Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[markppcli]

Assuming that the fire fight is won?

Advance to contact Sept 1914...When was the firefight won?

Some time around 1919

 

[daftandbarmy]

Okay. Perhaps just being a tad critical here but they just fired a $150,000 missile to take out a sniper where a few $300 60 mm mortar rounds would have probably been more effective and lighter to lug around. And I'm not even going to mention using a few 105 mm artillery rounds for a few hundred more that require no lugging around by the grunts at all.

This enagement looked a litle but like a PR tour e.g. '1 Section... you will have a journalist attached to you tomorrow. Take them our for a'drive by shooting' and make it look good, will you?'

 

[markppcli]

Okay. Perhaps just being a tad critical here but they just fired a $150,000 missile to take out a sniper where a few $300 60 mm mortar rounds would have probably been more effective and lighter to lug around. And I'm not even going to mention using a few 105 mm artillery rounds for a few hundred more that require no lugging around by the grunts at all.

I'm sure you mean the 2 inch mortar? I think the Brits had retired that well before they were in Helmand.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I'm sure you mean the 2 inch mortar? I think the Brits had retired that well before they were in Helmand.

Nope.

They used the 51mm MOR, which proved awful for a variety of reasons during its first real war, so they went back to the 60mm MOR.

51 MM Light Mortar
The 51 mm Light Mortar is a weapon that can be carried and fired by one man, and is found in the HQ of an infantry platoon.

The mortar is used to fire smoke, illuminating and HE rounds out to a range of approximately 750 m; a short range insert device enables the weapon to be used in close quarter battle situations with some accuracy.

The 51 mm Light Mortar has replaced the older 1940s 2' mortar.

Although the weapon remains available it is approaching its planned out of service date across the armed forces. The capability provided by the 51 mm mortar is being replaced by a combination of systems including the 40 mm Under-slung Grenade Launcher and rocket hand-fired illumination and smoke rounds. In Afghanistan, the 51 mm capability is being augmented by a purchase of a more modern 60 mm mortar.

British Army - The Infantry - 51mm Mortar, 60mm Mortar and Grenade Machine Gun - a5a13.2

 

[markppcli]

One day i'll get tired of being told I'm wrong.

 

[daftandbarmy]

One day i'll get tired of being told I'm wrong.

If you have a wife and teenaged kids, like me, you'll acclimatize quickly

 

[Infanteer]

One day i'll get tired of being told I'm wrong.

I find that once you get old, you're never wrong!

 

[FJAG]

...
Although the weapon remains available it is approaching its planned out of service date across the armed forces. The capability provided by the 51 mm mortar is being replaced by a combination of systems including the 40 mm Under-slung Grenade Launcher and rocket hand-fired illumination and smoke rounds. In Afghanistan, the 51 mm capability is being augmented by a purchase of a more modern 60 mm mortar.
...​

... and the Javelin.

 

[Brad Sallows]

Well, plainly the name must mean something to someone, since 2" is very close to 50.8 mm (51 mm). I assume they kept the calibre but made other improvements and adopted a metric name to reduce confusion.

 

[markppcli]

@FJAG

24:30 the Cost of Javelin vs 84mm Carl G

 

[FJAG]

@FJAG

24:30 the Cost of Javelin vs 84mm Carl G

This is an excellent video. The first portion is informative but drags a bit while the second portion, the lecture by the Chieftain, on the development and the use of tank destroyers and the capabilities and issues of modern anti-tank warfare is absolutely brilliant and raises numerous points for consideration of forming a new anti-tank capability for the Canadian Army.

 

[GR66]

@FJAG

24:30 the Cost of Javelin vs 84mm Carl G

I found this to be a very interesting video. In particular the discussions about the WWII era tank destroyer battalions and the relative effectiveness of AT weapons evenly distributed down at the lower levels of the unit structure vs concentrated in dedicated mobile AT units that can mass fire at a particular point in the battlefield.

Particularly interesting were his comments (around the 25min mark) about the politics around German wartime AT vehicle production with the politicians pushing for massive, heavily-armoured weapons like the Jagdtiger while the German Army really wanted highly mobile, lightly armoured, open-topped tank destroyers with excellent guns that could be employed enmasse in no less than Company (and preferably Battalion) strength.

I also think he made a very good point about not taking all the videos showing the effectiveness of ATGMs and loitering munitions against tanks in recent conflicts as being an indication of how effective they would be in a high intensity conflict vs a peer enemy.

I'd say the speaker definitely comes down on the side of the dedicated weapons/AT Platoon/Company/Battalion as opposed to the "arms locker" approach at least as far as the higher-end dedicated AT weapons go.

In a Canadian context, if we consider our Leopards as our primary anti-tank weapon how does that suggest we best organize our limited number of tanks?

I also found it interesting that there were no questions at the end of the talk.

 

[FJAG]

The lack of questions is most probably fatigue at sitting in a classroom when you're attending what is basically a handling weapons in the field oriented course. ... and then they're Yanks.

I agree with the dedicated weapons conclusion and add to that the fact that they need to be distributed to cover the zones that the units cover. His remark about the Bradley and the mixing of the long range wire guided TOW (which requires the vehicle to pause while shooting), the limited range of other infantry weapons, the high visibility of a tank hunting team to thermal optics, the need to fill gaps (especially in dispersed operations), the need for a strong reserve to counter penetrations all weigh in here as to how these weapons need to be organized in a formation. What he didn't cover very well is how suppressive artillery fire used by the advancing force will also hinder anti-armour defences.

There's a lot of meat to digest here (not the least of which is the example of how an Israeli tank force caught in a missile ambush had forgotten basic anti-tank drills because they'd been too tuned in to fighting a lightly armed insurgency.)

I think they need to bring the Chieftain and a few more historians and a bunch of wargamers into the the Force 2025 development process. (actually I'd be surprised and disappointed if they haven't already)

 

[markppcli]

There's a lot of meat to digest here (not the least of which is the example of how an Israeli tank force caught in a missile ambush had forgotten basic anti-tank drills because they'd been too tuned in to fighting a lightly armed insurgency.)

When I get back to my unit i'm going to poll how many crews have ever even loaded MBGDs let alone fired them. We need to start seeing that as a drill and expecting it to be followed.


I think there's a lot to be taken from it, I posted it simply because of the timely Javelin vs Carl G cost comment. I tend to agree that while a "weapons locker" works for an infantry platoon or section fight, it's probably not the way to organize your AT plan.


What conclusions an we draw form this in terms of our lav based, expeditionary army?

 

[daftandbarmy]

When I get back to my unit i'm going to poll how many crews have ever even loaded MBGDs let alone fired them. We need to start seeing that as a drill and expecting it to be followed.


I think there's a lot to be taken from it, I posted it simply because of the timely Javelin vs Carl G cost comment. I tend to agree that while a "weapons locker" works for an infantry platoon or section fight, it's probably not the way to organize your AT plan.


What conclusions an we draw form this in terms of our lav based, expeditionary army?

We shouldn't let the lessons from Afghanistan adversely skew our planning for a future peer/near peer armoured conflict type fight?

 

[FJAG]

We shouldn't let the lessons from Afghanistan adversely skew our planning for a future peer/near peer armoured conflict type fight?

This is one of the major reasons why I favour an asymmetric Army and have always argued against the all-singing, all-dancing concept.

We talk about muscle memory when we talk about small-arms drills and why it's important. The same concepts work at the formation level. There are many constituent parts there that need to operate in sync and switching your focus from counterinsurgency to high intensity conflict gets in the way of that process (just look at the ineffective eunuch that the artillery-especially air defence and tubes- has become, the armoured corps is becoming, and even the infantry is constantly at risk of what with mortars and atgms). Even when we didn't have Afghanistan the Army was slewing off capabilities and procedures and a fundamental understanding of the basics of what is needed at the extreme end even for a "small" army. (and IMHO, a two-division sized force is not a small army unless we allow it to be - and we did)

There needs to be an element of the Army (and IMHO it needs to be at least one brigade) which constantly thinks and practices high intensity warfare. At the same time we need an element that constantly thinks and practices low intensity, counter-insurgency and/or peacekeeping. We need to build sound doctrine and sound organizations for both environments so long as we are actively looking at both ... and we are looking at both. Yes, you can slew around from one to the other, it just takes time, but to properly develop the doctrine, the TTPs, the "muscle memory" and keep it developing with the times, you need at least a part of the force as a centre of excellence in that environment.

 

[Brad Sallows]

We don't have a force large enough to merit a tank destroyer/anti tank unit. (We sort of do, but there are so many capability shortcomings to fielding anything more than a brigade group, and defeating large armour attacks is not at the head of the list.) Could still try to maintain a doctrine by working with allies.

The phrase "local protection" describes what the CAF needs to actually have.

Dead ends: towed anti-tank guns, high velocity anti-tank guns on tracked chassis. Still useful: recoilless guns (versatility), missile systems, tanks.

 

[GR66]

This is one of the major reasons why I favour an asymmetric Army and have always argued against the all-singing, all-dancing concept.

The tough part in an Army the size of ours I think is finding the balance between being asymmetric enough to maintain a diversity of skill sets while at the same time maintaining enough symmetry to not wear out the most commonly elements of the force.

 

[Kirkhill]

A couple of thoughts

I'll start with "The Rise and Fall of the Emma Gees". That pamphlet keeps recurring because machine guns became ubiquitous. When they did they became the infanteer's personal belt fed rifle and employed at the gunner's discretion. They lose much of their effectiveness that way. Fire discipline, ammunition consumption, priority targets, mutual support, concentration of fire, etc - all of that is lost over time. Muscle memory fades. Maintaining a small MG platoon in the battalion as a Centre of Excellence probably has as much or more value than its actual tactical value.

At its best it provides MG advisors to Coy and Platoon commanders on how to get the best out of their assortment of GPMGs, LMGs and Automatic Rifles.

Although the weapons are universally distributed for carriage somebody needs to be maintaining a plan on how best to employ them as the CO/OC takes his command into different situations.

I suggest the same thing is true for mortars/artillery starting with hand grenades, 40mm-51mm-60mm-81mm-120mm-155mm and other HE launchers.

It is also true for the Anti-Tank Plan managing AT grenades and 40mm-66mm-84mm-120mm-127mm-152mm HEAT warheads.

Some of these weapons are "specialist" weapons. This is particularly true of the older systems. Newer systems don't require the same degree of operator training. This is good and bad and replicates the Rise and Fall of the Emma Gees. The old time specialist operators knew not just how to operate their systems but also their strengths and weaknesses and how to get the best out of them.

This is not a new problem. And, again, I suggest that history offers guides. In particular the mock battles of the Fort Henry Guard. Each man in the 24 man platoon is issued 60 rounds. He doesn't own any of those rounds. Those 1440 rounds belong to the Lieutenant leading the platoon. And he gets to decide how to group his weapons and where and when to discharge them. The fire discipline is more akin to a modern artillery unit than a modern infantry unit. I suggest that that same fire discipline needs to be employed with the modern infantry's support weapons. Section may only have half a dozen 84mm rounds or 2x 127mm Javelin rounds. But the Platoon Leader has 6 Javelins and 18 to 24x 84mms. The Coy Commander will have 18 to 24 Javelins and/or 54 to 112 84mm rounds. And those rounds can be selected depending on the target set anticipated.

Some of the lessons of the Emma Gees also apply. The Irishman in the Anti-Armour video talked about the value of Key Holes and using terrain. That is also known a "enfilade from defilade". Taking the enemy from the flanks while protecting your own flanks. Fire and Retire. Masking your signature. Obscurants. (In ancient days we didn't carry HE for the platoon mortar - we carried smoke and a couple of flares)

These lessons, I suggest are common to all Direct Fire systems, including the rifle.



Second thought

The cost of the Javelin - The capital cost of the Javelin is apparently somewhere in the 80 to 150,000 dollar range. About the same as most large calibre ATGMs. Pricey.

But what price FJAGs Excalibur, or even his cheaper guided systems?

For that round to be delivered to that grape hut the following is required:

The round,
The gun,
The truck,
The ammunition limber or equivalent
The crew
The GPO
The FSCC
The FOO
The Pl Leader
The Section Leader

A lot of dollars and time.

The Javelin may cost a lot of dollars but so does a manned battery of guns with rounds on hand. And delivery of the arty round takes time. And a second or third shot may be needed depending on how successful the game of Chinese Whispers was in relaying the target co-ordinates. And assuming the enemy hasn't moved by the time the first round arrives and stays around for the second round if the first round fails.

The Javelin, on the other hand, is immediately available, accurate, and effective.

Reducing the price of the effect is, of course, desirable. And thus CG84s, AT4s, NLAWs, M72s, 40mms and, I suggest, in the near future the provision of the 70mm APKWS vehicle mounted missiles which were developed as a cheaper supplement to the TOWs and Hellfires. And which could be mounted on the back of a MRZR.

PolarisGov MRZR - Armed UGV.... With a FLIR BlackHornet VRS (Vehicle Reconnaissance System) & Arnold Defense FLETCHER LGR-4 (Laser Guided Rocket x4)

www.snafu-solomon.com

As the guy in that field being shot at I would sooner have the solution to my problem in my hands than have to rely or my radio for timely assistance.

 

[Kirkhill]

We don't have a force large enough to merit a tank destroyer/anti tank unit. (We sort of do, but there are so many capability shortcomings to fielding anything more than a brigade group, and defeating large armour attacks is not at the head of the list.) Could still try to maintain a doctrine by working with allies.

The phrase "local protection" describes what the CAF needs to actually have.

Dead ends: towed anti-tank guns, high velocity anti-tank guns on tracked chassis. Still useful: recoilless guns (versatility), missile systems, tanks.

Agreed. We don't have a force large enough to merit specialized units.

But we should be able to create skilled Multi-Purpose Units. In the bad old days the Support Company was repository of specialist skills (and I note that the Brits maintained their MG platoons even while they distributed GPMGs to sections). But it was also convertible to a rifle company. Just like engineers can, in extremis, be converted (and wasted) as rifles.

I don't see why 27 sections, organised as 9 platoons, 3 companies and 1 battalion can't be effectively trained to employ their available MGs, HE and AT weapons in a co-ordinated anti-armour defense plan. Or be trained to use a portion of the assets as a fixed fire base while the rest of the unit advances.

But I thought the army taught those things in any case?