Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[GR66]

A couple of thoughts

I'll start with "The Rise and Fall of the Emma Gees". That pamphlet keeps recurring because machine guns became ubiquitous. When they did they became the infanteer's personal belt fed rifle and employed at the gunner's discretion. They lose much of their effectiveness that way. Fire discipline, ammunition consumption, priority targets, mutual support, concentration of fire, etc - all of that is lost over time. Muscle memory fades. Maintaining a small MG platoon in the battalion as a Centre of Excellence probably has as much or more value than its actual tactical value.

At its best it provides MG advisors to Coy and Platoon commanders on how to get the best out of their assortment of GPMGs, LMGs and Automatic Rifles.

Although the weapons are universally distributed for carriage somebody needs to be maintaining a plan on how best to employ them as the CO/OC takes his command into different situations.

I suggest the same thing is true for mortars/artillery starting with hand grenades, 40mm-51mm-60mm-81mm-120mm-155mm and other HE launchers.

It is also true for the Anti-Tank Plan managing AT grenades and 40mm-66mm-84mm-120mm-127mm-152mm HEAT warheads.

Some of these weapons are "specialist" weapons. This is particularly true of the older systems. Newer systems don't require the same degree of operator training. This is good and bad and replicates the Rise and Fall of the Emma Gees. The old time specialist operators knew not just how to operate their systems but also their strengths and weaknesses and how to get the best out of them.

This is not a new problem. And, again, I suggest that history offers guides. In particular the mock battles of the Fort Henry Guard. Each man in the 24 man platoon is issued 60 rounds. He doesn't own any of those rounds. Those 1440 rounds belong to the Lieutenant leading the platoon. And he gets to decide how to group his weapons and where and when to discharge them. The fire discipline is more akin to a modern artillery unit than a modern infantry unit. I suggest that that same fire discipline needs to be employed with the modern infantry's support weapons. Section may only have half a dozen 84mm rounds or 2x 127mm Javelin rounds. But the Platoon Leader has 6 Javelins and 18 to 24x 84mms. The Coy Commander will have 18 to 24 Javelins and/or 54 to 112 84mm rounds. And those rounds can be selected depending on the target set anticipated.

Some of the lessons of the Emma Gees also apply. The Irishman in the Anti-Armour video talked about the value of Key Holes and using terrain. That is also known a "enfilade from defilade". Taking the enemy from the flanks while protecting your own flanks. Fire and Retire. Masking your signature. Obscurants. (In ancient days we didn't carry HE for the platoon mortar - we carried smoke and a couple of flares)

These lessons, I suggest are common to all Direct Fire systems, including the rifle.



Second thought

The cost of the Javelin - The capital cost of the Javelin is apparently somewhere in the 80 to 150,000 dollar range. About the same as most large calibre ATGMs. Pricey.

But what price FJAGs Excalibur, or even his cheaper guided systems?

For that round to be delivered to that grape hut the following is required:

The round,
The gun,
The truck,
The ammunition limber or equivalent
The crew
The GPO
The FSCC
The FOO
The Pl Leader
The Section Leader

A lot of dollars and time.

The Javelin may cost a lot of dollars but so does a manned battery of guns with rounds on hand. And delivery of the arty round takes time. And a second or third shot may be needed depending on how successful the game of Chinese Whispers was in relaying the target co-ordinates. And assuming the enemy hasn't moved by the time the first round arrives and stays around for the second round if the first round fails.

The Javelin, on the other hand, is immediately available, accurate, and effective.

Reducing the price of the effect is, of course, desirable. And thus CG84s, AT4s, NLAWs, M72s, 40mms and, I suggest, in the near future the provision of the 70mm APKWS vehicle mounted missiles which were developed as a cheaper supplement to the TOWs and Hellfires. And which could be mounted on the back of a MRZR.

As the guy in that field being shot at I would sooner have the solution to my problem in my hands than have to rely or my radio for timely assistance.

Your two thoughts seem to somewhat contradict each other. In the first you are highlighting the need to better control the use of weapons by having specialists who are better able to understand and coordinate the weapons, but in the 2nd point you seem to suggest that the guy in the fields should have the ability to make the decisions on use of those weapons without having to rely on direction from above.

 

[Brad Sallows]

The gun,
The truck,
The ammunition limber or equivalent
The crew
The GPO
The FSCC
The FOO
The Pl Leader
The Section Leader

Already all paid for, because we have artillery for other reasons. The incremental costs are the rounds and the training to use them.

 

[Brad Sallows]

A question to gunners: from the point of view of command/control, does it really matter how many batteries are part of a regiment right now? Surely artillery can integrate more batteries into a unit quickly.

 

[Kirkhill]

GR66:
I accept that those are contradictory thoughts. They reflect two different battlefield with two different enemies.

But the common thread is who owns the support weapons. I suggest in both cases the OC owns the weapons.

In the Afghan situation he dispatches a small unit on a fighting patrol against an isolated target. He allocates one of his support systems to his section, which is trained in its use and authorized to employ the two rounds they are carrying.

At Wainwright that same OC might choose to group his systems in one platoon or deploy his sections primarily to optimize their anti-armour effect and mass their fires. He may even choose to adopt volley fire by platoon.

The OC needs to be able to exercise his troops to cover both scenarios, and many others, and train them how to use all their weapons in unison as well as in isolation.

 

[Kirkhill]

The gun,
The truck,
The ammunition limber or equivalent
The crew
The GPO
The FSCC
The FOO
The Pl Leader
The Section Leader

Already all paid for, because we have artillery for other reasons. The incremental costs are the rounds and the training to use them.

Are they? We have 37 guns. We have, nominally, 243 rifle sections plus a plethora of Surveillance, Observation, Recce, Cavalry and Armoured teams. All wanting anti-armour support.

 

[FJAG]

We don't have a force large enough to merit a tank destroyer/anti tank unit. (We sort of do, but there are so many capability shortcomings to fielding anything more than a brigade group, and defeating large armour attacks is not at the head of the list.) Could still try to maintain a doctrine by working with allies.
...

At over 30,000 soldiers in field units (Reg and Res) we're large enough, but the question is how should this unit look. My own view is that what we typically designate as recce regiments are the first part of it. A highly mobile unit, partially equipped with UAVs, used to observing and concentrating and dispersing as needed makes the key forward part. That needs to be meshed with the intelligence and EW system and a weapons delivery capability (in my view both long range precision guided rockets as well as shorter range armed UAVs. Cal it a cavalry regiment to distinguish it from traditional recce and armour. That organization (whether organic to the brigade or whether a "divisional attachment" is your new anti-armour force and can operate as a screen and once driven in to the flanks and gaps and as a blocking force.

The tough part in an Army the size of ours I think is finding the balance between being asymmetric enough to maintain a diversity of skill sets while at the same time maintaining enough symmetry to not wear out the most commonly elements of the force.

Yup, but that's a balancing act and taking an appetite suppressant when we start spreading ourselves too thin. In the 1970s we essentially had three brigades: one in Germany dedicated to high intensity conflict, two in Canada which were light and multi purpose and a small Special Service Force rapid reaction element and still we could put two battalion sized rotations through Cyprus every year. Today we still have three combat brigades a combat support brigade and a Special Operations Command. The manning is thinner but the functional components are, for the most part, still there.

As I keep suggesting. Make the stuff you need day-to-day or on very short notice Reg F and give the "only needed in emergency" roles to the ARes or to a hybrid RegF/ARes units. Have a core that masters the skills and a relatively inexpensive mass that fills the ranks when needed.

... The cost of the Javelin - The capital cost of the Javelin is apparently somewhere in the 80 to 150,000 dollar range. About the same as most large calibre ATGMs. Pricey.

But what price FJAGs Excalibur, or even his cheaper guided systems?

For that round to be delivered to that grape hut the following is required: ...

That argument might have some minimal merit if the infantry didn't already have some cheaper choices organically, but the real problem with it is that the artillery's role is not limited to delivering the odd Excalibur on some hapless sniper in Afghanistan (although based on its present establishment one can't blame one for thinking that ... I'm pretty sure that's what goes through the minds of some of the Army's misguided senior commanders - kind of like why are we paying for air defense, the Taliban don't have planes). Artillery is what it is and has what it has because in real wars there is a need to move and mass fires rapidly across the battlefield ... and to defend against air threats ... and even to add the over-the-horizon capabilities to the anti-armour fight.

 

[Kirkhill]

That argument might have some minimal merit if the infantry didn't already have some cheaper choices organically, but the real problem with it is that the artillery's role is not limited to delivering the odd Excalibur on some hapless sniper in Afghanistan (although based on its present establishment one can't blame one for thinking that ... I'm pretty sure that's what goes through the minds of some of the Army's misguided senior commanders - kind of like why are we paying for air defense, the Taliban don't have planes). Artillery is what it is and has what it has because in real wars there is a need to move and mass fires rapidly across the battlefield ... and to defend against air threats ... and even to add the over-the-horizon capabilities to the anti-armour fight.

In my mind - when it functions - the primary advantage of the artillery is volume (or mass) if you prefer. Not the launching of the occasional Excalibur but the launching of volleys of Excaliburs mixed with a bunch of HE.

For example, in support of an infantry battalion, appropriately armed with ATGMs, taking on an armoured force.

As to the availability of cheaper solutions. I agree. Now if only someone would buy them. I'm specifically thinking of Carl Gustafs that have a multitude of weapons - flechettes, airburst, bouncing, HE, Anti Structure, APERs, Anti-Light Armour, Anti-Heavy Armour, smoke, flares, laser guided... that are compatible with that projector. And yet, as I understand it, most of our CGs are issued with HEAT rounds that are designed to punch very small holes in very hard targets.

Likewise for the M72s. Those have advanced beyond Light Anti-Tank Weapons and with their variety of warheads are now disposable RPGs.

 

[Kirkhill]

By the way, when I referred to using battalion weapons in unison I am assuming that everyone has their Personal Role Radio these days.

 

[FJAG]

A question to gunners: from the point of view of command/control, does it really matter how many batteries are part of a regiment right now? Surely artillery can integrate more batteries into a unit quickly.

Yes they can. The rule of thumb for a direct support regiment (one that gives a guaranteed high rate of availability to the supported arms) is one battery per manoeuvre unit. That's why in the good old days we had four batteries in some regiments then went down to three for the three battalions (one was double tasked to support the recce screen and also the battalion in reserve). Going down to two presently is simply a numbers game that has nothing to do with doctrine. Armies tend to work stuff in threes and typically an artillery regiment or battalion has three gun or rocket batteries.

One can add more batteries, if appropriate, and if they can be properly commanded and controlled in the fight. Beyond direct support of manoeuvre elements, artillery provides general support which consists of weapon systems which are used in various stages of a battle or simultaneously across a broader front ... think MLRS or HIMARS for example or reinforcing support ... think of divisional or even corps tube artillery that can be added in at particular critical areas and times.

I think what limits adding batteries to a given direct support regiment is whether that particular type of battery's capability can be properly integrated into the regiment's command and control structure and whether it needs to be full-time organic to the supported formation or not. I've previously mentioned "over-the-horizon" anti tank batteries utilizing armed drones or short range precision anti-armour rockets. I think something like that would fit very well into a brigade's direct support regiment's role as they would be less vulnerable than front-line direct fire missiles and would bolster the brigades anti-armour capabilities with a flexible wide ranging massed response at critical stages and would be coordinated into the brigade's overall anti-armour and indirect fires support plans by one entity at the highest level.

Are they? We have 37 guns. We have, nominally, 243 rifle sections plus a plethora of Surveillance, Observation, Recce, Cavalry and Armoured teams. All wanting anti-armour support.

We have 24 guns in regiments. The rest are in schools etc.

I'm the last guy to say "we can't afford that" when something is needed, but long before I'd start handing out a Javelin to each rifle sections, I'd want to make sure we've priorized providing a basic GBAD system , an armed UAV system and sufficient battalion anti-armour platoons, mortar platoons and direct support artillery. I think I'd let the rifle platoons coast with their CarlGs for quite a while longer until all that other stuff gets sorted out and properly integrated first.

 

[markppcli]

We don't have a force large enough to merit a tank destroyer/anti tank unit. (We sort of do, but there are so many capability shortcomings to fielding anything more than a brigade group, and defeating large armour attacks is not at the head of the list.) Could still try to maintain a doctrine by working with allies.

The phrase "local protection" describes what the CAF needs to actually have.

Dead ends: towed anti-tank guns, high velocity anti-tank guns on tracked chassis. Still useful: recoilless guns (versatility), missile systems, tanks.

I think probably a Brigade AT Coy would make sense, with Bn's holding their own ATGMs. If that means we see a company level Javalin det, or a platoon I'm not really fussed. I wouldn't put it on the sections though as that erodes their primary task of takinga nd holding ground.


I think we get get a bit lost in Equip the Man vs Man the Equipment. What we should be looking at is the Brigade as the man, we give it the equipment it needs to do it's job, and then we man that. Organizations and structures are equipment dependent to a large degree.

 

[Kirkhill]

Yes they can. The rule of thumb for a direct support regiment (one that gives a guaranteed high rate of availability to the supported arms) is one battery per manoeuvre unit. That's why in the good old days we had four batteries in some regiments then went down to three for the three battalions (one was double tasked to support the recce screen and also the battalion in reserve). Going down to two presently is simply a numbers game that has nothing to do with doctrine. Armies tend to work stuff in threes and typically an artillery regiment or battalion has three gun or rocket batteries.

One can add more batteries, if appropriate, and if they can be properly commanded and controlled in the fight. Beyond direct support of manoeuvre elements, artillery provides general support which consists of weapon systems which are used in various stages of a battle or simultaneously across a broader front ... think MLRS or HIMARS for example or reinforcing support ... think of divisional or even corps tube artillery that can be added in at particular critical areas and times.

I think what limits adding batteries to a given direct support regiment is whether that particular type of battery's capability can be properly integrated into the regiment's command and control structure and whether it needs to be full-time organic to the supported formation or not. I've previously mentioned "over-the-horizon" anti tank batteries utilizing armed drones or short range precision anti-armour rockets. I think something like that would fit very well into a brigade's direct support regiment's role as they would be less vulnerable than front-line direct fire missiles and would bolster the brigades anti-armour capabilities with a flexible wide ranging massed response at critical stages and would be coordinated into the brigade's overall anti-armour and indirect fires support plans by one entity at the highest level.



We have 24 guns in regiments. The rest are in schools etc.

I'm the last guy to say "we can't afford that" when something is needed, but long before I'd start handing out a Javelin to each rifle sections, I'd want to make sure we've priorized providing a basic GBAD system , an armed UAV system and sufficient battalion anti-armour platoons, mortar platoons and direct support artillery. I think I'd let the rifle platoons coast with their CarlGs for quite a while longer until all that other stuff gets sorted out and properly integrated first.

OK - I agree with you. Let me have a battalion anti-armour platoon wit 8 CLUs on the peace-time establishment. That would permit a useful number for an immediate response unit but, more importantly would create and anti-armour centre of excellence in the battalion and create a training centre for instructing section Carl Gustaf gunners how to operate the Javelin/Spike ATGMs. It would also develop the tactics which the CG-Gunners, and their commanders, could expect to employ with their weapons when employed in unison. But please supply the battalions with the full range of munitions available for the Carl Gustaf.

And by the way - to the anti-armour, and mortar platoons (and presumably the pioneers) organize a DF platoon to maintain both MG and Designated Marksman skills. (Pet notion - every MG number 2 should be equipped with a DMR rifle with good optics.

 

[markppcli]

So a full combat support company? Where do we get those numbers? I have a couple suggestions and they start with a 3.


Do we assume that the job of the army is to expect to deploy battle groups, task tailored to mission, with the capacity to deploy a brigade if required? If so how to be best achieve that? What is required vs what is wanted vs what do we have?

 

[Kirkhill]

I think probably a Brigade AT Coy would make sense, with Bn's holding their own ATGMs. If that means we see a company level Javalin det, or a platoon I'm not really fussed. I wouldn't put it on the sections though as that erodes their primary task of takinga nd holding ground.

But how does the section hold ground against an armoured threat? Absolutely, when taking ground, the heavy ATGM is probably going to be more trouble than it is worth. But once the section is in place its biggest threat is likely to be armoured.

On the other hand grouping the ATGMs into a firesupport base in support of the advance is likely to be useful. Maybe a fourth section in each platoon (a weapons det if you like) armed with 2 to 4 ATGMs is an appropriate compromise.

 

[markppcli]

But how does the section hold ground against an armoured threat? Absolutely, when taking ground, the heavy ATGM is probably going to be more trouble than it is worth. But once the section is in place its biggest threat is likely to be armoured.

On the other hand grouping the ATGMs into a firesupport base in support of the advance is likely to be useful. Maybe a fourth section in each platoon (a weapons det if you like) armed with 2 to 4 ATGMs is an appropriate compromise.

Well then we end up with a weapons det trying to carry enough ammunition to keep the Javelin, the 84, and the C6 supplied. God help them if CQ drops off a C16 for them. Now let's say we have the 84's as a part of a weapons locker for the section. Fine, they probably won't want to carry them on the assault, so where is the weapons locker? Is it in a carrier close by, or is it a few bounds back with the CQ?

I would prefer to see and atgm held at a no lower than company level. That way no one is trying to carry it on the assault, and you aren't loosing section bodies to it. It's also where it can be off set, and given more freedom to hunt for lack of a better term. Sections have their M72s, platoons their 84s, and the company it's ATGM section. The Bn would have it's TOW (maybe), which could be held as a Bde AT Coy.

 

[Kirkhill]

So a full combat support company? Where do we get those numbers? I have a couple suggestions and they start with a 3.

My numbers start reducing at the section level. And in the vehicles. 2 man crews for the infantry (armour can do their thing) because I expect the vehicles to be fighting from fixed positions while the infantry is dismounted. I envisage them as an armoured and mobile HMG firebase. 6 man sections for all types of battalions (a fire team plus a crew served weapon).

Small platoons in the support company to maintain skills and distribute skills in the battalion and to provide some tactical capability. But the support platoons would be using the same weapons available to the rifle platoons. The rifles could then reinforce the support platoons by adding their weapons to the employment plans developed by the support platoons, or the the support platoons could detach teams to support detached companies and platoons.

In our army I believe that skills retention is a lot more important than tactical readiness. One battle group at 72 hours notice to move could be kept up to strength. Follow on forces are at 90 to 180 days NTM with others at 365 days NTM. Those units can add numbers at lot easier than they can add, and learn to employ, skills.

 

[Kirkhill]

Well then we end up with a weapons det trying to carry enough ammunition to keep the Javelin, the 84, and the C6 supplied. God help them if CQ drops off a C16 for them. Now let's say we have the 84's as a part of a weapons locker for the section. Fine, they probably won't want to carry them on the assault, so where is the weapons locker? Is it in a carrier close by, or is it a few bounds back with the CQ?

I would prefer to see and atgm held at a no lower than company level. That way no one is trying to carry it on the assault, and you aren't loosing section bodies to it. It's also where it can be off set, and given more freedom to hunt for lack of a better term. Sections have their M72s, platoons their 84s, and the company it's ATGM section. The Bn would have it's TOW (maybe), which could be held as a Bde AT Coy.

Then your Platoon Leader and OC haven't done their jobs right. The C6 I would put into the section's arms locker. The choice of Javelin or CG84 should be made by the OC or the Pl Ldr before the enemy is sighted, much less engaged. I want the Javelin the same place as the shovels, picks, machetes, concertina and spare batteries are held. Deliverable on short notice so that they can be integrated into the battle plan when required.

We seem to be saying much of a sameness. The difference, I believe, is that we are debating how much flexibility we can expect out of the troops manning the ATGMs and whether they are tied to their weapons or their tactics. Does it matter to the tactics if the DF-AT system is the M72 or the Javelin or anything in between? Can we expect one gunner to manage an M72, an AT-4, an N-LAW, a CG-84 and a Javelin/Spike CLU?

I wouldn't be overly concerned about the TOW. I know we have them but we are talking about incorporating the Javelins, which have comparable range and effect to the TOW (4-5 km), somewhere in the battalion. The Brigade AT coy can either be equipped with 10 km heavier ATGMs or the 25 to 40 km N-LOS systems (assuming that they don't end up with the Arty in an AT bty or in the LRPRs bty.)

 

[FJAG]

I think probably a Brigade AT Coy would make sense, with Bn's holding their own ATGMs. If that means we see a company level Javalin det, or a platoon I'm not really fussed. I wouldn't put it on the sections though as that erodes their primary task of takinga nd holding ground.


I think we get get a bit lost in Equip the Man vs Man the Equipment. What we should be looking at is the Brigade as the man, we give it the equipment it needs to do it's job, and then we man that. Organizations and structures are equipment dependent to a large degree.

That meets my own thought except I'd go for two anti-armoured "companies": one either direct or over-the-horizon to go with the brigade's "cavalry" regiment and another over-the-horizon artillery battery. That and an anti-armour platoon with each battalion.

"Equip the man" has become jingoism. I think it is still perfectly applicable for such organizations as the special forces and to an extent the rifle companies but for the bulk of the Army - we've been manning the equipment for some time now.

So a full combat support company? Where do we get those numbers? I have a couple suggestions and they start with a 3.

Which ought to be doable for an armoured brigade.

A US ABCT has one armoured regiment and two infantry battalions organized into three combined arms battalions. Those battalions do not have separate combat support companies because the ATGM and mortar capability is built into the rifle companies and recce into the bn's headquarters company. That said, if one took the brigade's light battalion one could build up the necessary combat support elements in the three combined arms battalions and have enough PYs left over which when added to the armoured regiment's recce squadron would form the basic structure of a cavalry regiment/battalion.

Do we assume that the job of the army is to expect to deploy battle groups, task tailored to mission, with the capacity to deploy a brigade if required? If so how to be best achieve that? What is required vs what is wanted vs what do we have?

I think that most armies have come to the conclusion that the brigade is the lowest level of integrated unit of action. We've been that way for over a half a century, the Americans went for BCTs two decades ago and the Brits just went that way as well.

The battle group was always an ad hoc organization cobbled together from within brigade resources to meet a certain mission. I think Canada made a large mistake when it went to the building block concept a few decades ago because we lost a major edge on organizing and training our brigades (a situation that CMTC supposedly remedied). As long as we accept the missions we do, we'll need to form battle groups for deployments but in my mind we should always, always focus on training for brigade operations and form battle groups for tasks or missions as a temporary measure. If the infantry and tankers and artillery and engineers and the service support folks train and organize for that, carving off a task specific temporary battle group ought not to be a challenge so long as the specific task is one suited for that particular type of brigade (ie heavy, medium or light)

 

[markppcli]

My numbers start reducing at the section level. And in the vehicles. 2 man crews for the infantry (armour can do their thing) because I expect the vehicles to be fighting from fixed positions while the infantry is dismounted. 6 man sections for all types of battalions.

So we expect heavy lav casualties then. I mean fine if we build that in, but I'd be pretty stunned to watch enemy IFVs not jockeying and moving their fire positions.

 

[Kirkhill]

So we expect heavy lav casualties then. I mean fine if we build that in, but I'd be pretty stunned to watch enemy IFVs not jockeying and moving their fire positions.

I expect the LAVs to jockey and relocate while focusing on supporting the dismounted infantry that they have delivered to the assault line, in exactly the same way that I would expect the MG platoon to jockey and relocate. I expect them to be fighting the 4 mph battle. Not the 40 mph battle.

And if that means casualties amongst the LAVs and their crews I can only think it also means casualties among the dismounted assault troops. Those troops want the fire of those LAVs on their objective constantly as they advance. That, surely, limits the possibilities for the LAVs to jockey and relocate.

 

[markppcli]

I expect the LAVs to jockey and relocate while focusing on supporting the dismounted infantry that they have delivered to the assault line, in exactly the same way that I would expect the MG platoon to jockey and relocate. I expect them to be fighting the 4 mph battle. Not the 40 mph battle.

And if that means casualties amongst the LAVs and their crews I can only think it also means casualties among the dismounted assault troops. Those troops want the fire of those LAVs on their objective constantly as they advance. That, surely, limits the possibilities for the LAVs to jockey and relocate.

I cant get into why this doesn't really make sense with what you said earlier without explaining the lowest levels of AFV operation, so I'm just going to leave this be. Suffice to say that a gunner is not going to be able to operate the cannon, handles, comms, and direct the driver in a jockey all at the same time on his own. But that's just my experience.

That meets my own thought except I'd go for two anti-armoured "companies": one either direct or over-the-horizon to go with the brigade's "cavalry" regiment and another over-the-horizon artillery battery. That and an anti-armour platoon with each battalion.

"Equip the man" has become jingoism. I think it is still perfectly applicable for such organizations as the special forces and to an extent the rifle companies but for the bulk of the Army - we've been manning the equipment for some time now.



Which ought to be doable for an armoured brigade.

A US ABCT has one armoured regiment and two infantry battalions organized into three combined arms battalions. Those battalions do not have separate combat support companies because the ATGM and mortar capability is built into the rifle companies and recce into the bn's headquarters company. That said, if one took the brigade's light battalion one could build up the necessary combat support elements in the three combined arms battalions and have enough PYs left over which when added to the armoured regiment's recce squadron would form the basic structure of a cavalry regiment/battalion.



I think that most armies have come to the conclusion that the brigade is the lowest level of integrated unit of action. We've been that way for over a half a century, the Americans went for BCTs two decades ago and the Brits just went that way as well.

The battle group was always an ad hoc organization cobbled together from within brigade resources to meet a certain mission. I think Canada made a large mistake when it went to the building block concept a few decades ago because we lost a major edge on organizing and training our brigades (a situation that CMTC supposedly remedied). As long as we accept the missions we do, we'll need to form battle groups for deployments but in my mind we should always, always focus on training for brigade operations and form battle groups for tasks or missions as a temporary measure. If the infantry and tankers and artillery and engineers and the service support folks train and organize for that, carving off a task specific temporary battle group ought not to be a challenge so long as the specific task is one suited for that particular type of brigade (ie heavy, medium or light)

I supposed I'm inherently wrong in seeing the Bde operation as tasking their battle groups aren't I? Downside of the coal face view I suppose.