The Missed Opportunities of a Kerry Presidency?
By Nic Boisvert
Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century www.ccs21.org
It has been more than two weeks since the American elections ended decisively. Thankfully, the world as we know it did not end with them, either from an Al-Qaeda attack that didn't happen or from the re-election of George W. Bush which did. History will judge how well global peace ultimately is served by his renewed mandate, and we will never know if John Kerry could have done better, let alone anything different. The Canadian electorate, however, had made no secret of their preferred choice, so Canadians concerned about our defence establishment can be excused for speculating as to the missed opportunities of a Kerry Presidency. The possibilities are decidedly mixed.
The international issue of most importance to our American allies is Iraq. When then-Prime Minister Jean Chretien snubbed President Bush's request for Canada to become more actively involved in the campaign to remove Saddam Hussein from power, Bush quietly turned the other cheek and received instead the juvenile and intemperate remarks of Chretien loyalists. (These comments stupidly continue.) If in return Bush did little to persuade Senators and Congressmen to re-open the border to Canadian beef and softwood lumber, neither did he take any active retaliation. Generally, his response could be styled as benign neglect. It is unlikely that John Kerry would have been so generous, pledged as he was both to encourage the allies to carry a greater portion of the burden in Iraq and to take protectionist measures to combat the out-sourcing of American jobs. Our border might have seen its billion-dollars-a-day in trade slow to a trickle.
Since that disastrous situation was just what so many of us had been predicting, what conceivable advantage was there in it? Simply put, a Kerry Presidency would have been more likely to push us harder to get our act together to fix up our military. The gentle nudges we have been receiving from Bush and Ambassador Paul Cellucci would have become in very short order a Kerry kick in the backside. We still would be in no position to contribute effectively, but Kerry's expectation that we shoulder our responsibilities in Iraq at least symbolically could have been just the incentive needed to expedite the revitalization of the Canadian Forces. Could any prime minister, let alone Paul Martin, refuse the president massively endorsed by the Canadian public?
Turning to our shared continental responsibilities, the issue of ballistic missile defence (BMD) seems finally to have entered Canadian consciousness. Prodded mostly by a Kerry-friendly media, opinion in the wake of Bush's re-election seems to have hardened against it, especially in a wildly anti-American Quebec, leading even the formerly supportive Conservative Party to concoct yet another variation of their Belgian waffle on the issue. Ironically, this consternation comes in tandem with reports that the Bush administration is quite content with the recent renegotiation of NORAD to serve only as the missile shield's early warning mechanism. Certainly BMD requires no Canadian component, and President Bush is unlikely to push Prime Minister Martin for a specific treaty when he comes to visit at the end of the month.
Once again, the re-election of George Bush seems not to be a major impediment to good relations, so what opportunity have we missed with John Kerry's loss? Nothing less than the hugely important expansion of NORAD to include naval and army elements in addition to the traditional aerospace dimension. The Canadian government faces a year-end deadline to renew the mandate of the Binational Planning Group (BPG) that is working to develop plans to coordinate responses to a range of cross-border security concerns. They are making great progress to fashion a command structure that will ensure Canadian sovereignty is not sacrificed to closer integration with American forces, but this critical continental security project is in danger of being sacrificed in the interests of political expediency. Although there is no formal linkage to missile defence, in the usual simple-minded Canadian approach to these issues the BPG is becoming conflated with BMD, and no one in Ottawa seems capable of mustering the political courage to set the record straight. Those fears are less likely to have arisen under a Kerry Presidency; at the very least they would have been easier to set aside.
But not all would have been sweetness and light with regime change in the United States. The proof is the selection of our Chief of Defence Staff General Ray Henault to become the next Chairman of the Military Committee of NATO. NATO insiders feared for Henault's chances against his Danish competitor, the thinking being that France would lobby the European members to vote against â Å“another North American commanderâ ? (that is, a Canadian Chairman alongside the established American Supreme Allied Commander). Kerry certainly would have seen greater advantage in appeasing the French on this matter than appealing to his feckless northern neighbour. The fear was that President Bush was coming to accept this view as well, with the pay-off being more meaningful NATO support in Iraq. Henault's selection suggests that President Bush must believe that Canada's commitment to re-invigorate its international standing is genuine, and the US evidently saw some merit in Canada facilitating the management of the global issues confronting NATO.
Congratulations, General Henault, on turning the tide. Your appointment is the first indication that the next four years need not be a missed opportunity, but rather a chance for a new Canadian beginning.
November 18, 2004
(Nic Boisvert is a former public servant with an interest in defence. He writes on behalf of the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century. Free use may be made of this piece so long as reference is made to CCS21 and its Web site â “ www.ccs21.org.)