Democratic president - they have proven it.

 
Started work on my own page o' links to keep track of the U.S. election - sharing it here in case someone might find it useful.

All adds/suggestions welcome - enjoy!
 
milnews.ca said:
Started work on my own page o' links to keep track of the U.S. election - sharing it here in case someone might find it useful.

All adds/suggestions welcome - enjoy!

What? No link to Bernie Sanders?  ;)
 
Brad Sallows said:
Here is what to not worry about: everything Trump says.  He isn't making policy statements; he is pandering to get elected.  What has establishment politicians riled is that he is doing what they do - tell lies to get elected - but he dialed it up to a level they lacked the courage to try.

Importantly with respect to foreign relations: between Clinton and Trump, Trump seems to be the less interventionist.

Rule of law has been strained in the US for four full presidential terms now.  Trump is the lesser risk.  Many establishment Republicans and conservatives are critical of Trump; congressional Republicans and Democrats may be expected to push back against Trump.  Congressional Democrats will not push back against a Democratic president - they have proven it.

There are a couple of problems with that though.

First, the pandering that Trump is doing is a detriment for the GOP not only going into the general election for this year, but also it has ramifications carrying on into the 2018 midterms and the 2020 race. And the message he is using only appeals to a specific part of the so called GOP base. And it won't get him elected in November, and makes it more difficult for some down ticket GOP candidates to win.

Second, and what I see is the bigger problem, the man has no policy, either foreign or domestic. With no record of public service which he can point to as experience, all he really has to run with is policy proposals. And I've heard nothing from him that comes close to being called a policy.

What gets me when you listen to the pundits and campaign reps speak about Trump and his electability, the Dems and pundits throw out the argument that everything he's done to now is only going to alienate big portions of the electorate. But his supporters and GOP pundits say "Well, it got him the nomination."

Yes, yes it did. But the GOP primary electorate is only a small part of the overall general electorate. And the percentage that voted for Trump is an even smaller subset of that group. And its not a big enough of a base to rely upon when your campaign message is as toxic to the key voting blocks you need to engage in order to win in November. Especially when there are alternatives on the ballot such as the Libertarians.

The first rule to follow when you have dug yourself into a hole is to stop digging. :dunno:

Not sure what they say about pulling the dirt back in on top of yourself.  [:D
 
Sure, Trump might not be electable.  But he might be the least damaging of the two likely options.  The US is still pretty much a 50/50 country with respect to its "culture wars", but the Democrats no longer care whether there is strong bipartisan support for the major changes they want to make.
 
Second, and what I see is the bigger problem, the man has no policy, either foreign or domestic. With no record of public service which he can point to as experience, all he really has to run with is policy proposals. And I've heard nothing from him that comes close to being called a policy.

So without Google, and off the top of your head - what has been President Obama's policy?
 
muskrat89 said:
So without Google, and off the top of your head - what has been President Obama's policy?

Don't start a war and don't sleep with an intern?
 
muskrat89 said:
So without Google, and off the top of your head - what has been President Obama's policy?

[sarcasm]Be the worst possible socialist that ever walked the face of the earth.[/sarcasm]

Obama is not running in this election, and Clinton has at times embraced and then distanced herself from the policies of the current resident of 1600 Pennsylvania Ave to the point where it's hard to nail her down with a plan to continue Obama's agenda.

The GOP has plenty of ammunition to argue against Clinton replacing Obama that they do not need to muddy the waters by mounting a challenge to Obama's policies during his 8 years in office. All of this is in consideration that they have yet to show any viable alternatives to his policies that they have rejected.

Many are saying that Clinton will just become a third term of the Obama administration. I don't think that will be the case. Billary (yes you will get a 2 fer if she is elected) is significantly different from Obama, particularly when it comes to foreign policy that attacking her based on Obama's policies would be missing the point.

Now the GOP and Trump are a different story, and this is where the Clinton campaign is going to have to fight a two front war. Trump's lack of experience and lack of policy means that the Party will be setting the agenda. And that agenda may be in opposition to what Trump wants. You can read it in the tea leaves in the contortions that the current GOP leadership and incumbents are putting themselves through in leveraging nuances between supporting the nominee and endorsing the nominee. Ryan's statement today regarding Trumps diatribe against the judge in his civil suit show this vividly. The party needs to get a Republican in the White House to ensure their conservative agenda can go forth, regardless of how bad that choice is.

You are going to see two campaigns from the GOP. Trump as the attack dog going after Clinton, but not having any form of an agenda of his own. And the Party putting out its' agenda and appealing to the voters that they need to elect Trump and the down ticket candidates in order to ensure that agenda can move forward in 2017.

So asking to name Obama's policies is at best a red herring.
 
cupper said:
Now the GOP and Trump are a different story, and this is where the Clinton campaign is going to have to fight a two front war. Trump's lack of experience and lack of policy means that the Party will be setting the agenda. And that agenda may be in opposition to what Trump wants. You can read it in the tea leaves in the contortions that the current GOP leadership and incumbents are putting themselves through in leveraging nuances between supporting the nominee and endorsing the nominee. Ryan's statement today regarding Trumps diatribe against the judge in his civil suit show this vividly. The party needs to get a Republican in the White House to ensure their conservative agenda can go forth, regardless of how bad that choice is.

More evidence that Trump is the GOP's albatross, but a burden they are willing to bear to regain the White House. McConnell gives Trump a dope slap. But will it work?

McConnell tells Trump: 'Get on message'

http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/282524-mcconnell-to-trump-get-on-message

Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) called on his party's presumptive presidential nominee Donald Trump to "get on message" in order to win the White House.

"We have plenty of issues," McConnell told reporters. "And my advice to our nominee would be to start talking about the issues that the American people care about and to start doing it now."

“In addition to that, it’s time to quit attacking various people that you competed with or with various minority groups in the country and get on message,” he said. “This election is eminently winnable.”

McConnell was barraged by questions about Trump's recent attacks on a federal judge's impartiality in a lawsuit against Trump University because of the judge's Mexican heritage.

McConnell reiterated that he "disapproved" of Trump's remarks but declined to condemn them as racist; Speaker Paul Ryan (R-Wis.), on the other hand, described Trump's comments as "textbook" racism earlier Tuesday.

“In a number of interviews on the subject of our nominee and his comments, I expressed my disapproval over and over and over again,” McConnell said. “I was asked about every incident last week. I’ve already said that I’ve disapproved of them."

McConnell repeated his warning, first issued last week, that Trump risks turning off Latino voters from the GOP in the same manner Barry Goldwater, the 1964 Republican presidential nominee, alienated African-American voters from his party for decades.

“I was worried that we would do to the Latino vote what was done to the African-American vote by defining our party in such a way that we could not reach out what has become the nation’s largest minority group,” he said. “I am worried about that. I said that last week and I’ll say it again today.”
 
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