Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[quadrapiper]

More expanding those skills across the three light battalions, and (carrying on the idea of reforming them as a single regiment) having enough mass to train the entire unit effectively in those specialties, and to support ongoing training.

How much LAV-specific training time do you see?

 

[daftandbarmy]

More expanding those skills across the three light battalions, and (carrying on the idea of reforming them as a single regiment) having enough mass to train the entire unit effectively in those specialties, and to support ongoing training.

How much LAV-specific training time do you see?

I have no direct experience converting a full light Infantry battalion into a mechanized/ armoured Infantry battalion, but I'm guessing that the LAV specific training has more to do with the operators (commanders, drivers, gunners etc) as opposed to the 'cargo' in the back.

Once the key operators are trained, it only takes a week or so to get the troops into the swing of things. Collective training up to BGp level would take longer, of course.

 

[dapaterson]

New equipment generally needs training for three groups: the operators, the employers and the maintainers.

 

[Kirkhill]

I suggest that the biggest training delta, and the one most frequently poorly addressed, is that of the employer.

What does this thing do? How am I going to use it? What are its limits?

 

[daftandbarmy]

New equipment generally needs training for three groups: the operators, the employers and the maintainers.

As a guy from a thoroughly 'dismounted' Infantry background I was most impressed at the work that had to go into the maintenance side for re-roling us into a 'mounted/ semi-mounted' unit for deployments to places like Belfast and Norway.

Hopping in a vehicle is one thing. Making sure that this vehicle, which covers thousands of Kms per week under high stress conditions, is ready to hop into is quite another.

 

[markppcli]

How much LAV-specific training time do you see?

So this is a multi faceted question. That I spent a fair bit of time staring at the screen writing and rewriting answers to. The answer is quite simply between the crew qualifications, the OJT training of the Limas, and the spatial awareness required of command teams (we move faster and reach further) it all adds up a lot. All of those people, however, are qualified dismounted infanteers and cover those skills on their career courses in a way that is not always true in the reverse ( WOs and up excluded).

I am pretty firm in my belief it's much easier, from a training perspective, so strip LAVs and have guys go dismounted then it is to add LAVs and all of a sudden insert a huge amount of both class room and field training.

To your other point, again each Light Bn has a para coy, has a mountain coy, has an "other coy." I don't see what you're suggesting as different? Bare in mind, we're all just talking about the numbers in a full Bn, but the army is talking about stripping Bns down to 60 percent manning to fill schools. So why are we even acting like 9 Bns is doable?

 

[blacktriangle]

It doesn't sound like there is use for 3 Light Bns in the CMBGs. Seems like they'd be better off re-roled to either true armoured infantry (with a proper IFV), re-roled to something like Light Cavalry (along with PRes Armd Recce) or simply have the personnel consolidated into the other Bns to pump up numbers and perhaps restore lost capabilities.

As for the tank destroyer talk, I think it was McG that posted what a modern tank destroyer looks like. It's an NLOS ATGM capability. Personally I think these should be controlled by the Artillery, and should be a priority right after we get something like Javelin or Spike LR for the Infantry. As for those complaining about using ATGM against Taliban & Daesh types, so what? The missiles have a limited shelf life IIRC, and there haven't exactly been many tanks to engage in recent decades...

 

[FJAG]

As a guy from a thoroughly 'dismounted' Infantry background I was most impressed at the work that had to go into the maintenance side for re-roling us into a 'mounted/ semi-mounted' unit for deployments to places like Belfast and Norway.

Hopping in a vehicle is one thing. Making sure that this vehicle, which covers thousands of Kms per week under high stress conditions, is ready to hop into is quite another.

Now imagine an M109 battery with 21 tracks and another 17 wheeled vehicles.

You'll understand why my RCEME LMT could do no wrong in my eyes.

... the spatial awareness required of command teams (we move faster and reach further) it all adds up a lot.

I'm not sure how things are done these days but in my day back in the mid seventies, the combat team commanders course had both a dismounted followed by a mounted phase. That course was basically designed for all infantry and armour leaders who had company/squadron command potential and a smattering of us gunners, engineers, loggies etc.

... but the army is talking about stripping Bns down to 60 percent manning to fill schools. So why are we even acting like 9 Bns is doable?

IMHO that would be a big mistake. The schools are already adequate in size to handle the core and leadership training. We definitely need a surge of recruiting and DP1 training to fill the blank files but much of that could be done with a temporary diversion of such training to regiments. We did that quite successfully in the artillery in the mid seventies( again) as the branch grew with extra batteries and air defenders (we had a great cut in the artillery around 1969-70, followed by stagnation for five years followed by a resurgence which put hundreds of new officers and gunners into the system very quickly). Personally I'd rather see a rifle company in each brigade temporarily designated to teach new recruits for their regiment rather then permanently sending the personnel as instructors to the school. I think beefing up the schools is in large measure a sign of our fetish for trying to centrally control everything.

A second solution is a thorough review of course lengths. We tend to have too much put into the syllabus and don't utilize the training week as well as we could. Most run on a five day 8 hour per day week. Time to get back to concentrating on the "must knows" and cutting back on the "should knows" and "could knows".

If the schools really need a few more folks maybe we should use the PYs from two excess div headquarters and five reserve brigade headquarters that we don't really need.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Pulling back up to a higher altitude for a moment, perhaps we look at tasks, potential operations and what capabilities we are deficient? Our higher level documents are sometimes us writing orders to ourselves, but they are an appropriate place to start.

Strong Secure and Engaged directs the CAF to deter and defend Canada and North America against attacks. I am not sure if we need to look too deeply into those tasks with respect to Force 2025.

Lead and/or contribute to NATO and coalition efforts to deter and defeat adversaries. This is a wide task including potential counter-insurgency along the lines of ISAF to conventional operations against a peer. The EFP would fall into this basket. I think we can see some Force 2025 implications in terms of capabilities and equipment. Infantry anti-armour weapons for BG level operations, and GBAD and SP artillery (depending on intensity) for CMBG-level operations.

Lead and/or contribute to international peace operations and stabilization missions with the United Nations, NATO and other multilateral partners. So peacekeeping and stability operations need to be a part of the discussion. We could argue whether ISAF would fall into this basket or the former. End result brings us to the same place. Could be some Force 2025 so-whats here.

Engage in capacity building to support the security of other nations and their ability to contribute to security abroad. Another broad category which would include missions like UNIFIER. Might be some Force 2025 implications here in terms of organization?

Provide assistance to civil authorities and law enforcement, including counter-terrorism, in support of national security and the security of Canadians abroad. For the Army I think we can see the NEO task here. I am not sure if there are Force 2025 implications with this one as we have had rotating battalions assigned to this task for some time.

Provide assistance to civil authorities and nongovernmental partners in responding to international and domestic disasters or major emergencies. A rather wide basket. I am not sure if our DART for disasters abroad and various IRUs for domestic situations require new capabilities. Having worked with some US agencies, however, perhaps an enhanced CBRN capability for consequence management?

While we could all debate on the system to acquire, I think it is hard to argue against something like a Javelin. Doesn't really need any new organizations. GBAD is a bigger question - our nature will be to have champagne tastes with beer income. What organizational changes would we need for that capability? For capacity-building, do we need dedicated units or are we happy taking away the leadership of units every couple of years to form capacity building missions?

 

[markppcli]

I suppose we'd need to define what kind of range and effect the Bde, i think we can agree a divisional deployment is unlikely, need from it's GBAD, and then determine if that's one system or a system of systems. If cost is an issue I've noticed what seems like a coulpe perfectly serviceable ADATS and 35mm guns parked in the grass around Gagetown....

 

[Kirkhill]

Battle Group Anti-Tank Options - American Style

Cold War Bradley Battalion - 54 Bradleys with 108 Ready TOWs and an additional 216 TOWs in the hulls - 3750 m range
- 24 Dragon MRAAW - 1000 m range
Anti armor weapons held at section/squad level.

USMC Battalion - 8x HMMWV mounted TOW held at Battalion
- 24x Dragon held at battalion
- 18x 83mm SMAW held at company (6/coy)

US Abn Battalion - 20x HMMWV with 20x TOW and/or 10x M2 HMG and/or 10x 40mm GMG
- 18x Dragon held at platoon (2/pl)

US Lt Battalion (2000) - 4x Vehicle mounted TOW and/or M2 and/or 40mm
- 18x Dragon held at coy (6/coy)

US Rangers - 9x Carl Gustav (RAAWS) held at company (3/coy)

Dragons replaced in service with Javelin (2500 m) TOW still providing Long Range coverage at 4000 m

Javelin range improved to 4000 m and starts to replace TOW in some battalions

US Stryker - 27 Javelins held at squad level (1/squad) - 4000 m - firing post for a single missile added to the RWS.

US Marines converting some of their TOWs to Javelins.

US forces adding Carl Gustavs. Selection of Javelin or Carl Gustav dependent on operations and scenario.



British airmobile forces armed with Milans and used as Anti-Tank forces on the armoured battlefield. Deployed by companies and battalions by helicopter.

Battalions held up to 24 firing posts.




Add ammunition types for the CG84 (27x 1/section) and up to 18 to 27 Javelin Firing Posts (CLU) per battalion. 6 to 10 rounds in the battalion per CG84 and CLU.

 

[FJAG]

Pulling back up to a higher altitude for a moment, perhaps we look at tasks, potential operations and what capabilities we are deficient? Our higher level documents are sometimes us writing orders to ourselves, but they are an appropriate place to start.

Strong Secure and Engaged directs the CAF to deter and defend Canada and North America against attacks. I am not sure if we need to look too deeply into those tasks with respect to Force 2025.

Not arguing with you at all but the one weakness with SSE for this discussion is that it is worded so broadly that it can be interpreted in just about any way that one wants. Obviously the flesh on the bones is added in the upper reaches of the twin towers in large part with how funds are allocated but we're not privy to those priorities.

For capacity-building, do we need dedicated units or are we happy taking away the leadership of units every couple of years to form capacity building missions?

That question is loaded with the answer. It strikes me that the one thing that we are not short of in the CAF is middle leadership at either the officer or NCO level. The problem is that it is all located either in field units or at a variety of headquarters and since headquarters are not well known for willingly giving up their staff positions it would seem to me that we're just playing a shell game if we allocate PYs to a permanent FSCB organization ... the positions will most probably come out of units anyway but permanently rather than temporarily.

If we were to pull 300 some odd MCpls to majors PYs out of Ottawa to form an FSCB battalion I'd be all for it. My guess, however, is that it will end up coming out of the light battalions and several of the other arms.

 

[GR66]

Lanchester's laws have a number of assumptions behind them, the first of which is "all things being equal". But we know that all things are NOT equal. Accuracy, armour, active protection, terrain, mobility are all factors that need to be considered in a situation.

Yes, quantity has its own quality, but quality matters quite a bit. Centauro can't fire on the move, it can't survive a hit from a return 120mm whereas an MBT may very well survive a 120mm hit. It likely can't get the rate of fire of an MBT and it can be destroyed by artillery much more easy.

And of course there is the crew protection aspect. We want a tank to protect the crew. The crew are more expensive than the tank itself and can be used to crew another tank. A tank is just money and industrial output.

Actually the Centauro II with the 120mm gun does have stabilization for firing on the move. Otherwise you're basically claiming the same differences between a Leopard and Centauro as could be made between a Jagdtiger and a Hellcat.

Yes it's Wikipedia, but it claims "The Hellcat was the most effective U.S. tank destroyer of World War II. It had a higher kill to loss ratio than any other tank or tank destroyer fielded by U.S. forces in World War II." M18 Hellcat - Wikipedia

Another key point of course is to not refer to a TD as a "tank". They have different and specific roles. A TD is meant to be used in the defence...massing fire from a larger number of cheaper platforms to overwhelm attacking tanks through volume of fire (with the added bonus of being able to provide direct fire support to infantry).

I'm certainly not suggesting that we adopt something like the Centauro INSTEAD of Leopards, but simply raising the question as to whether the argument made by the speaker in relation to TD's historical roles and the advantage of superiority in quantity of platforms possibly has some validity now as well.

If we are going on the assumption that the role of the CF in a European conflict would at least initially be in the defence (I'm assuming that we have no intention of invading Russia), then would it for example be beneficial to have a Regiment of TDs as part of our armoured mix instead of three Armoured Recce Regiments? Maybe a Tank Regiment for the attack, a TD Regiment for defence and an Armoured Recce Regiment for....well Recce.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Not arguing with you at all but the one weakness with SSE for this discussion is that it is worded so broadly that it can be interpreted in just about any way that one wants. Obviously the flesh on the bones is added in the upper reaches of the twin towers in large part with how funds are allocated but we're not privy to those priorities.

That question is loaded with the answer. It strikes me that the one thing that we are not short of in the CAF is middle leadership at either the officer or NCO level. The problem is that it is all located either in field units or at a variety of headquarters and since headquarters are not well known for willingly giving up their staff positions it would seem to me that we're just playing a shell game if we allocate PYs to a permanent FSCB organization ... the positions will most probably come out of units anyway but permanently rather than temporarily.

If we were to pull 300 some odd MCpls to majors PYs out of Ottawa to form an FSCB battalion I'd be all for it. My guess, however, is that it will end up coming out of the light battalions and several of the other arms.

The Army Commander in 2019 referred to the "missing middle" with regards to our Sgt to Maj level of leadership. I just came from an operational garrison, and we had rifle companies commanded by Lieutenants with a single Lieutenant as the 2IC as the rest of the leadership was tasked out to capacity building operations and missions with a heavy draw on leadership. My Garrison support unit was also critically short of Sgts to Majs. You can't just snap your fingers and draw 300 MCpl to Maj PYs out of Ottawa and have leaders who would go on those missions.

Regarding SSE, if this discussion is to be more than cloud shoveling then it needs a framework grounded in our tasks and not our wishes. Now, since this is not a decision-making body I suppose it doesn't make much of a difference in the end.

One option that should be on the table, if capacity building missions are going to be the norm, should be converting some of our units into such organizations. When not engaged on such missions they could run training for both components.

 

[Kirkhill]

Particularly like the idea of operationalizing the training system and having them learn their trade on our own citizen volunteers.

 

[Underway]

Actually the Centauro II with the 120mm gun does have stabilization for firing on the move. Otherwise you're basically claiming the same differences between a Leopard and Centauro as could be made between a Jagdtiger and a Hellcat. ...(snip)...

Sure, that doesn't invalidate my point. All things are not equal. The French are very much fans of large calibre on light wheeled vehicles. I think this is more of their recce doctrine, but also very useful in their colonial bush wars.

 

[medic5]

Actually the Centauro II with the 120mm gun does have stabilization for firing on the move. Otherwise you're basically claiming the same differences between a Leopard and Centauro as could be made between a Jagdtiger and a Hellcat.

Yes it's Wikipedia, but it claims "The Hellcat was the most effective U.S. tank destroyer of World War II. It had a higher kill to loss ratio than any other tank or tank destroyer fielded by U.S. forces in World War II." M18 Hellcat - Wikipedia

Another key point of course is to not refer to a TD as a "tank". They have different and specific roles. A TD is meant to be used in the defence...massing fire from a larger number of cheaper platforms to overwhelm attacking tanks through volume of fire (with the added bonus of being able to provide direct fire support to infantry).

I'm certainly not suggesting that we adopt something like the Centauro INSTEAD of Leopards, but simply raising the question as to whether the argument made by the speaker in relation to TD's historical roles and the advantage of superiority in quantity of platforms possibly has some validity now as well.

If we are going on the assumption that the role of the CF in a European conflict would at least initially be in the defence (I'm assuming that we have no intention of invading Russia), then would it for example be beneficial to have a Regiment of TDs as part of our armoured mix instead of three Armoured Recce Regiments? Maybe a Tank Regiment for the attack, a TD Regiment for defence and an Armoured Recce Regiment for....well Recce.

These are just my thoughts on the whole tank destroyer concept:

In order to defeat modern armour you need a large caliber high velocity gun. In order to mount a large caliber gun you need a rather large chassis. Larger vehicle means more vulnerability and more logistical burden. In the end you have a vehicle that can be destroyed with quite literally any handheld infantry anti-tank weapon, plus probably whatever autocannon is mounted on IFVs/AFVs.

Would you rather spend your money and manpower on a vehicle that won't last a second on the battlefield and is vulnerable to everything, or just purchase and man infantry anti-tank weapons that go from point blank to NLOS?

About the comparison between the Jagdtiger and Hellcat, mobility and size would be what I deem to be the largest differences. Today a Leopard has just as much mobility as any "tank destroyer" on good terrain and size is identical.

 

[medic5]

Sure, that doesn't invalidate my point. All things are not equal. The French are very much fans of large calibre on light wheeled vehicles. I think this is more of their recce doctrine, but also very useful in their colonial bush wars.

Underway,

Why can the French operate lightly armoured vehicles in their colonial wars without them being constantly destroyed by IEDs? What differences are there between the French's conflicts versus the US in the Middle East?

 

[daftandbarmy]

Underway,

Why can the French operate lightly armoured vehicles in their colonial wars without them being constantly destroyed by IEDs? What differences are there between the French's conflicts versus the US in the Middle East?

They aren't immune:

Two French soldiers killed in Mali: French presidency​

President Emmanuel Macron’s office says an explosive device hit the soldiers’ vehicle Saturday in Mali’s Menaka region.

Two French soldiers killed in Mali: French presidency

President Emmanuel Macron’s office says an explosive device hit the soldiers’ vehicle Saturday in Mali’s Menaka region.

www.aljazeera.com

 

[Underway]

Underway,

Why can the French operate lightly armoured vehicles in their colonial wars without them being constantly destroyed by IEDs? What differences are there between the French's conflicts versus the US in the Middle East?

Assuming this is correct and not just recency bias (ie: we don't see the French news so the perceived risk may be different than what it actually is).

This is just a guess based on what I have read. It comes down to the terrain and population. The French conflict in Mali has much less urban terrain to fight in than Afghanistan and Iraq did. And what urban terrain there is, its not 3-foot thick mud buildings that double as bunkers.

It likely means that the French can choose different routes to their targets and thus avoid obvious IED emplacement. The second thing is that the conflict is ethnic in nature. This means that the local population may very well be on the side of the French as opposed to Iraq/Afghanistan where the local population was often ambivalent or hostile. The major urban centres are pro-French.

/complete supposition