Which brings up the interesting point about states appealing to other states for National Guard assistance to protect their international borders when they feel that the Federal Government isn't doing its job.
And the issue of the Alaska Air National Guard being federalized to protect the national airspace rather than being Alaskans protecting Alaskan air space...
Lots of work for lawyers ...
Actually not so much. Both are permissible. The first is within Posse Commitatus because there is no federalization. The second is a legitimate federalization of the Alaska National Guard.
The issue is one of threat management, isn't it? Is the threat clear and present, current? Or is it a prospective threat?
Currently the zeitgeist is that domestically there is no threat. However, some of us think there is a potential threat. That potential threat shares much in common with the potential threat that soldiers on active service might face. The active service soldiers, whether currently serving in Estonia or in the future drawn from the Reserves will need the capabilities to counter that threat effectively. If those soldiers have those capabilities available to them in garrison in Canada for training purposes then in the event that the potential threat becomes an active threat, then those soldiers can be mobilized to meet the threat for the duration of the threat. If so then they would go from Class A service to Class B for the duration of the emergency. If the emergency persists then the temporary will become permanent and they will move from B to C and possibly Regular.
And if the emergency persists further then I would anticipate new technologies being applied to reduce the number of Class C and Regs on the payroll.
We agree, I think, that the Reserves are only a temporary or stop gap measure. But no stopping of gaps is possible without plugs, mattresses and balks - or guns and missiles in this case.
There's a bit of muddling of apples and oranges here, if I understand you correctly.
"Continuing, full-time service" v "other than continuing, full-time service," is the fundamental statutory definition that divides a reservist from a RegF soldier. Classes of reserve service is a regulatory provision that controls certain pay, benefits and even obligations of reservists at all times. (such as how many days a reservist may be ordered to train under s 33(2)(a) of the NDA or as a foundation as to what pay and benefits are payable depending on the type of service performed)
The CAF in large measure relies on voluntary service. The real crux of the matter, however, is the ability to call out reservists on a compulsory basis such as NDA s 31 (place on active duty) or NDA s 33(2)(a) (order to train) or NDA s 33(2)(b) (call out on service for any lawful duty other than training) or NDA s 275 (Call out in Aid of the Civil Power).
Quite frankly the powers that be in the CAF do not understand these concepts well, or at all, and as a result neither does the government. As an example, how many people know that when a reservist volunteers for NATO related tasking they are automatically placed on active service by virtue of OiC SI/89-103 once they leave Canada? How many know what the consequences of that are? My guess is
@dapaterson is one of the very few. As a consequence we have defaulted into a system of reservists volunteering not only for operations but also day to day Class A service. Canada simply does not "require" a reservists to show up for anything. This, IMHO, is a headspace problem. Canada's reserves could be used very similarly to the way that the US ARNG and USAR , however, the CAF (and by extension the GoC) has consciously chosen and then defaulted into not doing so.
Also don't use the term "emergency" too loosely. "Emergency" is a defined term under the NDA which
means an insurrection, riot, invasion, armed conflict or war, whether real or apprehended
We agree totally on the concept that reservists must be properly trained to meet anticipated threats that they may be mobilized to defend against. Equally they should have the equipment to meet that task albeit a concept of a given stock of equipment which is less than the total force that can be mobilized is a valid financial political risk course of action as long as the risk is fully understood and accepted by the powers that be. That's where I differ from the current CAF thinking. My belief is that, like the US ARNG and USAR, soldiers and units should have the equipment in hand that they will be mobilized on.
