I guess that makes sense the more I think about it. So we're suggesting having one heavy brigade and two mediums with a battalion of light?
They are mixed up. I recently read a service paper on this (hence why a navy guy knows some of this stuff). This makes some sense, if the single company shared with RCD and 12RBC is for training/familiarity and both schools are for the same then you would ideally want your soldiers able to drive/fix any variant they are dropped into. Tanks for deployment will likely come from the Strats stock, hence why they have double the number.
ukdefencejournal.org.uk
below-the-turret-ring.blogspot.com
www.navalnews.com
Maybe, for a hypothetical upgrade program, add in a purchase of enough new 2A8s to make up for however many are in for refit. Keeps the fleet at expected size, provides an immediate training platform for maintainers and operators, and, when everything's finished, provides a few more tanks.
Okay. I've given this some thought ever since seeing GR66's orbats so of course I just had to some of my own. Those of you who have seen my book have a general idea where I'm heading but I've refined it somewhat.
In short I see a two-phase restructure. Phase 1 is a reorganization that attempts as much as possible to use all existing infrastructure and existing equipment. It essentially calls for no new equipment (albeit that projects should start for a further Phase 2 restructure in 2030. (I'll post my ideas for Phase 2 later. Don't sweat the issue of who gets which roles for future weapon systems. What might be described as a mech recce squadron here might in future also carry some anti-armour weaponry. I'm looking at things with broad brushes at the moment.
The following are key elements:
The first slide below is what I believe is - more or less - the existing Army's structure. The second slide represents the Phase 1 Force 2025 structure.
- I'm a strong advocate of restructuring the reserves to maximize their stand-by and augmentation potential. I fully realize that this requires a broad redefinition of reserve terms of service, employer legislation, training, equipment and Reg F commitment. I also think that just because we haven't done something about it in 70 years is absolutely no reason to do anything now. You'll see that my organizations are defined as Reg F, Res F and Hybrid Reg & Res F depending on the very rough ratios and functions provided in each organization. There are a significant number of Res F unit amalgamations and reductions in headquarters. On the other hand all existing Reg F RSS staff-whether at bde HQ or within units-will be retained and redistributed so that each retained reserve unit will have the RSS staff of its various amalgamated components;
- The below diagrams for simplicity's sake have left off headquarters and admin companies, medical, Sigs and MP units. It's anticipated all of those will be provided roughly as they are now in a Reg F brigade;
- Re 1 CMBG. In redistributing equipment I've basically made 1 CMBG an armour heavy brigade with all - and I mean all - tanks going to Edm/Wainwright. I see any and all training having to do with tanks (whether armoured, armoured infantry, officer etc being done in Edm/Wainwright (if necessary with a Combat Arms School Det there) under the auspices of the 3 Div Depot Bn there. In order to create 4 sqns and spares etc each squadron will be reduced to three 4-tank troops and a 3-tank Sqn HQ (for 15 total) which will eat up 60 total plus a pair for the armd regt HQ. In total there will be one tk heavy combined arms regt and two infantry heavy combined arms battalions. To an extent this mirrors the basics of a US ABCT;
- Within 1 CMBG, I have removed the cbt sp coys from the two inf heavy combined arms bns. Some of the weapon systems will go to the rifle coys but the personnel and vehicles, together with the armoured recce squadron have made their way, together with one rifle coy, into the 3 PPCLI bn which is now designated a cavalry bn. I do not see this force as a pure recce force but expect it to have a larger more robust anti-tank capability (both direct and indirect);
- artillery within all the brigades remains unchanged with the exception that each regiment now has a reserve six-gun battery (using their existing 105mm C3s);
- With respect to 2 CMBG I have transferred 3 RCR to CANSOFCOM as a Security Force Capacity Building bn. It will require to change into a multi-disciplinary organization with various occupational groups and will probably be reduced in size from a full battalion but leader/instructor heavy;
- 2 RCR's LAVs in Gagetown go to 3 R22eR so that 5 CMBG becomes a complete LAV brigade. 1 RCR Petawawa's LAVs will be redistributed to three Depot Bns that are responsible for training Res F augmentees (as well as Reg F DP1 students) and which do not have ready access to the LAVs in Edm/Wainwright or Valcartier.
- A Res F infantry battalion and recce sqn (envisioned from the Ottawa area) will form 2 CMBG's third light battalion.
- As mentioned above, 5 CMBG becomes a full 3 LAV Bn bde. 2 Div's 2 CLBG and 5 CMBG become Canada's primary quick reaction, peacekeeping, northern operations etc force while 2 Div builds for heavier missions. While reservists do not have any additional equipment over their current holdings, the intent is that they conduct much of their annual training on the equipment of their Reg F counterparts.
- The CCSB in Kingston will essentially remain as is with the exception that I see the need to add another Hybrid EW Regiment to take on additional cyber security missions, a need to beef up and integrate the Intelligence Regiment more and to add another Engr Sp Regt, a supply and transport battalion, a maintenance battalion and a service battalion from the existing Eastern Ontario (as far west as Oshawa perhaps) to beef up our capabilities to conduct NSE operations without stripping various bases and service battalions of resources.
- A New Artillery brigade is formed in the Maritimes which will take over both 4th Arty Regt (GS) and 4 ESR as well as forming an GBAD regiment within the Maritimes and a LRPR Regt from the artillery units in eastern Quebec (Until such time as such weapon systems are available the artillery regiments will amalgamate into two regiments and continue using the 105 mm C3 howitzers. A Res F Recce Regt, Light inf bn and a service bn will be formed by amalgamating remaining Res F units in the Maritimes.
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A couple questions/comments.So here are my thoughts for Phase 2 which has much less restructuring but is based on roles and tasks if and when money is ever freed up for new equipment purchases. These are the following key elements to Phase 2:
- I'm not looking at priorities - just concepts.
- 1 CABG gets converted to tracked IFVs, and obtains 18 wheeled self propelled howitzers. The intent is at a minimum to convert the entire brigade to a full on armoured CA. This will make eight M777s available for reassignment. Four could go to each of 2 RCHA and 5 RALC to give them three four-gun batteries each.
- 32 Bde (Ontario) and 41 Bde (Western Canada) convert to armoured brigades as well. If money is available then more IFVs and tanks can be purchased to equip one or both of the brigades. If money isn't available then at least sufficient training vehicles must be made available so that both brigades can be trained on the equipment so that they can properly augment 1 CABG.
- If 1 CABG is upgraded to IFVs then eight LAV companies are available for redistribution. My priority would be to distribute these to 34 CMBG in Quebec to double the capacity to two full CMBGs (one Reg and Res). A second thought would be to make 32 in ON a LAV rather than an armoured brigade.
- I've decided to make the three Cavalry bns/regiments more robust by organizing them with two recce coys/sqns one anti-armour coy/sqn and one armed UAV battery each. In addition each brigade artillery regiment also receives a wheeled armed UAV battery. (Concurrent with this would need to be a general expansion of anti-armour systems at the rifle company level.
- Further to the 18 wheeled self propelled howitzers for 1 RCHA, additional ones should be considered in order of priority for 5 RALC and 34 CMBG as well as 32 and 41 Bde (if they get equipped). 5 RALC and 34 Bde are so equipped then 2 CMBG should go to three six-gun M577 batteries and the remaining guns assigned to 32 Bde's artillery regiment in order to keep all maintenance for the M777 in Ontario.
- There are numerous additional capabilities that need to be acquired chief amongst them are a BGAD regiment (preferably three twelve-launcher batteries and requisite radars) and a LRPR system (preferably a three siz-launcher batteries) both of which are hybrid organizations with one battery Reg F and two Res F each.
View attachment 65600
The organization is set up primarily to cater to the following factors:
Anyway. Have fun with it.
- The choice on what equipment to purchase is based on one of two posture options: The first is that without any major equipment acquisitions, the force is postured to organize its reserves to train on the equipment of the Reg F within division that it belongs to. This means that both the Reg F and Res F within a given division will have the same role and a mission and equipment and should be able to work with the same doctrine and TTPs but will not be able to expand beyond the force's current capabilities rapidly. The second is that with any additional equipment purchases (or even through a hand-me-down system), the force will be able to train on and expand with whatever additional equipment is made available. I.e. the force can rapidly grow in the event of an emergency;
- Critical equipment procurement is firstly in GBAD and secondly with an expanded anti-armour capability by way of anti-armour forces in the cavalry bns/regts and in the artillery regiments and then ground based fires (especially long range); and
- The system is set up to generally cater to the existing infrastructure and generally ought not to need any additional PYs for the Reg F but may require some affiliation changes - for example combined arms battalions are permanent armour/infantry establishments and 3 PPCLI becoming a cavalry regiment when I'm sure people would prefer to reactivate the VIII CH. I'm an agnostic on these issues and as far as I'm concerned the anti-armour battery in the cavalry bn could easily be infantry the same way mortars are.
- And yes, if there needs to be a budget reduction then 2 CLBG is the first on the chopping block to be replaced by reservists.
My thought is that 3 Div and 1 CABG and it's reserve units would be responsible for all Op Reassurance related rotos and exercises in Europe. 2 Div including 2 CLBG 5 CMBG and their reserve brigade would be responsible for all other operations. The two CCSBs would support any and all missions as required.
I know it's out of style to see anything in the way of a major deployment. I do, however, want the ability to deploy up to a division. My concept involves that reserve formations have a healthy number of Reg F personnel in both leadership and staff roles and that as such, once they are equipped and have achieved an acceptable level of training, reserve formations would be deployable. Over and above that there are a number of reserve units which would provide augmentees.
I'm looking at this as an aspirational plan done over time. I tend to believe that if all you ever set is low goals then all that you will ever achieve is low objectives (or worse - fail to meet your low objectives). I tend to believe in the Golden Rule of Deterrence - The gold standard of deterrence and assurance is a defensive posture that confronts the adversary with the prospect of operational failure as the likely consequence of aggression. We currently do not do that. Politically we need to be seen by our allies to be doing more (just as soon as some of them do more) or we are going to loose political credibility and thereby influence. We are perceived as freeloaders by some and irrelevant by others. That's not a good thing and a few billion spent on defence industry in this country would go a long way for both economic development in our heavy manufacturing sector and to build up a stock of military equipment. Putting that equipment into the hands of a reserve force (which would need major reform) would ensure that we do not have the highly costly full-time PYs to feed year-to-year. In the end, if one develops a viable reserve force, one could conceivably--and probably should--reduce the size of the Reg F and their pay envelope.
The enablers aren't actually being stripped. My model is the US ABCT. Combined arms battalions do not have "weapons companies" like the IBCTs do. Anti armour weapons are part of the IFV (see Bradley) and a pair of 120 mm mortars are organic to each combined arms rifle company. There is a scout platoon within the battalion headquarters and then, of course, the battalion has tanks and the brigade has a full cavalry battalion. It's not the entire CS company going to the cavalry bn but a large part of it.
Exactly. I've been mulling over divisional depot battalions for some time. What I would like to see is that the battalions have several companies that are scattered around the region so that training can happen close to wherever units are (such as in large urban centres as well as the current training centres) Each battalion would be responsible for both recruiting for the army and training everything in the way of DP1 and DP2 for all Reg F and Res F in their part of the country. Essentially a recruit, Res F or Reg F would be recruited and go on a BTL with the appropriate Depot Bn who would manage that individual until they achieve DP1 standard at which time they are turned over to a unit. Training would be year round for Reg F (and Res F who have the time to do it) and full-summer training for Res F students (including distance learning where appropriate) and managing trades people attending community college training and officer candidates civilian attending universities. I'm particulalry concerned about service support trades that seem to have choke points in their training cycles which I would like to see relieved by offloading much of the fundamental trades training to community colleges (where we would pay tuition but not salaries for reservists) and then have specific mil equipment courses during summer breaks (where we do pay salaries) Key to this is that at the depots, the training for a Reg F member and Res F member be identical and using the same equipment. (and that would be regardless of whether we fully equip the reserves or not. In my perfect world, Class A training during the winter would be restricted to ten monthly 2.5 day mandatory sessions during which basic refresher trg (such as annual weapons trg) while the summer would be a two (and better yet three) week mandatory exercise using a full complement of the Reg F equipment if the reserves do not have their own.
Actually 2 CLBG retains 1 and 2 RCR as light battalions plus the RCDs as a light cavalry unit with two light recce, 1 light anti-armour and one light UAV/anti-armour squadron plus an engineer and service capability. That is the Army's rapid reaction force which, in a pinch can be reinforced by LAV equipped elements from 5 CMBG.
Thanks. I appreciate them.
My thought is that 3 Div and 1 CABG and it's reserve units would be responsible for all Op Reassurance related rotos and exercises in Europe. 2 Div including 2 CLBG 5 CMBG and their reserve brigade would be responsible for all other operations. The two CCSBs would support any and all missions as required.
I know it's out of style to see anything in the way of a major deployment. I do, however, want the ability to deploy up to a division. My concept involves that reserve formations have a healthy number of Reg F personnel in both leadership and staff roles and that as such, once they are equipped and have achieved an acceptable level of training, reserve formations would be deployable. Over and above that there are a number of reserve units which would provide augmentees.
I'm looking at this as an aspirational plan done over time. I tend to believe that if all you ever set is low goals then all that you will ever achieve is low objectives (or worse - fail to meet your low objectives). I tend to believe in the Golden Rule of Deterrence - The gold standard of deterrence and assurance is a defensive posture that confronts the adversary with the prospect of operational failure as the likely consequence of aggression. We currently do not do that. Politically we need to be seen by our allies to be doing more (just as soon as some of them do more) or we are going to loose political credibility and thereby influence. We are perceived as freeloaders by some and irrelevant by others. That's not a good thing and a few billion spent on defence industry in this country would go a long way for both economic development in our heavy manufacturing sector and to build up a stock of military equipment. Putting that equipment into the hands of a reserve force (which would need major reform) would ensure that we do not have the highly costly full-time PYs to feed year-to-year. In the end, if one develops a viable reserve force, one could conceivably--and probably should--reduce the size of the Reg F and their pay envelope.
The enablers aren't actually being stripped. My model is the US ABCT. Combined arms battalions do not have "weapons companies" like the IBCTs do. Anti armour weapons are part of the IFV (see Bradley) and a pair of 120 mm mortars are organic to each combined arms rifle company. There is a scout platoon within the battalion headquarters and then, of course, the battalion has tanks and the brigade has a full cavalry battalion. It's not the entire CS company going to the cavalry bn but a large part of it.
Exactly. I've been mulling over divisional depot battalions for some time. What I would like to see is that the battalions have several companies that are scattered around the region so that training can happen close to wherever units are (such as in large urban centres as well as the current training centres) Each battalion would be responsible for both recruiting for the army and training everything in the way of DP1 and DP2 for all Reg F and Res F in their part of the country. Essentially a recruit, Res F or Reg F would be recruited and go on a BTL with the appropriate Depot Bn who would manage that individual until they achieve DP1 standard at which time they are turned over to a unit. Training would be year round for Reg F (and Res F who have the time to do it) and full-summer training for Res F students (including distance learning where appropriate) and managing trades people attending community college training and officer candidates civilian attending universities. I'm particulalry concerned about service support trades that seem to have choke points in their training cycles which I would like to see relieved by offloading much of the fundamental trades training to community colleges (where we would pay tuition but not salaries for reservists) and then have specific mil equipment courses during summer breaks (where we do pay salaries) Key to this is that at the depots, the training for a Reg F member and Res F member be identical and using the same equipment. (and that would be regardless of whether we fully equip the reserves or not. In my perfect world, Class A training during the winter would be restricted to ten monthly 2.5 day mandatory sessions during which basic refresher trg (such as annual weapons trg) while the summer would be a two (and better yet three) week mandatory exercise using a full complement of the Reg F equipment if the reserves do not have their own.
Actually 2 CLBG retains 1 and 2 RCR as light battalions plus the RCDs as a light cavalry unit with two light recce, 1 light anti-armour and one light UAV/anti-armour squadron plus an engineer and service capability. That is the Army's rapid reaction force which, in a pinch can be reinforced by LAV equipped elements from 5 CMBG.
Thanks. I appreciate them.
It's like this D&B.
It's like this D&B.
I have absolutely no expectations that the fools that have botched the reserve system continuously from the mid 1950s will suddenly have a epiphany and say "You know! FJAG's right. Lets do that" - because - Dunning-Kruger.
That, however, should not stop us from putting forward ways that the system can and should be improved.
I'm perfectly prepared to say that the system cannot be improved by fine tuning regardless how well intentioned it might be. It needs radical reform to reach its full potential.
How about you?
It's like this D&B.
I have absolutely no expectations that the fools that have botched the reserve system continuously from the mid 1950s will suddenly have a epiphany and say "You know! FJAG's right. Lets do that" - because - Dunning-Kruger.
That, however, should not stop us from putting forward ways that the system can and should be improved.
I'm perfectly prepared to say that the system cannot be improved by fine tuning regardless how well intentioned it might be. It needs radical reform to reach its full potential.
How about you?
I'm not meaning to derail the thread at all, I'm asking this in the context of the bigger "FORCE 2025" picture.
Don't forget the cost to train, and subsequently the cost to maintain (and compensate for) those skills. Something tells me that's where you'd find the true cost differences.
Judging from what I have seen of F2025 so far, someone, somewhere may be trying to do just that. However as we have pointed out, many times over multiple threads, having an effective reserve force is a complicated beast that takes more then just changes to an org chart or doctrine.
