LAV-25mm with TOW versus LAV-III with 25mm, MGS & LAV-TUA????

[Cdn Blackshirt]

I'm looking for an explanation from someone who knows more than I do (and that's probably most of you).

For operations such as Iraq, how would you compare the capability of a standardized unit of LAV III's with 25mm and TWO versus the mixed force that NDHQ is designing including standard LAV-III's, LAV III with TUA, MMEV and the infamous MGS?

Link to Delco Turret: http://www.delcosystems.com/DS-v2/LAV25tow.htm

The reason I ask this question is that in particular for counterinsurgency operations I would argue that it is usually the enemy that chooses the time and place of the encounter and as such, it is essential that whatever vehicle is engaged has the ability to respond.   This is very different than an open terrain conventional theatre where you can align your equipment more like chess pieces so that Recce picks up the target and a commander can task specific threats to specific vehicles.

Thanks in advance to whomever has the time to respond.

Cheers,


Matthew.    

P.S.   If I had my way, based on the concern described above I would think the M-2 family would provide a superior solution, but since that's not a reality I'm trying to identify the best possible solution within the LAV-III family.

 

[Matt_Fisher]

Matthew,

After spending 7 months in Iraq in an LAR unit using both LAV-25s and LAV-ATs (Emerson M-901 TOW turrets mounted on the 8x8 LAV chasis) I feel that I can submit my humble opinion on what our experience using dedicated TOW LAVs.

For the offensive portion of the war (March through April) they were a great asset to deal with any hard armour (tank) targets that we came up against.    However for the Security & Stabilization Operations (SASO)/Peacekeeping (April-?) they really weren't much more than a glorified M240/C6 carrier as in most ROEs they were restricted against firing TOWs (as well as our 25mm M242 chain gun in most cases, unless we were engaged by an RPG).   Additionally, since most of our engagements during SASO took place in urban environments, the minimum stand-off range of the TOW negated its effectiveness.

What they were good for was to be used as mounted OPs with their high power optical and thermal sights.   The Marines don't have the same surveillance/recce sensor equipment as the Canadian Coyote, so the enhanced range of thermal/daysight observation that the TOWs gave us was useful in certain applications.   ie. Screening the Iranian border, cordon ops, etc.

Generally the LAV-AT doesn't have too great of a reputation in the Marine Corps due to the increasing unreliability of the Emerson turret.   The turret is not stabilized and prone to alot of corrosion and experience all-too frequent mechanical and electrical breakdowns to the point that when an MEU deploys they're viewed as too much trouble to be worth the extra maintenance requirements for a 6 month deployment at sea.

Currently under the LAV Service Life Extension Program (LAV-SLEP) the Marines are considering 3 options in terms of either upgrading or replacing the LAV-AT.  

Option 1:   Replace the Emerson turret with the General Dynamics ATGM turret that is being developed for the Army's Stryker AT variant.
Option 2:   Retire the dedicated LAV-AT and upgrade a number of existing LAV-25s with the General Dynamics LAV-25/TOW turret system
Option 3:   Retire the dedicated LAV-AT and use TOWs mounted on HMMWVs.

I don't have any experience with the Canadian TOW turret, so I won't comment on its reliability/merits/problems, etc.

However, If I were the LAV God for the Marine Corps and could impart my wishes   onto the Corps, I'd seriously have a look at the LAV-25 TOW turret and if it didn't work out too well, then I'd look at the GD ATGM turret.   Lastly I'd go with the TOW HMMWV as they don't hold up worth sh*t against ambushes/IEDs.

As far as the "System of Systems"/MMEV/MGS/LAV TUA goes, I think you should check out the "Perfect Kill" thread under the News section of this site.  CASR has been gracious enough to publish/host my tank vs. MGS argument, so if you want to hear my opinon on that subject check out:  http://www.sfu.ca/casr/id-leo.htm

I am by no means an expert in these areas, but it doesn't take a rocket scientist to see that the CF ISTARS/MGS/MMEV/LAV TUA Emperor is naked. 



Cheers!

Matt

 

[bgreen]

Excellent contribution Matt.

Could I ask though about the use of dismounted Inf/marines during the built-up area ops.  As most of these areas are Defiles (streets and lanes) did the dismounted soldiers lead?  If not would not any veh be vulnerable to RPG-7 and remote controlled mines and booby traps?  Did the tactics change regarding movement in built-up areas and if so how?

Thanks again
BG

 

[Matt_Fisher]

As far as operations in built-up areas went, there were two different types of operations we tended to use.

The first was during what is known as "Phase III" of the war.  That was the period of time from March through April during the initial offensive.

2nd LAR stormed through Nasiriyah the night of March 24th 2003 and pretty much used a system of blasting everything that shot at them (Quite literally) and employing a very liberal recon by fire policy as they rolled through the city.  The LAV's 25mm M242 chain gun is capable of firing 200 rounds per minute of High Explosive-Incedniary rounds and the amount of firepower that this column of LAVs spewed forth was enough so that any of the Fedayeen and other Iraqi forces mainly chose to keep their heads down while they passed through.  As a result the entire battalion suffered no casualties during their advance.  However, on the heels of 2nd LAR was the 2nd Marine Regiment  who met quite a goodly amount of resistance.  Were the Iraqis scared of the LAVs, but unafraid to attack Amtracks and truck mounted infantry?  Or were Iraqis out of position along Rt. 7 which the LAVs had pushed through, only to reposition themselves to blunt 2nd Marines advance?  I can't say.

Pretty quickly the LAVs were dubbed "The Destroyers" by the Iraqis, as they simply destroyed everything in their path. 

Now would this tactic have worked so well as if the enemy was more coordinated and had better skill in ambushing armored forces as the Russians faced in Grozny?  Possibly, but the Russians didn't have the coordination that the Marines had between their ground and air forces to break up pockets of resistance.  However this doesn't negate that the LAV-25 has no protection from RPGs (at least per spec, but I'll address this later).

When the war turned into "Phase IV" Security & Stabilization operations we were not so concerned with ambushes in our AOR.  We were garrisoning the Wasit province and Al Kut, where the population at that time was pretty docile.  There was some intial resistance by Shi'a Islamic fundamentalist, but that ended pretty quickly in mid-April with a few key raids and arrests.

As for the use of our scouts...they were invaluable.  Most urban patrolling with the vehicles we would have the scouts mounted, but the SOP was to dismount and assault through an ambush with the LAVs firing in support, however this was always situation dependent (as with all "Assault through" SOPs). 

Where the scouts were worth their weight in gold was for doing Traffic Control points, raids where the LAVs provide overwatch while the Scouts would form the assault element.
Oftentimes in patrolling our vehicles would form what the Canadian infantry would term a "zulu" harbor and the scouts would dismount and patrol  the area and return to the vehicles.  Other times we'd follow in follow in trace and use them as "bait".

I'll post more on this later, but my two-week old daughter is starting to get fussy, so I've got to go for now.

 

[Matt_Fisher]

More on the scouts in Marine Corps LAR units.

Unlike the Canadian Recce. Sqn., Marine LAR units do not have an assault troop per se.   The 4 scouts that ride in the back of each LAV-25 (4 vehicles per platoon=16 scouts per line platoon) function in pretty much the same manner an assault trooper would in a Canadian recce. squadron.   They are trained and equipped to conduct rudimentary demolitions, counter-mobility engineering work and breaching operations, as each LAR platoon carries a set of demo. stores (C4, det. cord, blasting caps, detonators, crater charges, bangalore torpedoes, etc.) and are equipped with the AT4 (M72 replacement) and the SMAW (the Marine Corps equivalent to the Carl G) for anti-armour/assault work.

In addition to demo/assault work, most of the physical recce. tasks such as bridge recce, route recce, ford recce. the scouts will be the ones actually conducting the reconnaisance and compiling the report while the LAVs provide the overwatch.

The same goes for the standard blind corner and defile drills as taught in the Armoured Corps, except that rather than have crewmembers dismount as the Canadians do (at least when I was still a black hat), the scouts conduct the work, allowing the vehicle to be fully crewed.

In addition to mounted patrols, alot of the time both the crewmen and scouts would form into a composite dismounted group and conduct patrol work on foot.

As far as the LAVs resistance to RPGs, IEDs, mines and other such nastiness...

On 2 occasions we had LAVs in our company get hit with IEDs, and the 4 vehicles that were involved in the attacks were completely unscathed.   However, there have been M2 Bradleys that have been completely destroyed by larger IED attacks and the Israelis have experienced an IED attack where a Merkava was destroyed by Palestinian insurgents, resulting in the death of at least 2 crewmen inside the vehicle.

As far as RPGs:   We had an LAV-AT get hit on the left side of the vehicle, about 8" underneath the TOW turret.   I can't say whether the equipment strapped to the side of the vehicle (the TOW ground-mount tripod and a cot) caused the grenade to explode prematurely, acting as a sort of stand-off applique armor, or that the warhead's explosive charge wasn't up to spec, but luckily the explosion didn't penetrate the hull.   Unfortunately the TOW gunner was exposed at the time and received alot of shrapnel which turned his buttocks, lower back and kidneys into hamburger.   He did survive the attack and has been retired from the Marine Corps with a 100% disability rating by Veteran's Affairs.

So the long and short of RPGs is that no, they're not able to survive a hit from a built-to spec. RPG, however quality control thankfully leaves alot to be desired in alot of the factories around the world producing such weapons, so it pretty much turns into a game of Russian Roullette as to whether the enemy you're up against has a dud loaded.

 

[tabernac]

Wow, quite literally is seem you have been through hell and back...

 

[Lance Wiebe]

Matt;

Perhaps you can answer a question for this old soldier.

Early in the war, everytime the Marines were seen on the news they were mounted in the LVTP's.  An early report that I heard claimed that initially, the Marine LAV's were parked because the tires were destroyed rather quickly by the rough rocks.  Even after tires were flown in from the States, the report said that the LAV's were only allowed off-road in certain areas, to keep from destroying more tires.

This caused much debate here.  Mostly because the report was an army report, and the US Army likes to "diss" the Marines when it gets a chance.  But, the report did contain a lot of valuable information, (most of which, I am sure, will be ignored by our senior leaders).  The tire issue was only mentioned as an aside, as the Army had to move in to some areas pre-designated as a Marine area of responsibility. 

So, my question is, were the tires really an issue in some areas of Iraq?

 

[Matt_Fisher]

This is the first time I've ever heard of such a report.   Do you have a specific reference for it?   This report wasn't found on Mike Sparks Airborne Equipment Shop/Air-Mech Strike was it?

This is what 1st Marine Division had to say in its after-action reportabout the employment of LAR units during Opeation Iraqi Freedom:
"G-3
Topic:   Light Armored Regiment And Battalion Organic to the Marine Division

Discussion:   During OIF, nimble, hard-hitting LAR units proved themselves highly versatile and employable across the spectrum:
- In advance guard, screening, covering force missions
- Put together under the ADC, three LAR Battalions executed a 150 mile attack beyond Baghdad to Tikrit and Bayji
- Dominating in stabilization operations.

They can be the most lethal, versatile force on the battlefield if we:
- Add the best FAC suite equipment available
- Add an assault gun/120mm mortar.

We should also consider use of the Army Stryker vehicle to defray R&D costs/lower unit cost.

Recommendation:   7th Marines become an LAV Regiment to work in cooperation with a DS towed artillery battalion and tank battalion.   One independent LAR Battalion remains to source MEUs and provide the Division Commander with his own GS LAR capability."
Source:   http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/1mardiv_oif_lessons_learned.doc

From my experience:
As far as Marine LAVs being parked and not in action during the initial advance?   No.   LAR units were not hindered by the terrain tearing up our tires and LAR was out in front of the advance along with the tanks.   Once you get as far north as Nasiriyah, the terrain in Iraq between the Tigris and the Euphrates (which was the Marine's AOR) transforms from desert with rocks and sand into irrigated farmland with dirt and mud.  

A probable reason you didn't see too many LAVs in the news during the onset of the war is that FOX News Channel had an embedded reporter with 3rd LAR Bn. and since Canada doesn't broadcast FOX News Channel, most of the news footage you probably saw were from other reporters (CNN/NBC/CBS/ABC/BBC etc.) embedded with the non-LAR type units either mounted in LVTPs, which we now call AAVs (Amphibious Assault Vehicle or Amtracks more commonly) or in hard-back HMMWVs.   That would probably explain why you didn't see much coverage (other than on FOX) of the LAVs as FOX had the only reporter embedded in LAR.   The Marine Corps advanced with 1st, 2nd and 3rd LAR Battalions (reinforced with A & B Companies of 4th LAR) in 1st Marine Division and 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade had the remnants of 4th LAR (D, C & H&S Companies) in it, and if you go by sheer numbers, you've got 4 battalions of LAR mounted in LAVs wheras you've got about another 8 or 9 Infantry battalions mounted in AAVs so statistically you're going to see more images of Marines in AAVs than LAVs.

The constant use and amounts of mileage put more wear on the tires in 4 weeks than they'd had run on them in 4 years.   What also compounded the mileage is the fact that getting and maintaining perfect wheel alignment on an LAV in the field is very difficult and that helped to degrade a large number of tires prematurely.   Overall though, we did go through alot of tires and pretty much every vehicle mounted 2 spares on the march up.  

Mounting tires/run flats onto rims was pretty much a daily part of our camp routine once we'd established our operating base in mid-April and given that our unit only brought up a manual operated hydraulic pump for the manual tire machine and having to manually pry the run-flats into the tires using a system of compressing the run flat insert to look like an "8" with ratcheting straps so that we could pry it into the tire using a combination of soapy water for lubrication and tanker pry bars for leverage.   Tire building was a hard, dirty and hot task.   Any tanker/track driver that says that LAV crewman have it easy not having to do track maintenance should spend some time in the middle-eastern sun building a set of tires by hand.   A good crew could pull a broken/wornout tire off the rim, pry the run-flat out of the broken tire, compress the run-flat and pry it into the new tire and then mount and seal the new tire on the rim in about 35 minutes if they were really busting their butts and you didn't have PFC Murphy as part of your team.

 

[Lance Wiebe]

Hmm.  I did kinda wonder.  The report was an initial "lessons learned", written about lessons learned from, IIRC, 3ID.  There were some very interesting points brought up, but the mention of LAV tires caused a lot of gossip here.  Why would an army unit be discussing LAV's?  Strange.

BTW, my memory is not 100% after all those meals and coffees from aluminium mess tins, so it may not have been 3ID...

But you did bring up another point.  Were your tires not pre-mounted on rims before being mounted as spares?  Or were you referring to the so-called "down time", when you would be fixing the destroyed spares?

And, one last thing.  Thanks for providing a timely and comprehensive answer.

 

[Matt_Fisher]

Lance,

When my unit, 4th LAR intially went over we had about enough tires on rims/prebuilt tires for each vehicle to have 2 spares for each vehicle.

After that we had to build new tires assemblies using new tires and recycled run-flats and rims.  You can order complete tire assemblies, however they cost more and weigh more/take up more space and therefore have a greater logistical footprint to transport in theatre.  Hence, we only got resupplies of the unassembled tires.

Interesting that 3rd ID would be commenting about LAVs/LAR seeing as how they have no LAVs in their orbat and until the Marines got held up by the Diyala River Bridge, the Marine Corps was advancing ahead of schedule compared to V Corps/3rd ID.

A decent read on the Marine Corps' experience in Iraq is "The March Up:  Taking Baghdad with the 1st Marine Division" by Bing West and Maj. Gen Ray West (USMC).

 

[Lance Wiebe]

Thanks for the book recommendation, and for your reply.

 

[Kirkhill]

I just had a thought.  One of the problems mentioned with mounting TOW and a cannon on a common platform was that the vibration from the cannon knocked the TOW boresighting off line.  It has been suggested that the Javelin doesn't have the same problem because of the fire and forget sighting system.

Question:  Does the new wireless and/or fire and forget version of the TOW have the same susceptibility to vibration? 

If it doesn't couldn't it be mounted in pods on a Cannon vehicle?  Either the current 25mm or the 60mm that Pappy is talking about here http://army.ca/forums/threads/16757.0.html ?

If it could be accomodated then it would make a fairly formidable DFSV for medium ops or else the turret on a heavy APC (tracked) would make a great complement to MBTs.

 

[Kirkhill]

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/cgi-bin/client/modele.pl?session=dae.4308111.1089903978.QPadasOa9dUAAESlMZk&modele=jdc_34

By the way here are some more reports on the Stryker on operations in Iraq. 

â Å“They're not worried that 'I'm sitting in a death trap,' â Å“ Joyce said. â Å“They can focus on the mission, not whether or not a bullet is going to come through.â ? 

Soldiers rest more easily knowing no one has died inside a Stryker, and none of the vehicles have been ripped open by bullets or bombs.

 

[Cdn Blackshirt]

Have they mounted Javelin on any vehicles to date?



Matthew.  ???

 

[Kirkhill]

REMOTE WEAPON STATION WITH JAVELIN
General 
Crew One man remote operation
Combat weight: (with 200 rounds M2) 145 Kg
Power 28V DC MIL-STD-1275 compatible
  Grenade launcher (optional)
Weapons 
Main weapon M2HB
Rates of fire: 450-600 shot/min
Ammunition: 12.7 x 99mm
Ready rounds: 200
Stowed rounds: vehicle-dependent

Main weapon (alternative) MK 19 40mm AGL
Rates of fire: 350 shots/min
Ammunition: 40mm family
Ready rounds: 32
Stowed rounds: vehicle-dependent

  All-electric 28 V DC drives
Manual back-up mode
BIT
Space for gun mounted sight (back-up)

Environmental
Temperature operating range  -40 °C to +70 °C
  NBC decontamination compatible
MIL-STD-810
MIL-STD-461

Fire Control System (FCS)
Commander has complete control of the aiming and firing of the weapons from under armor
Azimuth: 360 ° continuous, drive rate >20 °/second
Elevation: -20 ° to +60 °, drive rate >20 °/second, slow tracking rate <0.15 mrad/second

Options
Laser Range Finder
Integration of Laser warning system
Stabilized Fire Control
Integration of Target tracking
Integration of Global Positioning System (GPS)
Operation and maintenance training
Image intensifier camera
Spares management system
Embedded training compatibility
Dual FOV thermal camera
Load main gun under armor

Javelin Features
2.5 km x range capability
Defeats all known armor
Fire and Forget
Soft launch
Minimum signature/blast
Rugged, portable, air dropable round
Replaceable Battery/Collant Unit (BCU)
EMI hardened
Missile weight with launch tube approx. 35 lbs (15.9 kg)
Missile length with launch tube:47.2 inches (1198 mm)
Fielded: Airborne, Special Forces; Light Infantry, Mech Infantry and Marines



© 1996 - 2004 General Dynamics Land Systems, All Rights Reserved | Copyright and Privacy Notice

REMOTE WEAPON STATION WITH JAVELIN
General 
Crew One man remote operation
Combat weight: (with 200 rounds M2) 145 Kg
Power 28V DC MIL-STD-1275 compatible
  Grenade launcher (optional)
Weapons 
Main weapon M2HB
Rates of fire: 450-600 shot/min
Ammunition: 12.7 x 99mm
Ready rounds: 200
Stowed rounds: vehicle-dependent

Main weapon (alternative) MK 19 40mm AGL
Rates of fire: 350 shots/min
Ammunition: 40mm family
Ready rounds: 32
Stowed rounds: vehicle-dependent

  All-electric 28 V DC drives
Manual back-up mode
BIT
Space for gun mounted sight (back-up)

Environmental
Temperature operating range  -40 °C to +70 °C
  NBC decontamination compatible
MIL-STD-810
MIL-STD-461

Fire Control System (FCS)
Commander has complete control of the aiming and firing of the weapons from under armor
Azimuth: 360 ° continuous, drive rate >20 °/second
Elevation: -20 ° to +60 °, drive rate >20 °/second, slow tracking rate <0.15 mrad/second

Options
Laser Range Finder
Integration of Laser warning system
Stabilized Fire Control
Integration of Target tracking
Integration of Global Positioning System (GPS)
Operation and maintenance training
Image intensifier camera
Spares management system
Embedded training compatibility
Dual FOV thermal camera
Load main gun under armor

Javelin Features
2.5 km x range capability
Defeats all known armor
Fire and Forget
Soft launch
Minimum signature/blast
Rugged, portable, air dropable round
Replaceable Battery/Collant Unit (BCU)
EMI hardened
Missile weight with launch tube approx. 35 lbs (15.9 kg)
Missile length with launch tube:47.2 inches (1198 mm)
Fielded: Airborne, Special Forces; Light Infantry, Mech Infantry and Marines



© 1996 - 2004 General Dynamics Land Systems, All Rights Reserved | Copyright and Privacy Notice

 

[ArmyRick]

I think we should be stepping away from TOW. I am a trained TOW gunner and I know there are flaws with the system.
Maybe making Javelin II or extending its range to 5KM would be a better idea. I have seen a couple of videos (including in Iraq) of Javelin in action and wow. It rocks. I hope since we gave up MBT, that we go with Javelin on the ALAWS project.