Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Kirkhill]

Equip is more expensive mainly because the radios they use are much much better, any other weapons/gear they use is almost a rounding error after comms are considered. Training is much more expensive. Not only the selection, but even something as simple as the amount of ammunition they use is orders of magnitude more than infantry uses.

In the grand scheme of things, however, it's chump change. (looks a 60+billion dollar warship procurement and 30+ billion dollar aircraft procurement)

Are we all agreeing that the primary difference between a Special Forces Operator and the rest of the Army is the training budget? To me that speaks more to the shoddy attention to training in the rest of the Army, in particular the Reserves, than about the quality of the Special Operators.

We almost seem to be saying "if you jump through enough hoops long enough and prove yourself committed to us we will eventually train you". (Come to that, based on the tales from recruiting, we seem to be saying exactly that).

Why wouldn't we be training the Light Infantry (or General Duties Infantry as I prefer) with the same intensity as the SF Operators? As Underway notes, in the grand scheme it would be chump change - especially given how few of the creatures there are. And local range time and thousands of bullets has to be cheaper than the grand theatre pieces of Wainwright.

For that matter, with respect to the Reserves, which would attract and retain most civilians? A bit more beer money or an annual allocation of 5000 rds of 5.56 or 9mm, a rifle with an annual refurbishment and a new barrel, and free access on their own time to a local range?

Add in some useful multipurpose vehicles from MILCOTS market and decent comms and you have the basis for a solid volunteer force.

And, with a few thousand more rounds annually, and access to some of the more exotic disposable weapons available, you can train effective infantry.


Final thought:

With respect to the number and size of infantry battalions. Frankly I have no time for tying the PYs, or the structure of the non-LAV infantry to the LAV infantry. If anything I would be looking to the CSOR end of the spectrum for ideas.

The number of infanteers, even the number of companies, is not as important as the existence of the Light Battalions and the range of weaponry and skills they can bring to the field. I would recommend keeping 3 Battalions, if for no other reasons than mutual political support and permitting three discrete but mutually communicative local experiments to develop and adapt lessons learned.

I would be fine with three Light Battalions of 270 each if that is all the manpower that is available.

On the other hand, if we are going to tie ourselves to the LAVs then, 45 LAVs with 6 GIBs each = 270. If the Light Battalions were organized on that principle, and the reserves, then they would supply a ready drop in to the LAVs when the LAVs ran out of GIBs...assuming the LAVs survive.

4 LAVs = 4x 6 Infanteers (1x 6 Command and Support + 3x 6 with 1x 4-man fire team and 1x2 crew served system) modelled on the Scandinavian pattern. = 24

15 LAVs = 3x 4x 6 Infanteers = 72 + 3x 1x 6 Command and Support =18 for a total of 90

45 LAVs = 2x 3x 4x 6 Infanteers with 2x 3x 1x 6 Command and Support = 180 + 15x 6 Command and Support specialists = 90 for a total of 270.

270 that can be dumped in the back of the LAVs or operate independently as battalions or companies or support of CANSOFCOM, or be brigaded into what would be, effectively, a 20th century battalion of 810 with an additional 270 HQ and Atts.

It could also be a model for the Reserves.

I know it means 6 man sections and 24 man platoons. That just means you need to task more sections and more platoons and more companies to achieve your objectives if the situation requires.

 

[dapaterson]

It starts with selection, not training.

 

[daftandbarmy]

For that matter, with respect to the Reserves, which would attract and retain most civilians? A bit more beer money or an annual allocation of 5000 rds of 5.56 or 9mm, a rifle with an annual refurbishment and a new barrel, and free access on their own time to a local range?

In my experience it's the same stuff that attracts and retains the most Reg F personnel: good leadership.

Just watch the troops melt away when there's a crappy CO/ RSM in the seat.

 

[Kirkhill]

In my experience it's the same stuff that attracts and retains the most Reg F personnel: good leadership.

Just watch the troops melt away when there's a crappy CO/ RSM in the seat.

I won't disagree. But good leaders also melt away when they don't have the tools (read Authority and Budget) commensurate with their desires and their Responsibilities. When they spend too much time reaching back and don't have the time to push forwards.

 

[Kirkhill]

This should go in the British Military thread but it also is germane to this discussion concerning the utility of light forces.

Paratroopers drop into the desert at dawn as UK sends warning to Russia

In an exclusive dispatch, Danielle Sheridan reports from alongside Army's latest operation in Jordan as UK bolsters its Middle East presence

www.telegraph.co.uk

 

[FJAG]

Just a few random thoughts Kirkhill.

Special Forces Operators are envisioned to be ready to deploy tactically on zero notice. Their standard of training needs to be very high at all times. Most other army components do not need that and the training can be more paced.

There is also the issue of the materiel that you start with as DAP points out. spec operators have been specially selected for their capabilities to learn rapidly, make rapid decisions and be self starters and already come to the organization with a fairly good skill set. Other parts of the army not so much. There is also the level of training to be achieved. While special operators may have a variety of missions many of their skill sets transfer from one mission to the other and are generally focused on the small team level. Army units on the other hand have a wide variety of disparate skill sets and the units need to be trained and exercised collectively in ever larger groupings. All that takes time when you consider the level of turnover, postings and blank files in the unit.

While the costs of ammunition might be chump change for a small unit like TF 2, it becomes pretty big dollars for a mechanized brigade once you factor in everything including pol costs, rations etc etc for 5,000 folks. Just as important is leadership burn out. It takes a lot of effort to put together a meaningful exercise for a battalion. We've all done advance to contacts up and down the ranges where the most challenging aspect was staying awake in the back of the track. Really good training, however, requires a lot of senior folks putting a lot of time and effort into organizing it. You can only do that for so long.

The other aspect is the number of folks. Back when I was a young gunner officer I was told that the reason we had two guns in the troop was because it took three guns using the projectiles we had and the rate of fire the guns gave out to neutralize a certain size of enemy tactical entity. We had four guns because that way one could always be down for rest and maintenance and even if we lost one we would still be an effective fire unit. Then we became three gun troops and then six gun batteries and now two gun troops but I seriously doubt there has been a rationale evaluation of the effects since the 1970s. I'm not saying that we don't know what the effects are - we do - its just we haven't tied those to the establishment and a high intensity conflict. Our establishments are $ for number of systems purchased and available PYs driven.

It's the same for infantry. Back in the sixties we changed from 303s and Brens to we used the same platoon establishment when we switched to FNs. The M113 more or less accommodated that section but you suddenly had to deal with the driver and machine gunner one dismount. That was a whole new thing but more and more the size and organization of the section had to do with the specific number of vehicles and crew required and whatever room was left for dismounts. Folks like Infanteer have a lot better handle on the development of small team tactics and organization then I ever will but I think that mostly these things are reactive to numbers of troops and vehicles available than rational thought. I've never been able to understand how, if there is a rational number of people required in a section (and thereby platoon and company etc) how we could do something like foist HTLA on units in combat the way we did. It's almost like on exercise when you pull folks out to practice combat casualties.

All that is to say I'm not sure if anyone can put there finger on the number of dismounts that a battalion needs for any given situation before it becomes combat incapacitated. I'm not even sure if we game this at any given time to see if our establishments should change or if we just react (like when mortars and pioneers disappeared or when we went down to two batteries in a three battalion brigade)

While it's nice to have a standard model of what a rifle platoon or company should be, it seems to me that a combined arms brigade looks and operates very, very differently from a light infantry brigade.

 

[daftandbarmy]

This should go in the British Military thread but it also is germane to this discussion concerning the utility of light forces.

Paratroopers drop into the desert at dawn as UK sends warning to Russia

In an exclusive dispatch, Danielle Sheridan reports from alongside Army's latest operation in Jordan as UK bolsters its Middle East presence

www.telegraph.co.uk

Well, the British have a military doctrine that matches their Foreign Policy so, of course, they have 'light forces' like an Air Assault Brigade.

Canada? I'm not so sure....

 

[Kirkhill]

Just a few random thoughts Kirkhill.

Good stuff!

Special Forces Operators are envisioned to be ready to deploy tactically on zero notice. Their standard of training needs to be very high at all times. Most other army components do not need that and the training can be more paced.

Agreed. The shorter the NTM then the more training is necessary.

There is also the issue of the materiel that you start with as DAP points out. spec operators have been specially selected for their capabilities to learn rapidly, make rapid decisions and be self starters and already come to the organization with a fairly good skill set. Other parts of the army not so much.

I presume you are talking about Gunners?

My sense is that much of the population falls into the entrepreneurial, self-starter, self-taught realm these days. The lack of steady work will do that to you.

There is also the level of training to be achieved. While special operators may have a variety of missions many of their skill sets transfer from one mission to the other and are generally focused on the small team level. Army units on the other hand have a wide variety of disparate skill sets and the units need to be trained and exercised collectively in ever larger groupings. All that takes time when you consider the level of turnover, postings and blank files in the unit.

I would suggest that what you described wrt to the special operators applies equally to the infantry. I will stipulate that the rest of the Army are Specialists. I guess what I am saying is that the Special Operators' specialty is Generalism - a field that used to be the job of the infantry.

In Praise of Infantry; Wavell, 1948

And his stable mate Slim

"[Special Forces] trained, equipped and mentally adjusted for one kind of operation were wasteful. They did not give, militarily, a worthwhile return for the resources in men, material and time that they absorbed... They were usually formed by attracting the best men... The result was undoubtedly to lower the quality of the rest of the Army. This cult of special forces is as sensible as to form a Royal Corps of Tree Climbers and say that no soldier, who does not wear its green hat with a bunch of oak leaves stuck in it should be expected to climb a tree.'

---

Field Marshal Sir William Slim, 1956"

I've re-read that quotation many times. And my sense is not that he was complaining about training men for particular operations (like jumping out of aeroplanes or landing craft) but that they were then held in reserve on double rations and the fighting was left to the rest of the PBI.

Modern Special Forces and the PBI have reversed roles. The SF Operators are on call or in the field every day. The PBI mans the garrisons.

While the costs of ammunition might be chump change for a small unit like TF 2, it becomes pretty big dollars for a mechanized brigade once you factor in everything including pol costs, rations etc etc for 5,000 folks. Just as important is leadership burn out. It takes a lot of effort to put together a meaningful exercise for a battalion. We've all done advance to contacts up and down the ranges where the most challenging aspect was staying awake in the back of the track. Really good training, however, requires a lot of senior folks putting a lot of time and effort into organizing it. You can only do that for so long.

But I'm not talking about 3 mechanized brigades, and 6 more in reserve. I'm considering 27 regular companies and 51 in reserve, all armed with direct fire small arms with common sighting systems - and access to the panoply of man-portable munitions currently on the market. Lots of 5.56 and 9mm. Occasional familiarization with the munitions.

You can keep your 25/105/120/155 rounds for the specialists to play with.

The other aspect is the number of folks. Back when I was a young gunner officer I was told that the reason we had two guns in the troop was because it took three guns using the projectiles we had and the rate of fire the guns gave out to neutralize a certain size of enemy tactical entity. We had four guns because that way one could always be down for rest and maintenance and even if we lost one we would still be an effective fire unit. Then we became three gun troops and then six gun batteries and now two gun troops but I seriously doubt there has been a rationale evaluation of the effects since the 1970s. I'm not saying that we don't know what the effects are - we do - its just we haven't tied those to the establishment and a high intensity conflict. Our establishments are $ for number of systems purchased and available PYs driven.

I agree, kind of. But replacing 25 pdrs with 155mm Archers was never going to be a one for one proposition in any case.

Rational thought, IMHO, starts with recognition of the realities, and those realities include budgets, people and the realistic capabilities of available vehicles. We pull Orbats (TOEs if you will) from various eras with ease and compare those to modern requirements.

But we routinely forget that, like all plans, they never survived contact with the enemy. The Cal Highs, the Maisies and, in particular the Black Watch spent their war from July 44 to Mark Tennant's last round on May 8th 1945 fighting whatever the enemy had to send at them with whatever they had available to respond. The number of people, the level of training, the supply of weapons, ammunition and vehicles, even dry boots, shovels and rations were constantly in flux. Part of the job of the leadership, whoever was surviving on a given day, was to reorganize his troops to accomplish Paragraph 2 Intent.

Unlike the arty which had a more stable structure.

All that is to say I'm not sure if anyone can put there finger on the number of dismounts that a battalion needs for any given situation before it becomes combat incapacitated. I'm not even sure if we game this at any given time to see if our establishments should change or if we just react (like when mortars and pioneers disappeared or when we went down to two batteries in a three battalion brigade)

And I will counter that I don't think there is an answer to the numbers of anything that are needed for any given situation. Battles have been lost with overwhelming numbers. They have been won against insurmountable odds.

Plans are good. They are necessary to organize the pieces on the chess board. But how they are employed decides the match. D&B is right to focus on the quality of the leadership. But that means giving junior leaders to play chess, to play games and lose, in short - to learn. And that costs money. But training infantry costs less money than tankers, engineers and mechanics.

While it's nice to have a standard model of what a rifle platoon or company should be, it seems to me that a combined arms brigade looks and operates very, very differently from a light infantry brigade.

There we agree.

I happen to think that light forces are under-estimated, particularly in the Canadian context with its focus on 4CMBG and the armoured battlefield of the North German Plain.

Interestingly the Germans put a lot of emphasis on Defended Localities manned by well equipped light infantry while the Panzers were heading back to Moscow.

If the capabilities of Light Forces, and the General Duties Infantry, were under-estimated in the 80s it is all the more true today. Even the Yanks are resurrecting the too light to fight 7th 9th Division.

 

[Infanteer]

Are we all agreeing that the primary difference between a Special Forces Operator and the rest of the Army is the training budget?

If y'all are agreeing on that, then y'all (1) missed my earlier post explaining the difference and (2) are wrong.

Special Operations Forces have different missions, with a different bucket of tasks, and thus or organized and employed differently. The training bit falls out from that.

 

[GR66]

If y'all are agreeing on that, then y'all (1) missed my earlier post explaining the difference and (2) are wrong.

Special Operations Forces have different missions, with a different bucket of tasks, and thus or organized and employed differently. The training bit falls out from that.

Is that maybe where the "Special" in Special Operations Forces comes from?

 

[Kirkhill]

If y'all are agreeing on that, then y'all (1) missed my earlier post explaining the difference and (2) are wrong.

Special Operations Forces have different missions, with a different bucket of tasks, and thus or organized and employed differently. The training bit falls out from that.

So my error. The difference is not the troops. It is the tasks they get assigned and the size of the training budget they get.

 

[Infanteer]

I've re-read that quotation many times. And my sense is not that he was complaining about training men for particular operations (like jumping out of aeroplanes or landing craft) but that they were then held in reserve on double rations and the fighting was left to the rest of the PBI.

The quote was drawn from Defeat into Victory, and his earlier commentary provides context to his statement.

He wasn't complaining about specially trained forces hanging back, his argument was that they were training too many men for specific tasks that would not achieve strategic effect in the theatre. More specifically, he was incensed that the Chindits were increased to a 6 brigade force, and that a well trained, experienced division (70th Infantry, which fought in North Africa) was broken up to provide additional forces to form the Chindit force.

When every division counted in that theatre, Slim felt those brigades would have been better suited conducting conventional operations against Japanese forces in India and Burma as opposed to conducting long range penetration operations into Burma which ultimately resulted in the Chindits being decimated by the jungle and Japanese.

In sum, Slim acknowledged need for specially organized forces elsewhere in the book ("to stir things up") but was opposed to the overabundance of manpower and resources dedicated to tasks that would not achieve strategic effect in the theatre he was fighting in.

 

[Kirkhill]

I read the same book.

As I recall he didn't think the Chindits offered more than his line battalions, British and Indian, did.

As to the tasks of the Special Forces. That has been something of a movable feast over the years. The Special Forces Support Group owes its existence to the SAS and SBS being tasked to jobs they felt a common line battalion could do. Like clearing caves. And thus 1 Para got promoted to the Champions League.

And now we have the promotion of line battalions to the Army Special Operations Brigade and Security Forces Assistance Brigade. The Paras and the Royal Marines are regularly retasked to special missions like Sierra Leone. In Malaya and Borneo that SAS got the press but almost every battalion did time in the jungles working with the locals. Reserve units like 21 and 23 SAS and the HAC have been reassigned and re-reassigned.

Again, I will stand on my statement that it is not the operators that are special so much as the operations. The primary difference is the amount of preparation. Kind of like taking a year to convert a reservist to field ready standard.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I read the same book.

As I recall he didn't think the Chindits offered more than his line battalions, British and Indian, did.

As to the tasks of the Special Forces. That has been something of a movable feast over the years. The Special Forces Support Group owes its existence to the SAS and SBS being tasked to jobs they felt a common line battalion could do. Like clearing caves. And thus 1 Para got promoted to the Champions League.

And now we have the promotion of line battalions to the Army Special Operations Brigade and Security Forces Assistance Brigade. The Paras and the Royal Marines are regularly retasked to special missions like Sierra Leone. In Malaya and Borneo that SAS got the press but almost every battalion did time in the jungles working with the locals. Reserve units like 21 and 23 SAS and the HAC have been reassigned and re-reassigned.

Again, I will stand on my statement that it is not the operators that are special so much as the operations. The primary difference is the amount of preparation. Kind of like taking a year to convert a reservist to field ready standard.

No. No way.

Out of about 150 trained soldiers who attempt SAS/ Joint UKSF selection they will accept about 10, from two selections per year. That's about 20 people (about 4-5 of which might be Officers) per year.

Just because you are a PARA or a Marine doesn't get you a pass. They can fail just like anyone else, and many do. Other SOF organizations have similar selection standards.

And for good reason because they are employed on very specific, strategic and tremendously risky tasks, completely open to being fucked up by other units who think they're 'special'. Which I have seen happen (at arms length of course) with tragic results.

The UK's SFSG was modelled closely on the US 'Delta-Rangers' approach. Same goes for the JTF2-CSOR thing, and this methodology has been proven time and again in the GWOT, and elsewhere, so it's probably not going away soon.

They are not 'light Infantry' and should never be utilized as such, and vice versa.

 

[Kirkhill]

No. No way.

Out of about 150 trained soldiers who attempt SAS/ Joint UKSF selection they will accept about 10, from two selections per year. That's about 20 people (about 4-5 of which might be Officers) per year.

Just because you are a PARA or a Marine doesn't get you a pass. They can fail just like anyone else, and many do. Other SOF organizations have similar selection standards.

And for good reason because they are employed on very specific, strategic and tremendously risky tasks, completely open to being fucked up by other units who think they're 'special'. Which I have seen happen (at arms length of course) with tragic results.

The UK's SFSG was modelled closely on the US 'Delta-Rangers' approach. Same goes for the JTF2-CSOR thing, and this methodology has been proven time and again in the GWOT, and elsewhere, so it's probably not going away soon.

They are not 'light Infantry' and should never be utilized as such, and vice versa.

But the entire Special Service ethos evolved from calling for volunteers from the Army. Most were disgruntled infanteers bored of hanging round barracks and wanting to get into the fight. Selection largely consisted of rounding up the willing

The willing were then formed into company sized groups like the SAS, SBS, Popski's Private Army, and Churchill's Commandos. The concept became popular, and useful, and evolved into something like 30 Army Commandos, 11 Marine Commandos and 18 Para battalions. Even the SAS expanded to a full Brigade.

By VJ Day in August 45 the Parachute battalions were being allocated 18 year olds straight out of basic infantry schools. Some were being passed by MOs to the Paras with flat feet because they wouldn't have to march as they were to be flown to work...

Whole units were "volunteered" to the Air Landing Brigades while others were "volunteered" to Achnacarry.

People that couldn't keep up with the rigorous training, that weren't mission ready, were simply RTUd (Returned To Unit (or predicament for those volunteers from the Glasshouse)).

Certainly there is a case for well-trained, capable troops, mission ready for deployment at short notice. And I support both the concept and existence of the Special Forces and their ethos.

But.

Given that the Special Forces are, according to Infanteer's definition, described by the tasks they are assigned, and those tasks vary constantly over time, then IMO it is little wonder that the difference between Special Forces and Light Infantry fades to grey.

SAS in Afghanistan complained about the numbers they were losing clearing caves. When the war started there wasn't a high expectation of a need for cave clearers. That was not on the conventional training schedule. One could call it a Special Operation. Something outside of the ordinary. So it got assigned to the Special Operations Community. When it became ordinary (or rather designated ordinary) it was passed on to more conventional forces like the Paras, and eventually light infantry.

Similar developments occurred in Borneo and Malaya. Special circumstances demanded immediate, effective response by capable troops ( in both cases these included troops that were found in the Reserves, not on the active rolls). The skills and tactics were developed and passed on to regular light infantry, including Paras and Marines along with Guards and County regiments, and they took over as the special became conventional.

The Paras still moan about Tunisia where they were dropped in and then kept in the line for months as just a few more battalions of light infantry. But the local requirement in mountainous Tunisia was for infantry. Once the paras were on the ground they were there to fight. For as long as the circumstances required and they were capable. Arnhem was a light infantry fight.

The Orne river was a light infantry fight. So was the Crater in Aden. So was the Radfan.

The SAS, in North Africa, essentially fought as Light Cavalry after discovering the disadvantages of dropping into the middle of an enemy held airfield and having to rely on Shank's Mare (with a few broken legs) to exfiltrate.

And, at the other end of the spectrum, we can't forget "those who only stand and wait". Those soldiers of all arms who stood guard at vital points with a Lee Enfield. Including here in Canada. The most basic of "infantry" skills.

I don't take issue with the Special Forces, Paras and Marines training hard and demanding that their troops be able to keep up as they train for a broad spectrum of operations that the rest of the Army anticipates may occur but seem a lot less likely than the operations the rest of the Army trains for.

But when the enemy starts voting, and starts doing the unexpected, then the unexpected becomes the expected and the Army has to be able to shift, to adapt, and do it rapidly.

If you find your Special Forces over tasked and your conventional forces under tasked then the Special has become conventional and the Army needs to adjust. And given that the Special Forces are almost uniformly "light", and assuming that they have demonstrated an ability to succeed with light equipment and tactics, then the need is most likely to be for comparably equipped troops who can absorb the lessons learned at local battle schools. Just like the British Army (and Sam Hughes's CEF) morphed at Boulogne and Etaples absorbing local lessons from survivors of the early battles of WWI.

If the Special and Light Forces prove inadequate to the enemy and it proves necessary to bring up heavier forces then they have at least bought time to deploy the heavies. They have also learned how the enemy fights and its capabilities. And they remain on site to secure the flanks and react to the unexpected.

Don Rumsfeld died yesterday: Known knowns, Known unknowns, Unknown unknowns. The LAV-Heavies manage the Known knowns. The Specials handle the Unknown unknowns. The grey zone of Known unknowns I suggest is best met by light forces that are adaptable, trainable, rapidly deployable and, importantly, relatively cheap to equip with an adaptable tool kit that can be rapidly refreshed from the market with the latest technology.

Almost every one of the Five Eyes (and much of NATO) has been moving their emphasis from Heavies to Specials as their specials are heavily tasked and their Heavies are under utilized. More Heavies are being converted to Light and while the Specials expand more of the Special Operations (Duties) are cascaded down to re-roled Lights.

One of the many areas I agree with FJAG is that just because the market demand for Heavies is changing does not mean that we should be discarding the Heavies. Any more than the Brits discarded their Specials after WW2. In both instances the solution is the same. Retain those skills (and in the case of the Heavies the equipment) in Reserve, in storage.

The Heavies need a permanent force presence. But the mass, on which they rely, should be held in reserve.

And Reserves should also be being prepared to fill the slots on the actual grey battlefield of today. To take the load off the Specials.

 

[Brad Sallows]

Whatever SF were or were meant to be in WWII, is different from what they are and should be today.

True SF (unconventional tasks) aside, concentrating the best combat soldiers and leaders in units which spend a lot of time out of battle and occasionally in short operations with high casualty rates seems a bit insane. Not really maximizing potential.

 

[MilEME09]

Perhaps with our SF guys we should use a small number of then to create a internal OMLT going around the various units both reg and reserve and training them for a bit. It would utilize their skill sets and experience to increase the overall effectiveness of the CAF.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Technology has really helped SF expand their influence and abilities, in particular comms, CAS and helicopters. The light infantry/Commandos/Para/CSOR serve not only as recruiting ground but also as a backstop/QRF for SF forces and can quickly exploit the gains made by the SF or support their withdrawal against superior forces. So from what i have seen those light forces fill a need in the conflicts that are not near peer/peer fights. For those while the aforementioned forces can play a role, they will get curb stomped by a competent armoured brigade. Even if they do manage to stop them, it will be at a very high cost and your SF/Light forces will be shattered and need to rebuild.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Perhaps with our SF guys we should use a small number of then to create a internal OMLT going around the various units both reg and reserve and training them for a bit. It would utilize their skill sets and experience to increase the overall effectiveness of the CAF.

This was one of my Hobby Horses.

You don't need SOF troops though, just a small training cadre of Capt/WO/Sgt/MCpl types per unit, maybe 5 or 6 of them, who have far more time and resources to design and deliver meaningful training to everyone, Offrs/SNCOS too.

The British TA model is a good example.

 

[Kirkhill]

Converting Stryker-borne light infantry into a Javelin Anti-Armor Battalion capable of successfully defending against and attacking mechanized forces by being well prepared and exploiting terrain.

U.S. Army | Infantry Magazine

www.benning.army.mil

The battalion was able to destroy enemy mechanized elements at distances of 1,500-2,000 meters away from positions of dominant terrain with a clear line of sight. Trained Soldiers were able to achieve a 50-percent kill ratio on enemy armored vehicles in both offensive and defensive operations. While 50 percent is low, it was in real-world battlefield conditions with Infantrymen climbing up significant terrain to achieve effects against enemy armor.

The key to the employment of the M98A2 was the use of movement and maneuver of the Stryker vehicles and the dismounted Infantry. NTC’s vast open terrain allowed for the employment of weapon systems at their maximum effective ranges. This required a “push and pull” technique between dismounted and mounted Infantry Soldiers. The Stryker platoons would dismount Infantry squads and “push” them forward, utilizing the Strykers’ remote weapon systems to cover their movement. The dismounted squads seized dominate terrain, established hasty support-by-fire positions using Javelins, and provided overwatch for the Strykers as they “pulled” forward. The “push and pull” technique allowed the battalion to defeat enemy armor by maneuvering the dismounted Infantry with Javelins to positions of advantage and overwatch the movement of vehicles as they bounded forward. This technique requires a thorough terrain analysis by the battalion staff during the military decision-making process and the company leadership during troop leading procedures in order to maximize the usage of the terrain available.

During Battle Period 4 of NTC 14-03, we found ourselves attacking into an enemy armored formation defending key terrain in vicinity of the Arrowhead and Alpha/Bravo Pass. We had to maneuver to Refrigerator Gap and conduct a breach of enemy obstacles to pass elements of the brigade onto their objective. The terrain was not the most suitable place to maneuver Strykers as it was restrictive or severely restrictive in nature. Based on the posture of the enemy, we recognized we would have to employ the “push and pull” technique described above. Our rifle companies deliberately cleared mountainous terrain dismounted en-route to their objective and only moved vehicles forward once overwatch positions with Javelins were established. While this technique took extended time to execute, it enabled our battalion to destroy 10 armored vehicles before reaching our objective.

one of the biggest lessons at the tactical level was that dismounted Infantryman employing Javelins in the right terrain can hold their own against enemy armor. As we move into our next training path, Javelin training needs to be more deliberately integrated at the individual through collective training levels. Our leader development program needs to incorporate these lessons learned so that we can coach junior leaders on the tactical deployment of the Javelin in the SBCT as it pertains to terrain.

Our battalion recognized that training 40 Javelin operators was insufficient for NTC, considering the lethality of the system against a near-peer threat utilizing armor. Units should maximize the ability to send one to two weapons squad leaders per company to the Heavy Weapons Leaders Course at Fort Benning (http://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/197th/229/HWLC/). This course trains Soldiers in the rank of sergeant through lieutenant on the tactical employment of an anti-armor platoon and technical proficiency of the Javelin, Improved Target Acquisition System (ITAS) and heavy machine guns while operating in a decentralized competitive environment. Having this expertise resident in the squad gives a rifle battalion the ability to train proficiency on the Javelin for all Soldiers in the formation.

Terrain and training.