Bert
Sr. Member
- Reaction score
- 4
- Points
- 230
It seems the quest for resources these days as it relates to the middle east
appears to be growing or at least more contentious in the news. China and
Japan are seeking access to resources and are becoming definite competitors.
I wonder whats going to happen in a few years with the US, the EU, Russia,
China, and Japan (the big energy consumers) all jostling around with their own
concerns. We should throw them into "BMQ" and make them learn to work
together for a change. Anyway, another stratfor special.
Japan, U.S.: A Mutual Strategic Concern
www.stratfor.com
Summary
Japan and the United States will meet Feb. 19 for "two-plus-two" talks on the
alliance between the two nations. It has been widely leaked that the joint
statement to be released at the end of the meeting will for the first time
include a clear delineation of Taiwan as a key strategic issue for Japan.
This only vocalizes moves Japan already has taken in association with the
United States to encapsulate Taiwan in the Japanese defense sphere. While
these moves clearly show that the United States considers China the greatest
threat to its interests in East Asia, the Chinese leadership senses a
long-term opportunity for an alliance with the United States against Japan.
Analysis
Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura and Defense Agency Director
General Yoshinori Ono will meet with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld for "two-plus-two" talks on the
alliance between the two countries. It has already been leaked that the joint
statement issued at the talks' conclusion will include a declaration that
Taiwan represents a mutual strategic concern -- a change for Tokyo, which
previously preferred to let such things go unsaid.
While Beijing obviously will react to this news with consternation, it is
unlikely the Chinese leaders are surprised. As Stratfor noted in October
2004, Washington and Tokyo already were discussing the movement of fighter
aircraft to Shimoji, a location that brings them within striking distance of
the Chinese coastline opposite Taiwan. Not long after, rumors emerged that
Taipei was funding some of the new air base's construction through indirect
channels and by letting the United States divert money from Taiwanese defense
support to the airfield work.
The acknowledgement of Taiwan as a strategic interest of Japan appears to be
rather late in coming. Eighty-five percent of Japan's energy supply comes
from the Middle East -- and is shipped through the South China Sea right past
Taiwan. This has long been a reality, but until now, Tokyo was content to let
the United States bear the brunt of providing protection and security to
Taiwan. Since the end of the Cold War, however, Tokyo has become more
aggressive in asserting its own defensive capabilities and priorities.
Japan has moved to add in-air refueling capabilities, extended its assistance
to the Untied States in the Iraq war (including supplying U.S. warships and
deploying noncombat troops to Iraq), begun developing and deploying its own
spy-satellite network and linked itself to the U.S. development of regional
missile defense systems. Japan has sought to increase its maritime security
cooperation along its main energy supply line -- working with India and
Singapore among others -- and it is actively reviewing the constitutional
constraints on its military.
For Beijing, these represent troubling moves. While the United States still
stands as China's main global competitor, Japan is a next-door neighbor --
and one with a history of less-than-peaceful relations with China. Beijing
sees the growing assertiveness of Japan as a challenge, but also as a
potential opportunity. While Washington and Tokyo have a mutual interest in
keeping China from embarking on any regional military adventurism or from
becoming the dominant player in East Asia, Beijing sees room for cooperation
with Washington based on a potential mutual threat from Tokyo.
Japan is the world's second largest economy, and its interests do not always
appear to mesh with those of Washington -- such as on the question of energy
supplies from Iran -- so Beijing hopes eventually to capitalize on the
likely, but less apparent, point at which the United States and Japan move
from being global partners to global competitors.
Whether Washington sees this potentiality -- or views it as a threat -- is
unclear, but the U.S. government obviously views China as a clearer and more
present danger, and is working with allies in the region to step up the
containment of the Middle Kingdom. Tokyo's overt moves to firm up its
security relationship with Taiwan, then, further tighten the noose around
Beijing and may instigate more rapid and creative responses from the Chinese
leadership as it seeks to counter the containment ring now closing in.
appears to be growing or at least more contentious in the news. China and
Japan are seeking access to resources and are becoming definite competitors.
I wonder whats going to happen in a few years with the US, the EU, Russia,
China, and Japan (the big energy consumers) all jostling around with their own
concerns. We should throw them into "BMQ" and make them learn to work
together for a change. Anyway, another stratfor special.
Japan, U.S.: A Mutual Strategic Concern
www.stratfor.com
Summary
Japan and the United States will meet Feb. 19 for "two-plus-two" talks on the
alliance between the two nations. It has been widely leaked that the joint
statement to be released at the end of the meeting will for the first time
include a clear delineation of Taiwan as a key strategic issue for Japan.
This only vocalizes moves Japan already has taken in association with the
United States to encapsulate Taiwan in the Japanese defense sphere. While
these moves clearly show that the United States considers China the greatest
threat to its interests in East Asia, the Chinese leadership senses a
long-term opportunity for an alliance with the United States against Japan.
Analysis
Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura and Defense Agency Director
General Yoshinori Ono will meet with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld for "two-plus-two" talks on the
alliance between the two countries. It has already been leaked that the joint
statement issued at the talks' conclusion will include a declaration that
Taiwan represents a mutual strategic concern -- a change for Tokyo, which
previously preferred to let such things go unsaid.
While Beijing obviously will react to this news with consternation, it is
unlikely the Chinese leaders are surprised. As Stratfor noted in October
2004, Washington and Tokyo already were discussing the movement of fighter
aircraft to Shimoji, a location that brings them within striking distance of
the Chinese coastline opposite Taiwan. Not long after, rumors emerged that
Taipei was funding some of the new air base's construction through indirect
channels and by letting the United States divert money from Taiwanese defense
support to the airfield work.
The acknowledgement of Taiwan as a strategic interest of Japan appears to be
rather late in coming. Eighty-five percent of Japan's energy supply comes
from the Middle East -- and is shipped through the South China Sea right past
Taiwan. This has long been a reality, but until now, Tokyo was content to let
the United States bear the brunt of providing protection and security to
Taiwan. Since the end of the Cold War, however, Tokyo has become more
aggressive in asserting its own defensive capabilities and priorities.
Japan has moved to add in-air refueling capabilities, extended its assistance
to the Untied States in the Iraq war (including supplying U.S. warships and
deploying noncombat troops to Iraq), begun developing and deploying its own
spy-satellite network and linked itself to the U.S. development of regional
missile defense systems. Japan has sought to increase its maritime security
cooperation along its main energy supply line -- working with India and
Singapore among others -- and it is actively reviewing the constitutional
constraints on its military.
For Beijing, these represent troubling moves. While the United States still
stands as China's main global competitor, Japan is a next-door neighbor --
and one with a history of less-than-peaceful relations with China. Beijing
sees the growing assertiveness of Japan as a challenge, but also as a
potential opportunity. While Washington and Tokyo have a mutual interest in
keeping China from embarking on any regional military adventurism or from
becoming the dominant player in East Asia, Beijing sees room for cooperation
with Washington based on a potential mutual threat from Tokyo.
Japan is the world's second largest economy, and its interests do not always
appear to mesh with those of Washington -- such as on the question of energy
supplies from Iran -- so Beijing hopes eventually to capitalize on the
likely, but less apparent, point at which the United States and Japan move
from being global partners to global competitors.
Whether Washington sees this potentiality -- or views it as a threat -- is
unclear, but the U.S. government obviously views China as a clearer and more
present danger, and is working with allies in the region to step up the
containment of the Middle Kingdom. Tokyo's overt moves to firm up its
security relationship with Taiwan, then, further tighten the noose around
Beijing and may instigate more rapid and creative responses from the Chinese
leadership as it seeks to counter the containment ring now closing in.