Shake Hands with the Devil: The Journey of Roméo Dallaire

[gratefulcivi]

Occasional lurker, first-time poster.  Thought it would be timely to point out that a film about LGen Dallaire's return to Rwanda is showing as part of the Toronto Int'l film festival.  Details below, or at

http://www.e.bell.ca/filmfest/2004/filmsschedules/description.asp?pageID=searchforafilm&id=261


FILM TITLE:

Shake Hands with the Devil: The Journey of Roméo Dallaire

Programme: Real to Reel
Director: Peter Raymont
Country: Canada
Year: 2004
Language: English
Time: 90 minutes
Film Types: Colour/Digital Betacam



SCREENING TIMES:
Sunday, September 12     03:30 PM     VARSITY 8
Tuesday, September 14     03:00 PM     VARSITY 8

Production Company: White Pine Pictures/Canadian Broadcasting Corporation/Société Radio-Canada
Producer: Peter Raymont
Written By: Based in part on the book "Shake Hands With the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda" by Lt. Gen. Roméo Dallaire
Cinematography: John Westheuser
Editor: Michele Hozer
Sound: Ao Loo
Music: Mark Korven
Principal Cast: Lt. Gen. Roméo Dallaire

In 1994, approximately eight hundred thousand people were brutally slaughtered in Rwanda. Most belonged to the Tutsi tribe, though many of the victims were moderate Hutus who refused to participate in the genocide. The horrific nature of this event was exacerbated by the outside world's indifference. As embassies were swiftly evacuated and multinational companies pulled up stakes, the only international presence left (and the only possible sanctuary) was a small United Nations force - but it was hamstrung by that organization's inability or refusal to act.

Their leader was Canadian Lieutenant General Roméo Dallaire, who - despite suggestions that he depart as well - insisted on staying. After nearly a decade of silence, Dallaire recently addressed the events he witnessed in his book "Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda." In early 2004, he returned to Rwanda for the first time since the genocide. That visit is the subject of acclaimed filmmaker Peter Raymont's powerful documentary, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Journey of Roméo Dallaire.

The film recounts the facts of the catastrophe in chilling detail. We hear about the woefully undermanned UN force and the conflicting agendas of the countries involved (many only to rescued their own citizens); the inexperience of the peacekeepers, who failed to recognize actual threats (brutal agitators were dismissed as mere "clowns"); and the appalling lack of fortitude and foresight shown by the UN (Dallaire could have stopped much of the slaughter if they had let him attack a weapons depot).

Raymont interviews a string of diplomats and witnesses, including UN Special Envoy Stephen Lewis and BBC reporter Mark Doyle; the latter offers one of the most telling indictments when he says that news networks were more concerned about the O.J. Simpson case than genocide in Africa. Ultimately, though, the focus is on Dallaire himself, still haunted by his inability to prevent the massacre. Many argue he is too hard on himself, but it is Dallaire's refusal to cede responsibility which, even now, makes him so intriguing. Shake Hands with the Devil is a study of one of the most horrifying incidents in recent memory, but it's also a portrait of heroism.

- Steve Gravestock

Peter Raymont worked at the National Film Board of Canada in Montreal before moving to Toronto. He has directed more than one hundred documentaries during his thirty-year career. His numerous international awards include a Genie for best short documentary for The World Is Watching (88). His other films include: Voices from the Shadows (92), Chasing the Dream (93), Hearts of Hate: The Battle for Young Minds (94), The Undefended Border (02), The World Stopped Watching (03) and Shake Hands with the Devil: The Journey of Roméo Dallaire (04).

This film is rated 18A.

 

[pbi]

In 1997, when I was the Canadian student at the United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, MGen Dallaire was one of the guest speakers. I had the great honour to be his Aide de Camp during his visit, so I got to meet him for the first time. I have since had a short telephone conversation with him on an unrelated matter. My impression of him is that he is a very good man who carries a huge burden. My classmates at Quantico shared that opinion: you could have heard a pin drop in that lecture hall with 300 people in it, and his lecture was the talk of the syndicate rooms for a couple of days afterward. I was told by one of the faculty that every year MGen Dallaire was selected as top or runner-up guest speaker of the year: and that was against a playing field that included some pretty heavy hitters such as the Chiefs of each of the US services, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, etc etc. I was very proud to be a Canadian soldier. Cheers.

 

[R2Truman]

I am constantly amazed at our ability to lionize a man who so clearly failed in his appointment, then top that off we promte not once, but twice.  Yes Rwanda was a tradegy, and possibly not preventable, but surely some action as opposed to Daillaire's response might have shook the jello tree... I beleive part of his PTSD issue, which I accept is very real and painful for him, is that he is trying to come to grips with the fact that he decided to do nothing....
R2

 

[Infanteer]

Hmm...two of your three posts have managed to rip into the two most active General Officers of the Canadian Army with two sentence attacks, all the while hiding behind a nice anonymous profile.   Is this the usual way for Ottawa snipers to contribute?

 

[pbi]

R2T:

I am constantly amazed at our ability to lionize a man who so clearly failed in his appointment, then top that off we promte not once, but twice.  Yes Rwanda was a tradegy, and possibly not preventable, but surely some action as opposed to Daillaire's response might have shook the jello tree... I beleive part of his PTSD issue, which I accept is very real and painful for him, is that he is trying to come to grips with the fact that he decided to do nothing....

Perhaps the reason we are proud of him is that given the limited resources at his disposal, and the dysfunctional, bureaucratic system he was trying to work within, he did what he could do, short of launching his own personal bayonet charge. If you say he failed, I agree with you. So does he. But, in his failure he did something very important: he shoved the UN and the world's face in the sh*t that existed in Rwanda, which far too many governments would just like to forget. The Brahini Report, which marked the first time the UN took a really hard look at how it does "peace ops" (whatever those are...) and which built up more steam for a UN Standby Force, was IMHO a direct outcome of his efforts. His real value is as a messenger, exposing the whole sordid story to us and warning us (especially us complacent Canadians) that sometimes the only way to stop bad people is to use force, including killing them quickly before they can get rolling.

As for his promotions, I don't know enough about him to begrudge him his rank. The brief time I spent with him, however, gave me the feeling of a good human being and a natural leader: the best kind of person to wear that rank. I guess you must know him better than me. Which is quite possible, of course. Cheers.

 

[Slim]

I am constantly amazed at our ability to lionize a man who so clearly failed in his appointment, then top that off we promte not once, but twice.   Yes Rwanda was a tradegy, and possibly not preventable, but surely some action as opposed to Daillaire's response might have shook the jello tree... I beleive part of his PTSD issue, which I accept is very real and painful for him, is that he is trying to come to grips with the fact that he decided to do nothing....
R2

I guess you missed the whole siries of " How to win friends and influence people" lectures at NDHQ? It was the same day as the "Support good troops and officers" lecture...Don't worry though, those lectures are never well attended. :

I'm sure you wouldn't have understood anyway.

Slim

 

[Blindspot]

I am constantly amazed at our ability to lionize a man who so clearly failed in his appointment, then top that off we promte not once, but twice.   Yes Rwanda was a tradegy, and possibly not preventable, but surely some action as opposed to Daillaire's response might have shook the jello tree... I beleive part of his PTSD issue, which I accept is very real and painful for him, is that he is trying to come to grips with the fact that he decided to do nothing....
R2

Are you from Belgium by any chance?

 

[Duotone81]

I am constantly amazed at our ability to lionize a man who so clearly failed in his appointment , then top that off we promte not once, but twice.   Yes Rwanda was a tradegy, and possibly not preventable, but surely some action as opposed to Daillaire's response might have shook the jello tree... I beleive part of his PTSD issue, which I accept is very real and painful for him, is that he is trying to come to grips with the fact that he decided to do nothing....
R2

He failed to prevent the unpreventable eh? A contradiction n'est pas? Well I'm sure with your witty comments and great logic you would've been able to do more with less and prevent the slaughter of 800000 people with only a handful of poorly trained and equiped Bangladeshi Peace Keepers. He decided to do nothing? I guess he missed the lecture on Carpe Diem at RMC. Or you have no clue what you're talking about perhaps?

Note: I apologise to the Mods and other members of this board if I'm out of line but I have the utmost respect for MGen. Dallaire and I get upset when I hear this sort of slander.

 

[Lexi]

This film is rated 18A.

Rats. 

 

[Slim]

We'll paint a moustache on you and sneak you in Lex

Slim

 

[alan_li_13]

Planning to go see it this Tuesday w/ a few of my cadet buddies. Too bad it starts at 3 pm, we'll have to leave school early.
I'm gonna bring my copy of the book in hopes that he'll be there to sign it.

 

[KevinB]

I always considered Dallaire a failure - and wondered why they sent an Artillery officer to command an Infantry Mission (of course he is French and it was the Artillery's turn  : ).

Honestly if Dallaire is to be beleived that he sent all these messages about being understrength etc.  You might wonder why he did not do a "Mac" and gone to the Press ???  Or was he just asleep at the switch...

 

[Redeye]

KevinB:

Reference your first statement, while anyone in the CF is entitled to cynicism, his original MOC isn't so important, by the time you make it to being a General in any form, you should have a very thorough understanding of the role of all trades, so I don't think his artillery background is an issue.  For whatever reason, he was the man picked to do the job.

I'm sure in hindsight, the media might have been an effective strategy to get the world to see what he saw - but of course, hindsight is always 20/20, it's when you're on the ground things are different...  Who even knows if it might have been as effective as "Mac"'s choices were?

All I know, for what it's worth, is that I'd never want to trade places with him.

 

[Gunner]

I always considered Dallaire a failure - and wondered why they sent an Artillery officer to command an Infantry Mission (of course he is French and it was the Artillery's turn  ).  Honestly if Dallaire is to be beleived that he sent all these messages about being understrength etc.  You might wonder why he did not do a "Mac" and gone to the Press  Or was he just asleep at the switch...

Kevin, you posts are generally of better quality than this.  Criticize his actions if you want but explain it with reason vice "armchair general" rationale. 

You know if the Patricia's had a better grip on 2 Cdo the Airborne Regiment wouldn't have been disbanded.  Thanks for ruining it for the rest of the army.  :

 

[KevinB]

Gunner,  I got cuttoff from my full responce. 

The mission clearly required more troops - when faced with the cold facts that the UN does not care about black africa Dalaire had two choices 1) to pull his troops back into a more protective posture, and let the genocide occur.  2) Go public with the damning evidence that the UN was not interested in stopping the slaughter.

The Third option leave the troops out and let them sit int he breaze was not a rationale option - for while I agree with Mission, Men, Equiptment, Self - as a cornerstone for operations, in an operation where he apparently clearly noted that there was no hope for success it is foolhardy to squander your troops for no possibility of sucess.

On top of that there are reports that he drove past the scene of the Belgian murders while the Para's had been disarmed but where still alive - now I would expect a LEADER to take some personal risk and come to the aid of his beleaguered forces if he was in the direct vicinity.

He chose option 3...


Now IMHO that makes him culpable for the failed mission.

 

[Gunner]

The mission clearly required more troops - when faced with the cold facts that the UN does not care about black Africa Dalaire had two choices 1) to pull his troops back into a more protective posture, and let the genocide occur.  2) Go public with the damning evidence that the UN was not interested in stopping the slaughter.

I would submit to you that the UN, the world, and the media didn't care sweet tweet about Rwanda, the main focus was on Europe at the time.  How much support can you muster when no one cares about what you are doing.  I've served in Africa and from my perspective, no one really cares about Africa (that goes for the Africans themselves and the remainder of the world).  It is a beautiful continent with untapped potential in terms of its people and resources and all it seems capable of doing is one step forward and three back.

The Third option leave the troops out and let them sit int he breaze was not a rationale option - for while I agree with Mission, Men, Equiptment, Self - as a cornerstone for operations, in an operation where he apparently clearly noted that there was no hope for success it is foolhardy to squander your troops for no possibility of sucess.

He tried to stop it, but he wasn't able to.  Had he done something else will be academic at this point.  As he himself has stated, he constantly wonders if he should have went down in a blaze of glory trying to stop state sponsored genocide in the country without any mandate and no support from the rest of the world.  Would the Belgians, arguably his best troops, actually have followed him down that path?  Certainly the remainder of his Third World force wouldn't have.

On top of that there are reports that he drove past the scene of the Belgian murders while the Para's had been disarmed but where still alive - now I would expect a LEADER to take some personal risk and come to the aid of his beleaguered forces if he was in the direct vicinity.

 

Haunts him as well.  What would have accomplished the greater good.  Save the lives of a couple of Belgians or save the lives of hundreds of thousands of Tutsi?  Quite a moral conundrum.  Not sure what I would have done in the same situation because it is simply a "what if" scenario.

Now IMHO that makes him culpable for the failed mission.

Kevin, I don't disagree that he responsible.  He accepted the mission, led the mission, and now is the public face responsible for its failure.  The deeper issues of UN bungling bureaucracy and security council inaction are not discussed and the nameless bureaucrats have moved on to bigger and better things.  LGen Dallaire lives with the UNs collective failure. 

 

[KevinB]

I think we are over our 30min 

Anyway 1 quick point before I log off.

I agree with your assesment.  I just get irked that we (the CF) have promoted him twice and he is now reaping rewards for his failures.

Speak to a few of the Belgian Para's here  ;D  The aren't to fond of him I'll tell you that.

 

[Lance Wiebe]

Redeye, for what it is worth, I totally disagree with the premise that MOC doesn't matter.  

What you do as a youngster has a direct bearing on your makup as a man.  Infantry officers know how to lead, at least the ones that climb through the ranks.  By lead, I mean lead your men in dangerous/arduous times.  Armour (as in tanks) and artillery are not the same.  The ability to have some idea of what Infantry do, and the ability to lead Infantry to do the same, are two different animals.

Take a personal example.  I am armour, and have worked closely with the Infantry on many, many occasions.  I know what they do, and what I do.  And while I would never hesitate to command a tank troop, ask me to take command of an Infantry Platoon, and, well, while I might have the basic knowledge, I could never adequately lead them.

To me, combat arms should lead combat arms.  An artillery officer should never command a Brigade on operations, just as a LEME/EME/RCEME officer shouldn't.

Having said that, we will never know for sure what would have happened with different leadership.  Gen Dallaire is living with his personal "what ifs", and will be haunted for the rest of his life.

 

[Gunner]

Kevin,

I just get irked that we (the CF) have promoted him twice and he is now reaping rewards for his failures.

  He has become the darling for proponents of intervention all over the world.  I only worked with him once (95) and he seemed a very personable man.  Not sure if he should have been promoted, decorated, etc simply because he was the fall guy for Rwanda, the UN and by extention, Canada.

Lance,

Infantry officers know how to lead, at least the ones that climb through the ranks.  By lead, I mean lead your men in dangerous/arduous times. Armour (as in tanks) and artillery are not the same.  The ability to have some idea of what Infantry do, and the ability to lead Infantry to do the same, are two different animals.

I have to tell you, there are a whole bunch of armour and artillery officers that would disagree with your definition of leadership.  I guess I would argue that Peace Support Operations are not a traditional infantry job, so, following your logic, they shouldn't lead any missions.

Take a personal example.  I am armour, and have worked closely with the Infantry on many, many occasions.  I know what they do, and what I do.  And while I would never hesitate to command a tank troop, ask me to take command of an Infantry Platoon, and, well, while I might have the basic knowledge, I could never adequately lead them.

I have to assume you did some type of combined arms training at the combat team level.  Square Combat Team consists of a Inf Coy and Armd Sqn (and other attachments) and command is based on the mission, etc.  Armour leads in the open, Infantry leads in close terrain.  Combined arms means working together to accomplish the mission, not working for the infantry.

To me, combat arms should lead combat arms.  An artillery officer should never command a Brigade on operations, just as a LEME/EME/RCEME officer shouldn't.

Last time I checked, Armour, Artillery, Engineers and Infantry are all combat arms.  Dallaire wasn't a Brigade Comd in Rwanda, he was the military commander (can't seem to recall who the SRSG was).  He wasn't there to site infantry trenches, he was there to command the UN Mission.  If he wanted infantry trenches sited, he had an Infantry CO to do that for him.  Or don't you like the capabilities of the Belgian Paratroopers?

Having said that, we will never know for sure what would have happened with different leadership.

That's right we won't.  If it had been somebody else the genocide could have been much worse.

Gen Dallaire is living with his personal "what ifs", and will be haunted for the rest of his life.

Not only that, he gets to hear armchair generals tell the world what they would have done.

 

[Infanteer]

Redeye, for what it is worth, I totally disagree with the premise that MOC doesn't matter.

Sorry, I'm with Gunner on this one.  Leading a Platoon or commanding a Tank Crew doesn't really have any bearing on commanding a formation.  By this time, the Officer's have had a lot of similar training.  The tactical employment of one's MOC specialty and the operational employment of the combined arms team are two different things.

We've both argued that cross training should begin much earlier, but MOC gradually loses relevence as an Officer reaches higher ranks (that is why they lose their capbadge).  Are you meaning to tell me that Patton shouldn't of had command because he wasn't an Infantry guy?