I read this off of Stratfor‘s www site. Makes interesting reading. Apologies to Mike Bobbit if this post is too long:
STRATFOR‘S GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
http://www.stratfor.com
18 March 2003
War Plan: Consequences
Introduction
All wars have consequences. Some are intended, some are
unintended. Some wars, such as the Kosovo war, give rise only to
local consequences. Some wars have global consequences, but only
for a short time, like the 1956 British-French-Israeli attack on
Egypt. Other wars reshape the world so profoundly that everything
that comes after is in some way a consequence of that war; World
War II is an obvious example. Some wars are really only battles -
- part of a much broader and longer conflict -- and cannot be
defined in any other way. The Korean War appeared to be a
freestanding event, but it was really simply an episode in a much
longer, very complex Cold War.
In our view, Iraq has more in common with Korea than with other
wars. It is a campaign, not a war. It will be remembered as an
episode in the global war between the United States and radical
Islam. That does not mean that the war cannot be consequential,
but it does mean that the war is embedded in a sequence of events
and cannot be understood outside of this context.
The intended consequences of each side are well understood, from
our point of view, and we have discussed them extensively in this
series. The United States has a series of goals that boil down to
three:
1. Shifting the psychology of the region through a decisive
victory.
2. Eliminating weapons of mass destruction.
3. Using Iraq as a base for follow-on operations in the region.
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein‘s strategic goal is simple:
1. Survival
In our view, the United States is likely to achieve its military
goals, and Hussein will fail to achieve his. The campaign might
take longer than hoped, and casualties potentially might be
higher than desired, but the outcome ought to be a U.S. victory.
Therefore, the issue is what the consequences -- intended or
unintended -- will be in the Iraq campaign.
Consequences Within Iraq
The United States and its coalition partners will occupy Iraq. In
effect, this means occupation by the United States. It is not
clear, however, that the United States will occupy all of Iraq.
Events in Turkey have created both a military and a political
question mark.
The Turkish army has operated in northern Iraq for a long time.
It has three interests there: securing its frontiers against
events in Iraq, preventing the formation of a Kurdish state and
managing Kurdish behavior near its borders, and controlling oil
fields around Mosul and Kirkuk that represent a critical supply
for Turkey. One of the reasons for Ankara‘s reluctance to permit
U.S. troops in the region is that this would limit Turkey‘s own
ability to act on these three interests directly.
Depending on how the war evolves, Turkish intervention in
northern Iraq is highly likely. Turkish forces are already in
Iraqi territory, pursuing Ankara‘s first goal. Turkey, once in
Iraq, has two interests. First, its forces will seek to take
control of the Mosul oil fields and, if possible, the oil fields
in Kirkuk. It is highly likely that the Kurdish forces in the
northeast also will move on Kirkuk, since that is an old Kurdish
city as well as an oil center. The likelihood of combat between
Turkish and Kurdish forces is high. Indeed, Turkey might intend
to use this conflict to settle matters with the Kurds.
This Turkish action does not challenge any fundamental U.S.
interests. In executing precursor operations, the Turks will have
to engage some of the Iraqi formations. In effect, if Turkish
troops move in, they will be doing some of the heavy lifting that
the 4th Infantry Division was supposed to do; in terms of
defeating Iraq, this is more than a satisfactory conclusion. Nor
will a Turkish occupation of the line from Mosul to Kirkuk pose a
challenge to U.S. strategic plans. The basic geography of Iraq
will still permit U.S. power projection throughout the region.
The challenge that the Turkish presence poses is to U.S. postwar
reconstruction plans. The United States is relying on the sale of
Iraqi oil to fund those plans in the long run. If it does not
control the northern oil fields and their output is diverted to
Turkish uses, the amount of oil available will decline
substantially. This will pose a challenge to reconstruction.
Therefore, the United States will have to reach some sort of
accommodation with Turkey and will have relatively few levers
with which to do so. It cannot go to war with Turkey, and Turkey
clearly is not indebted to the United States.
Moreover, a Turkish-Kurdish war is likely to result in disaster
for the Kurds. The United States has a poor record of keeping its
promises to the Kurds, and one of the fundamental issues in this
campaign is U.S. reliability. Countries like Kuwait, Qatar and
Bahrain are watching this dynamic carefully. From a tactical
point of view, the fate of the Kurds is a matter of little
consequence. From a strategic point of view, the treatment of the
Kurds has substantial significance.
The United States will have to deal with the Turks on their role
in Iraq. That will be one of the first items on any postwar
agenda. Accompanying this will be the need to deal with Iran,
which has been supporting a number of Shiite groups in the north
and south. Iranian-sponsored forces already have entered Iraqi
territory in the north, and Iranian operatives are working in the
south. U.S. relations with Iran are poor, and officials in Tehran
have said they believe the country is the next target in the
region. The United States will have to control Iran‘s behavior in
Iraq.
Therefore, there is a serious question as to just what parts of
Iraq the United States will control. It certainly will control
the bulk of the country, but it may not control all of it
directly or in practical terms. This means that the United States
will have to devote substantial forces to the protection of its
perimeters in Iraq, as well as additional forces for controlling
Iraq itself.
As in Afghanistan, the United States will create a puppet
government. If the government actually were to function as
Washington has advertised -- as a representative of all Iraqi
ethnic groups -- it would tear itself apart in a week. But since
no one has elected anyone, and all of these puppets are
handpicked by the United States, it misses the point that these
ethnic groups are fragmented along several lines. A genuinely
function government is a long way away. It does not mean that
U.S. forces cannot invent and govern through a puppet entity --
pretending, as in Afghanistan, that it has legitimacy. Over time,
it might actually gain some.
The primary burden for reconstructing Iraq will fall on the U.S.
military, its contractors and that segment of the Iraqi
technocracy that remains intact. Obviously, British, Australian
and other coalition partners will be able to participate. The
extent of destruction will depend on the nature of the war. If
there is an early collapse of the Iraqi army and no destruction
of the oil fields, reconstruction should not be the issue. The
primary issue will be new construction, particularly expanding
the capacity of the oil fields.
However, it is Hussein‘s intention to conduct a campaign that
must, as an inevitable side effect, lead to massive destruction.
The torching of oil fields makes military sense, as we have
pointed out. The strategy of delay and attrition will lead to
massive damage to the civilian infrastructure as well as to major
civilian casualties. Thus, if Hussein is successful in resisting
to any degree, the requirements of reconstruction can be massive.
The most difficult and immediate problem will be in Baghdad
itself. Cities the size of Baghdad cannot survive for any period
of time without water, sanitation, food deliveries and, as the
basic enabler, electricity. Intense combat in Baghdad will create
an immediate humanitarian crisis that, if left unmitigated, will
lead to deaths in a matter of days. Thirst doesn‘t wait, and
water from unsanitary sources leads rapidly to disease.
The manner in which the United States handles the crisis of
Baghdad -- if such a crisis occurs -- will condition the entire
atmosphere of postwar Iraq. One-quarter of Iraq‘s population
lives inside of Baghdad proper, and perhaps half live in the
densely populated region south of it. Disaster will come quickly
here.
The United States has extensive experience in relief efforts in
non-urban areas; it is much less experienced in emergency relief
in large metropolitan areas. The ability of individuals to cope
in cities is much lower than in the countryside. The city is a
system of systems that does not tolerate failure well. Massive,
rapid repairs to major facilities will be difficult, particularly
if intermittent combat continues.
Iraq has massive centrifugal forces. The Hussein regime was not
an accident: Brutal dictatorship was a political solution for a
fractious nation. The United States has the ability to impose its
will on the nation. It has the ability to create a council under
its authority. It can, if it wishes, pretend that that council
represents the will of the Iraqi people. Nevertheless,
withdrawing from Iraq will require either a major evolution in
Iraqi national identity, a very sophisticated and complex
arrangement among parties that deeply distrust each other, or a
new dictator.
U.S. forces will be in Iraq for a long time. It is not only a
matter of strategic desirability, it is also a matter of
necessity. Chaos in Iraq is inconsistent with the psychological
goals of the campaign. It also would create dangers to U.S.
deployments there. The United States will, from the moment the
occupation begins, be forced to assume responsibility for the
governance of Iraq. Whether it creates an indigenous council or
tries to hand off control to the United Nations, the United
States will remain in Iraq for a generation and will be
responsible for the nation‘s well-being.
Regional Consequences
The primary purpose of the Iraq campaign will, of course, be to
influence and reshape the region. Al Qaeda has support throughout
the Middle East, and most governments are either complicit or
unwilling to incur the political costs of disrupting al Qaeda and
similar groups at home. The purpose of this campaign is, first
and foremost, to create a politico-military environment that
persuades countries in the region to redefine their behavior. To
put it more brutally and honestly, it is to bring massive
military forces to bear on countries in the region in order to
compel them to cooperate, or failing that, carry out future
military confrontations.
There will be two dimensions to this. The first will be to
redefine the atmosphere of the Middle East. Washington now
accepts as a given that it bears the deep animosity of the
region. Officials do not see any opportunity for a short-term
solution to this problem, and the problem presented by al Qaeda
is immediate. If the United States cannot be loved, the second
best outcome is to be feared. A victory in Iraq would demonstrate
both American will and power. If it can be coupled with a
successful and relatively prosperous occupation, fear can be
coupled with respect.
The second dimension is politico-military. Following the war, the
United States not only would be an occupying power but also would
field a force that is in effect indigenous to the region, at
least from a military point of view. The presence of a massive,
mobile force, permanently based in the region, without depending
on the permission of others, would redefine the region
dramatically. The United States expects to be able to use that
force to its ends.
From the U.S. point of view, three countries are particular post-
campaign targets: Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iran. In Washington‘s
eyes, all three are, in different ways and with different
intentions, facilitators of al Qaeda. Since the United States has
little confidence in its ability to destroy al Qaeda directly,
the U.S. focus is on enabling countries -- whether the enablement
is part of government policy, an unintended consequence of other
internal problems or the result of fear.
Once Iraq is occupied, U.S. forces will have two missions. The
first will be the occupation, pacification and reconstruction of
Iraq. The second will be to pose a direct military threat two
these countries. The United States certainly has no intention or
desire to invade any of these countries. At the same time, the
United States takes the view that it is only the threat of direct
military action that will compel them to cooperate in destroying
al Qaeda. A threat has no meaning if it is not serious.
Therefore, in order to be effective, the United States will have
to be prepared to carry out follow-on campaigns.
Each of these countries is in a different position.
* Syria maintains a complex policy of hidden accommodations over
Lebanon with countries like Israel, and equally hidden support
for paramilitary groups. As with other countries, its primary
interest is in regime survival, with a secondary interest in the
absorption of Lebanon. Following the war in Iraq, the Syrians
would be completely surrounded by potential enemies: the United
States, Israel and Turkey. The U.S. 6th Fleet will be offshore in
the Mediterranean. At that point, Damascus‘ room for maneuver
will be sharply curtailed. Hussein was an enemy but was not
particularly interested in the internal affairs of Syria. The
United States will be in Iraq because it is interested in Syria,
and that government‘s ability to resist redefinition of its
policies will be extremely limited.
* Saudi Arabia‘s internal politics are far too complex to deal
with here. Suffice it to say that there are elements in Saudi
Arabia that have supported al Qaeda, at least according to the
United States, and that the Saudis have lacked the ability or the
will to dismantle that apparatus. Saudi Arabia is a country with
deep internal divisions and serious financial problems. From
Iraq, the United States would be able to manipulate these
internal contradictions directly. Moreover, it would have a
tremendous lever over Saudi policy. If the United States controls
Iraq‘s oil, it will be in a position to put severe pressure on
oil prices. Riyadh needs a relatively high price of oil, despite
the kingdom‘s low production costs; its debts need to be serviced
through the cash flow that oil produces. Between the manipulation
of Saudi Arabia‘s internal political system, the potential
ability to manipulate oil prices and the presence of U.S. forces
on its borders, the United States is assuming that it can force
Riyadh to reshape its behavior.
* Iran represents the most serious regional challenge for the
United States. Unlike Saudi Arabia and Syria, Iran is a
substantial national entity which, though deeply divided, might
well present a united front against the United States. The
correlation of forces between the United States and Syria or
Saudi Arabia vastly favors the United States. The correlation of
forces with Iran is not nearly so favorable, however, and
therefore the U.S. military threat is not nearly so credible. At
the same time, U.S. leaders have noted that Iran has a
substantial nuclear weapons program that in many ways is more
sophisticated than Iraq‘s. Iran also has maintained complex and
murky relationships with al Qaeda since January 2002. Even though
the United States technically poses a two-front threat to Iran
(Iraq and Afghanistan), Washington does not have a deep appetite
for war with Iran. At the same time, it must, in some way, reach
accommodation with Iran or force Tehran to change its behavior.
We expect Iran to be the next major confrontation in the region.
The Saudis already are adjusting their position, allowing U.S.
forces into the kingdom. The Syrians have little room for
maneuver. The Iranians -- who already claim that they are the
next target of the United States -- are by far the most
formidable challengers to U.S. regional hegemony. So long as Iran
keeps its distance from al Qaeda and related groups, Washington
is prepared to avoid confrontation. However, the extraordinarily
complex internal political struggle between reformers and
conservatives creates situations in which challenging the United
States and aligning with al Qaeda benefits some groups. The
central government is divided and therefore will become an arena
in which confrontation will be generated. We expect emerging
issues between the United States and Iran in the wake of the Iraq
campaign.
Global Consequences
The fundamental threat to the United States from al Qaeda will
not be reduced by the campaign in Iraq. But it is our view that a
successful campaign will cause the threat to lessen more than if
the United States had not gone to war. One of al Qaeda‘s
recruiting arguments has been that the United States intends to
make war on all Islamic countries; the other has been that the
struggle against the United States is not hopeless because the
superpower is weak and corrupt -- unable to wage war and
therefore vulnerable to dedicated paramilitary groups. Since one
of the foundations of revolutionary groups is hope -- the belief
that sacrifice can lead to victory -- any action that undermines
that hope limits recruiting. Now, this in no way implies that the
threat declines. Al Qaeda will carry out attacks as intensely as
it can over time. But in the long run, destroying its
infrastructure in host countries and undermining the sense of
hope might have some limiting effect. At any rate, we believe the
Iraqi campaign will not increase the total quantity of attacks on
the United States, but it might move the distribution of attacks
forward, increasing the tempo of operations at the present time.
There is also a fundamental shift in the global alignment. It is
noteworthy that France and the United States treated each other
as enemies during the U.N. diplomatic process. That is to say
that France did not simply express its objection to U.S. aims --
rather, Paris used its resources aggressively to block American
ambitions.
France‘s motives in this were two-fold:
* It saw the Iraqi issue as an opportunity to generate momentum
in Europe for a unified foreign policy designed to balance U.S.
power. French leaders understood that the nation, by itself,
could not hope to counterbalance U.S. power. Therefore, they saw
Europe, coalesced around a Franco-German axis, as the
counterbalance; they saw France as the dominant power in this
European entity.
* France has long had ambitions to be a major player in the
Middle East. It has historical roots there and current interests
in a range of commercial entities. France has long felt hindered
by U.S. policies and presence in the region. Paris sought to
supplant the United States by establishing closer relations with
Arab countries than the United States did. It sought to use its
defense of Iraq as a trigger for greater regional influence.
French hopes have been shattered on both fronts. In Europe, the
reaction to a French-designed European foreign policy has been
overwhelmingly negative. Apart from Germany, only Sweden, Belgium
and Luxembourg have signed on to the French program. Paris‘
influence, particularly in the east, has suffered severe blows.
In the Middle East, France has been shown to be incapable of
controlling the United States and therefore to be an unreliable
ally.
The Franco-American confrontation has generated precisely the
opposite effect than what Paris had intended. Out of fear of
France, much of Europe aligned with the United States. Out of
appearance of weakness, France has lost tremendous credibility in
the Middle East. The United States will press home this
advantage. Washington in essence has demonstrated that it cannot
be blocked and that it will not allow international institutions
to control its actions. This, of course, has bred great
resentment. It also has created a situation in which European
powers, including Russia and potentially Germany, will have to
re-evaluate their behavior toward the United States.
If the Iraq war goes well -- if it ends quickly, with relatively
few casualties and with an effective and benign occupation -- the
United States will emerge from the war with substantially
enhanced power globally. The issue for the United States is not
whether it is liked; the issue is whether the cost of resistance
to U.S. policies is high enough that challengers will be
deterred.
It follows that the United States will not reconcile with France.
Rather, Washington will seek to make an example of the
consequences of active attempts to thwart American policies.
Russia and Germany opposed but did not devote nearly the
resources that France did to defeating U.S. ambitions. Opposing
and working actively to block U.S. policies is the distinction --
and from the U.S. point of view, France crossed the line.
Washington will have one policy for the rest of Europe, another
policy for Germany and Russia and a third policy especially for
France. U.S. policy in the Middle East and in Europe will be
constructed around this, not simply out of anger at France --
although this should not be dismissed -- but as an exercise in
power and a lesson in consequences.
Conclusion
The Iraq campaign will not transform the world, but it will be
far from a trivial event. It obviously will change life
dramatically in Iraq -- with the proviso that in this very
ancient land, the more things change, the more things stay the
same. Another conqueror always changes things, but life goes on.
On a global scale, if the war is successful from Washington‘s
viewpoint and the United States is able to reconstruct Iraq
rapidly, U.S. power will simply grow. Public opinion is volatile.
Rome was never loved; it was admired.
It will be on the regional level that things will change the
most. We will make a bold assertion: The region bordering Iraq
will see the most dramatic changes since the fall of the Ottoman
Empire and the Sykes-Picot Agreements that created the modern
Middle East. The insertion of American power into the middle of
this region will redefine the behavior of the entire region. It
is crucial, however, to understand that the Iraq war is no more a
war than Guadalcanal was a war. It is a campaign that will be
followed by other campaigns.
All of this depends on the course of the war. Four outcomes now
possible: Hussein‘s abdication and a peaceful U.S. entrance; a
rapid U.S. victory; a more difficult victory; an inconclusive war
ending in an inconclusive cease-fire. It would appear to us that
the likely outcome rests somewhere between the second and third
choices.
