Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Ostrozac]

Well then we end up with a weapons det trying to carry enough ammunition to keep the Javelin, the 84, and the C6 supplied. God help them if CQ drops off a C16 for them. Now let's say we have the 84's as a part of a weapons locker for the section. Fine, they probably won't want to carry them on the assault, so where is the weapons locker? Is it in a carrier close by, or is it a few bounds back with the CQ?

I would prefer to see and atgm held at a no lower than company level. That way no one is trying to carry it on the assault, and you aren't loosing section bodies to it. It's also where it can be off set, and given more freedom to hunt for lack of a better term. Sections have their M72s, platoons their 84s, and the company it's ATGM section. The Bn would have it's TOW (maybe), which could be held as a Bde AT Coy.

The assault is precisely when you most want the 84, it’s primary role should be as a bunker-buster — it is shockingly inadequate as an anti-tank weapon, and although we named it the SRAAW (Medium), that’s because we pressed it into the role that should have been filled by something like Milan.

When we had Eryx we had no choice but to push them down to platoon level, because of the all-too-short range, but Javelin would be a comfortable fit at the company level. But whether held at platoon or company level, the important thing is that a dismounted company needs to be able to hold ground, which you cannot do without ATGM — because without ATGM the enemy can feel safe to standoff armoured vehicles outside recoilless rifle range and freely reduce our defensive positions with direct fire. A reverse slope defence can mitigate that, but not eliminate it. We need to make our infantry dangerous to approach — and 3 Carl Gs per company frontage certainly doesn’t cut it.

There‘s an old line that the Soviets considered the best tank terrain to be that without anti-tank weapons. As it stands, there is a risk that our next enemy believes that terrain is whatever is being held by a Canadian infantry company.

 

[Kirkhill]

I cant get into why this doesn't really make sense with what you said earlier without explaining the lowest levels of AFV operation, so I'm just going to leave this be. Suffice to say that a gunner is not going to be able to operate the cannon, handles, comms, and direct the driver in a jockey all at the same time on his own. But that's just my experience.

Mark, I will bow to your experience, and all those others that have been there, done that.

My counter point is based on the Stryker operating as a section carrier and employing its ROWS in support with only a 2 man crew. And when the Stryker is upgunned to the 30mm Dragoon ROWS it still operates with a 2 man crew.

Fundamentally, I thnk that I am perceiving the LAV as an adjunct for an infantry battalion (an Infantry Section Carrier) as opposed to seeing it as a Light Armoured Car in an armoured regiment (an Armoured Fighting Vehicle).

 

[Kirkhill]

Mark, I will bow to your experience, and all those others that have been there, done that.

My counter point is based on the Stryker operating as a section carrier and employing its ROWS in support with only a 2 man crew. And when the Stryker is upgunned to the 30mm Dragoon ROWS it still operates with a 2 man crew.

Fundamentally, I thnk that I am perceiving the LAV as an adjunct for an infantry battalion (an Infantry Section Carrier) as opposed to seeing it as a Light Armoured Car in an armoured regiment (an Armoured Fighting Vehicle).

M1296 Dragoon Armored Personnel Carrier | Military-Today.com

The M1296 Dragoon is an upgraded version of the Stryker infantry carrier vehicle with significantly improved lethality. It is fitted with unmanned turret armed with a 30 mm cannon. Its official designation is Infantry Carrier Vehicle - Dragoon, or ICVD.

www.military-today.com

 

[Kirkhill]

In the Anti-Tank video you posted LCol Moran commented that BMP2 switched from the 76mm of the BMP1 to the 30mm cannon not to make it a better AFV, in the sense of being able to engage other AFVs, but to be able to better engage dismounted ATGM teams at longer ranges. A 2 km Milan team could not be outranged by a machine gun. A 30mm burst would throw their aim off.

 

[markppcli]

I more meant as an example of

The assault is precisely when you most want the 84, it’s primary role should be as a bunker-buster — it is shockingly inadequate as an anti-tank weapon, and although we named it the SRAAW (Medium), that’s because we pressed it into the role that should have been filled by something like Milan.

When we had Eryx we had no choice but to push them down to platoon level, because of the all-too-short range, but Javelin would be a comfortable fit at the company level. But whether held at platoon or company level, the important thing is that a dismounted company needs to be able to hold ground, which you cannot do without ATGM — because without ATGM the enemy can feel safe to standoff armoured vehicles outside recoilless rifle range and freely reduce our defensive positions with direct fire. A reverse slope defence can mitigate that, but not eliminate it. We need to make our infantry dangerous to approach — and 3 Carl Gs per company frontage certainly doesn’t cut it.

There‘s an old line that the Soviets considered the best tank terrain to be that without anti-tank weapons. As it stands, there is a risk that our next enemy believes that terrain is whatever is being held by a Canadian infantry company.

My point was more about the encumberance and logistics than what tool for what job really.

 

[Ostrozac]

My point was more about the encumberance and logistics than what tool for what job really.

That’s fair. I agree that rifle sections should be fairly lean and mean, but platoon weapons dets need to be humping enough firepower to actually win firefights. I suspect that probably means a 5 vehicle platoon, to haul everything and everyone, but 5 LAVs vs 4 LAVs per platoon isn’t the hill I want to make my stand on. I’m standing by my favourite bugbear — ATGMs. Self-propelled mortars being a close second.

 

[markppcli]

That’s fair. I agree that rifle sections should be fairly lean and mean, but platoon weapons dets need to be humping enough firepower to actually win firefights. I suspect that probably means a 5 vehicle platoon, to haul everything and everyone, but 5 LAVs vs 4 LAVs per platoon isn’t the hill I want to make my stand on. I’m standing by my favourite bugbear — ATGMs. Self-propelled mortars being a close second.

I'm not against the idea sections have that, I just think it means we need to take that into consideration in how we support them, and how far away they get. Al alternative though do you need a weapons det in a mechanized platoon if every section could have access to an 84 and a C6 stored in a lav? Could then those PYs become the Coy Javelin section. Just a thought I've had watching a C6 team gun a long side the LAV firing it's stabilized C6.

 

[Ostrozac]

do you need a weapons det in a mechanized platoon if every section could have access to an 84 and a C6 stored in a lav?

Yes, in my opinion. Several reasons come to mind, the first is space in the vehicle. Not just for the weapons, but the 84mm ammo and the SF kits. Also flexibility. A platoon, and a company, needs to be able to fight either alongside its vehicles or separated from them. If you’re absolutely tied to fighting near your vehicle, you’re not an infantry unit — you’re some type of cavalry. Also, effectiveness. I’ve always been shocked, going back to when I was a weapons det commander, that while we preached that machine guns should be sited in pairs, in practice they were issued singly — I think that a platoon weapons det should have a pair of GPMGs, with SF kits, hence my bias towards a physically larger weapons det.

With their grenade launcher ammo and M72s the rifle section is probably already on the edge of humping too much stuff for the assault, I’d put everything heavier into the platoon weapons det.

 

[Kirkhill]

That brings up the issue of should all infantry battalions be identical? Or can LAV infantry battalions not only divest themselves of much of the Combat Support Company, but also reduce their mounted sections to a single fire team (with or without ATGMs). And perhaps supply an ACSV formation to carry full sized companies from full sized battalions.

 

[Kirkhill]

As to infantry and cavalry and SP Mortars

Infantry SP Mortar for the 4 MPH battle

Cavalry SP Mortar for the 40 MPH battle.

 

[Ostrozac]

That brings up the issue of should all infantry battalions be identical?

They absolutely should all be identical, as we have no light forces doctrine and no one can point to a role currently being done by the 3rd battalions* that couldn’t be done by a LAV battalion dismounted.

An exception would be the “heavy brigade” armoured infantry role that was abandoned when the Army cancelled the Close Combat Vehicle project. But that would require a tracked IFV, that we don‘t intend to acquire.

*Except for parachuting. Which has little tactical application for a force that has access to Chinooks.

 

[markppcli]

Yes, in my opinion. Several reasons come to mind, the first is space in the vehicle. Not just for the weapons, but the 84mm ammo and the SF kits. Also flexibility. A platoon, and a company, needs to be able to fight either alongside its vehicles or separated from them. If you’re absolutely tied to fighting near your vehicle, you’re not an infantry unit — you’re some type of cavalry. Also, effectiveness. I’ve always been shocked, going back to when I was a weapons det commander, that while we preached that machine guns should be sited in pairs, in practice they were issued singly — I think that a platoon weapons det should have a pair of GPMGs, with SF kits, hence my bias towards a physically larger weapons det.

With their grenade launcher ammo and M72s the rifle section is probably already on the edge of humping too much stuff for the assault, I’d put everything heavier into the platoon weapons det.

So we already have 84 racks and with a front line load of, if memory serves, 6 rounds for it I don't think the ammo storage is that big of an issue. The SF kit yes, but I'd argue that should almost be seen as defensive stores or specialized equipment, no one's setting that up on a hasty attack. Unless you are in which case I'd very much like to see how it's done.

If you had a Weapons Section, because it's past being a det now, with 2 x C6 Teams (4) and an 84mm team (2) that gives you 6, now let's assume the MG teams will operate under the direct control of a MCpl with the 84 belonging to the Pl Cmd. We're at 7, but 8 in the LAV. Could you give up the No 2 on a C6 to make up that space? Maybe. Or could we get really radical have the WO dismount from depth to control the dismounted fight with the PL Comd taking control of the LAV fight, freeing that seat? Or vice versa.

I do absolutely agree with you though that we are getting to that point where it's very easy to overburden out guys. We need to start thinking about how much we expect out of the rifle section, and how do these new tools we have to improve our accuracy effect that. Do we need as many rounds if we're supposed to be getting more and more first round hits?

 

[Kirkhill]

They absolutely should all be identical, as we have no light forces doctrine and no one can point to a role currently being done by the 3rd battalions* that couldn’t be done by a LAV battalion dismounted.

An exception would be the “heavy brigade” armoured infantry role that was abandoned when the Army cancelled the Close Combat Vehicle project. But that would require a tracked IFV, that we don‘t intend to acquire.

*Except for parachuting. Which has little tactical application for a force that has access to Chinooks.

I find the argument that we have no doctrine for employment a fairly weak reason for not having the capability. But that's an argument that I have lost many times over. And I will respectfully bow out and agree to disagree.

I am willing to accept that Canada's Army is comfortable in its LAVs and that is how it chooses to work. Now all that has to happen is for the government to agree that they will only employ you in places where your LAVs are comfortable and at the time of your choosing.

 

[MilEME09]

As to infantry and cavalry and SP Mortars

Infantry SP Mortar for the 4 MPH battle

Cavalry SP Mortar for the 40 MPH battle.

Does the twin motor carrier still have a small troop compartment? Have this be the weapons det vehicle

 

[Kirkhill]

The armies that are using the twin mortars, by and large, are the same ones issuing Anti-Tank weapons to the sections and deploying small sections of 6 rather than 10.

In my view each section in a CV90 essentially is, first and foremost, a weapons det. A weapons det that can also conduct local clearing operations.

 

[Underway]

If AT is best used in mass, then penny packeting it out to the platoon level seems folly where it would overburden the rifle coy's with little overall impact to the battlespace. Even a few Javlin's wouldn't allow you to hold against aggressive armour any more than without. For the recce elements that they would be good against, the LAV 25mm would suffice to deal with those as well as the 84.

This was mentioned earlier by either @TangoTwoBravo or @Infanteer with regards to how to distribute tanks (the ultimate AT weapon), and that when they were split up they were massacred.

So those orphan light infantry Battalions we were talking about earlier in the thread. Seems to me that they could be re-rolled into AT companies. This would allow for the number needed to have an impact against enemy massed armour. Set up in the defensive where the terrain was favourable to hold the ground or b) move rapidly to an area where the enemy armour has massed and is pushing in.

Obviously, you would like to use your own tanks for this in an ideal situation but in many ways, the increased operational mobility of LAV AT could be very useful here. It would also fit into the infantry role of holding the ground.

Would this be dismounted AT capability where you set up a tripod system for use or a TUA type system (or both)? Given the way, the Spike-LR and now the MMP work it could be combined with a larger tactical UAS to provide non-LOS targeting.

 

[Ostrozac]

On the topic of light forces, I would observe that even when we had a dedicated light infantry force, with enablers trained and equipped to fight alongside them, in the form of the Canadian Airborne Regiment, mechanized units were still tasked with dismounted roles — the AMF(L) role in Norway comes to mind. Not to mention that nominally Airborne units would rerole to mechanized if operations required — M113 for Germany, AVGP for Somalia. We have a long history of mech retraining to fight dismounted, and vice versa. I‘d lean towards every battalion training to fight mechanized, with LAVs, with the option to downgrade to dismounted, as it is faster to transition down than up.

 

[Weinie]

My numbers start reducing at the section level. And in the vehicles. 2 man crews for the infantry (armour can do their thing) because I expect the vehicles to be fighting from fixed positions while the infantry is dismounted. I envisage them as an armoured and mobile HMG firebase. 6 man sections for all types of battalions (a fire team plus a crew served weapon).

Small platoons in the support company to maintain skills and distribute skills in the battalion and to provide some tactical capability. But the support platoons would be using the same weapons available to the rifle platoons. The rifles could then reinforce the support platoons by adding their weapons to the employment plans developed by the support platoons, or the the support platoons could detach teams to support detached companies and platoons.

In our army I believe that skills retention is a lot more important than tactical readiness. One battle group at 72 hours notice to move could be kept up to strength. Follow on forces are at 90 to 180 days NTM with others at 365 days NTM. Those units can add numbers at lot easier than they can add, and learn to employ, skills.

The fallacy, as I see it, with this NTM COA is that it doesn't account for casualties/attrition.

When we were working CBP, no one factored in that we could likely expect extensive/massive attrition, across all domains in a near peer/peer environment. We likely would not have enough time, or the sp chain, to train/equip/re-equip a follow-on force before hostilities finished.

 

[Kirkhill]

On the topic of light forces, I would observe that even when we had a dedicated light infantry force, with enablers trained and equipped to fight alongside them, in the form of the Canadian Airborne Regiment, mechanized units were still tasked with dismounted roles — the AMF(L) role in Norway comes to mind. Not to mention that nominally Airborne units would rerole to mechanized if operations required — M113 for Germany, AVGP for Somalia. We have a long history of mech retraining to fight dismounted, and vice versa. I‘d lean towards every battalion training to fight mechanized, with LAVs, with the option to downgarde to dismounted, as it is faster to transition down than up.

My problem here Ostrozac is that prior to the AVGP/LAV era there was no difference between infantry carried in trucks, helicopters, or M113s, or walking, at the Company level. The Combat Support Coy looked different but retained the same capabilities. Even the Airborne fought their rifle platoons the same way as the M113 platoons. They organized their Combat Support along Company Cbt Tm lines.

One set of manuals served all types of infantry. And they could expect to swap vehicles but always understanding they were going to assault on foot with the same weapons and the same support regardless of the means of transport. When moving they would take their platoon mgs and mount them on the pintles for expedient protection on the move. When halted, and going into the defence, the MGs would be dismounted to establish an effective anti-personnel defence. In the assault - well circumstances dictated how the OC and Pl Ldr decided to employ the guns.

When we got the AVGPS then we lost the flexibility to dismount the guns - they, and their gunner, were now tied to a platform that couldn't go where the rifles went and made a much bigger target. And even with the old Grizzly, when the VC dismounted it was only with great difficulty. As to the number of people you could put on the ground - The M113 and all other forms of transport permitted the retention of the nominal 10 man rifle section (with an 11th for the driver). The Grizzly had seats for 11 according to the pamphlet. 1 was the driver. 2 was the gunner. 3-8 sat back to back in the rear facing outwards at their vision blocks. 9 was the VC/Section Ldr who was jammed in between the driver and the turret with no room for his fighting order. (That had to be handed to him by his manservant after the dismount). Numbers 10 and 11 shared a 1.5 man folding jumpseat just behind the engine compartment. In practice it was more common just to carry six and the section leader/vc.

That set the template for the entire LAV series. Our LAV infantry is not infantry as it was known in the 1960s. It is Armoured Infantry or even Cavalry. The emphasis throughout is fighting and supporting the vehicle with the troops. Not, IMO, the vehicle supporting the troops. That is why I have difficulty with the notion of the LAV battalion being able to swap rides and immediately start operating effectively as leg infantry. It is nothing to do with fitness or smarts. It has everything to do with mindset, training and familiarity with your suite of weapons and sensors.

Having said that I can accept that Canada is going to field a LAV/ACSV army and that, if needs must, then the LAV army has the ability, with a year's notice, to turn itself into something else. I question whether or not a LAV battalion can ditch its vehicles and fight as effectively in the leg role as a battalion that trains that way from the get go.

 

[Brad Sallows]

Are they? We have 37 guns.

My point is this: whatever size force of manoeuvre units we have, if it is properly supported it will have artillery. So we don't pretend that the cost of guns, trucks, limbers, etc is part of the cost of PGM anti-armour rounds when we compare to the cost of launchers and missiles. With artillery, the launchers we sort of get "for free".

Likewise, unless the 84mm we have are incapable of firing munitions other than HEAT, we already have a good enough (versatile, flexible, portable) weapon - we just need to buy ammunition and pay to train people to use it. If we are too poor to use Javelin to bust a bunker with a handful of insurgents in it, we have an affordable alternative.

My question about artillery organization was intended to highlight the fact that an artillery unit (my simplified high level view) is a fire control centre, however many batteries you want to plug in to meet most use cases, and a commensurately sized administrative echelon. The number of batteries doesn't matter; the number of available FOO parties matters.

The thing about "tank destroyer doctrine" is that I would not expect anyone to revisit the WWII solution (essentially a purpose-designed and -equipped tank-defeating blocking force capable of displacing frequently to avoid being overcome); I'd expect to see a doctrine emerge for a particular kind of combined arms battle, maybe necessitating (or preferring) some things we don't have (like attack helicopters). I'd expect most of those things to have other uses.

It relates, I suppose, to my short answer to the question about alternatives if we did away with tanks: more indirect fire (firing pieces, not necessarily units) and aviation.