Our North - SSE Policy Update Megathread

[Blackadder1916]

Pretty funny, and concerning on a variety of levels

Ich Bin Ein Indianer​

Germany’s obsession with a past it never had​

In one of its more equivocal forms, the experience of homesickness is rooted in an intuition that there is not and never has been a home. This occurred to me on an unseasonably warm spring afternoon, shortly after arriving in the town of Regensburg, deep in the heart of Bavaria. Outside the train station, I found a cab and asked the driver if he knew of the Regensburg Cowboy Club. He gave me the once-over. “Cowboy Club?” he queried. (I was lacking the requisite Western attire.) “Yes,” I said. “The Regensburg Cowboy Club.” He shrugged. “No problem,” he said.

I was in Regensburg on the advice of Murray Small Legs, my Blackfoot guide to Germany’s famously flourishing Indian hobbyist movement. As I was soon to discover, the presence of a Canadian at the Cowboy Club was a special occasion. My trip was a reversal of a pilgrimage that, for most hobbyists, is a right of passage: Instead of coming to North America to see real Native Americans, I was journeying to Germany to see pretend Indians.

Murray Small Legs, incidentally, is not a hobbyist; he is a real Blackfoot, from the Peigan reserve, in Alberta. He has been living in a suburb of Berlin since 1997, part of a growing aboriginal expatriate community in a country where an estimated 60,000 Germans convert, on weekends and holidays, into Nineteenth-Century Native Americans. For those who haven’t witnessed its curious pageantry, Indian hobbyism describes the imitation and study of Native-American culture by non–Native Americans. Typically, the hobbyist gatherings in Germany are organized around a central event, such as a powwow, a sweat lodge, or a rodeo. It was just such a gathering that I hoped to witness in Regensburg. The Regensburg Club, Murray Small Legs had told me, was hosting a weekend rodeo, and the local cowboys were expecting large contingents of dress-up Indians.

Located on the outskirts of town and forming a narrow border between a housing development and the farmland beyond, the Regensburg Cowboy Club is surrounded by a tall, Western-style wooden fence. The club occupies two or three acres of grassy land and is divided by a long, rectangular log cabin. On one side of this cabin is the Club’s camping ground, which, on this day, was dotted with brightly painted teepees. The other side was occupied by what looked to be a miniature Nineteenth-Century American frontier town. The fence, I realized, was designed not only to keep strangers out, but to mark a symbolic division of present-day Germany from the wild, unbridled West. Murray Small Legs had told me to ask at the gate for the “Chief.” The cowboy at the gate was shirtless, wearing a black ten-gallon hat, a leather vest, a pair of seriously new gwg jeans, cowboy boots, and a sheriff’s badge. “The Chief,” I said.

As I waited, I caught my first glimpse of Nineteenth-Century American life through the gate. A middle-aged German woman, wearing a horn-trimmed fur hat and a buckskin jumpsuit, chased after three young kids in fringed leather pants. I was fixed on a group of boys just behind them — who were dressed in leather loincloths, with American and Confederate flags on their heads — when the Chief approached. His outfit was similar to the gatekeeper’s, except it included a shirt, a handsome number of the classic, pearl-buttoned, Western variety. He extended his hand. Here it was, my first physical contact with Germany’s hobbyist movement, and it felt good.

Ich Bin Ein Indianer | The Walrus

Germany’s obsession with a past it never had

thewalrus.ca

Though we did go a couple of times to a 'cowboy bar' that was south of Lahr (I think it was near Ringsheim), it was definitely a different vibe from the typical C&W joints that were found in San Antonio (where I was prior to my posting to Germany). But there was a sub-culture of Deutscher cowboys in our small neck of the woods even back 30 years ago. However, I don't recall seeing any Indians to make the matched set but according to this site they were there, tucked away in the woods around Sulz.

Geschichte

www.indianerclub-lahr.de

 

[lenaitch]

@lenaitch

Did you just describe the Maritimes ?

But at least some will go down the road to Fort Mac et al (or is that just Newfs?)

 

[Furniture]

But at least some will go down the road to Fort Mac et al (or is that just Newfs?)

They refer to everyone with an East Coast accent as "Newfs"... My Ex's family thought it was real funny... Turns out bigotry takes many forms.

 

[Underway]

Canada, U.S. to negotiate Beaufort Sea boundary dispute

Canada and the United States say they have created a task force to negotiate a boundary dispute in the Arctic.

www.ctvnews.ca

This comes on the heels of a finalized deal with Denmark on Hans Island. Seems the new reality is causing allies to remove irritants and show Russia and China hiw talking things out can work instead of shooting things out.

 

[Kirkhill]

A suggestion - buy subs, and focus on Canada.

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/09/25/canadas_defense_dilemma_1060703.html

In conclusion, Canada must chart a careful course in its defense policy, one that is grounded in a clear understanding of its strategic priorities and resources. The growing challenges in the Arctic, North Pacific, and North Atlantic demand a meaningful response, but Canada’s commitments must remain focused and restrained. By continuing to prioritize North American security, Canada can fulfill its defense obligations in a way that is both effective and sustainable. The nation’s defense strategy should be one of cautious engagement, ensuring that it remains a reliable partner to its allies while avoiding unnecessary entanglements in distant conflicts. This approach will not only protect Canada’s core interests but also preserve its ability to respond to emerging threats in an increasingly uncertain world.

Andrew Latham - The Institute for Peace and Diplomacy - l’Institut pour la paix et la diplomatie

Senior Washington Fellow Expertise: Historical Geopolitics / Grand Strategy / Great Power Competition / History of International Thought Contact: info@peacediplomacy.org Follow: Twitter Linkedin More Experts Biography Dr. Andrew Latham is a professor […]

peacediplomacy.org

 

[Czech_pivo]

A suggestion - buy subs, and focus on Canada.

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/09/25/canadas_defense_dilemma_1060703.html

Andrew Latham - The Institute for Peace and Diplomacy - l’Institut pour la paix et la diplomatie

Senior Washington Fellow Expertise: Historical Geopolitics / Grand Strategy / Great Power Competition / History of International Thought Contact: info@peacediplomacy.org Follow: Twitter Linkedin More Experts Biography Dr. Andrew Latham is a professor […]

peacediplomacy.org

So does that mean leave NATO?

What does 'focus on Canada' really mean?

As others have pointed out, and I agree with, Canada is in essence an 'island' that heavily depends on the concept of 'Open Seas'. So pulling on this string a bit further means, that Canada must have alliances with like minded nations around the world who's 'sea lanes' overlap, intersect or are the same. This means the US, the Europeans (EU), Japan, Australia/NZ, South Korea, (and maybe down the road The Philippines, Vietnam?).
So focusing 'on Canada' means we continue the course with NATO/NORAD and we strengthen relations with Japan/Australia/NZ/SK. I would interpret this to means a strong, capable, robust 'blue water' Navy that has depth, redundancy, stealth and packs a mean left hook. In addition, the same argument could be added to the RCAF, it must have all of the above. The Army falls into the 'what do we want it to be capable of' category under the 'focus on Canada' approach.

Just my 2 cents.

 

[Navy_Pete]

A strictly insular focus is a waste of time and a lazy cowards approach IMO. Sure, we need to sort out our own stuff, but security of the US, EU and others is absolutely critical for Canada, and if a lunatic in NK or other country starts a nuclear war we are all on the same bus to destination foxed (thanks Ozzyman).

Security aside, we're a net export nation by far, so our economy depends on people wanting and being able to buy what we have for sale, so defending our trading partners makes a lot of dollars and cents as well. Far flung markets are important, but the US and EU are still the main ones by far.

 

[Cloud Cover]

He means this: Toward a Canadian Grand Strategy of Restraint - The Institute for Peace and Diplomacy - l’Institut pour la paix et la diplomatie


….

From a restraint perspective, issues such as democracy promotion, human rights, peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction, and international development are not considered to be core Canadian national interests. To be sure, advocates of restraint are not opposed to these “goods.” Rather, they argue that the policies designed to promote these goods are often counterproductive, can lead to overreach, tend toward utopianism, and sometimes mask quasi-imperial efforts to remake parts of the Global South in the Western image. And, perhaps most importantly, they do not directly impact core national interests, constituting at best second-order interests.

Nor from a restraint perspective is acting like, or being recognized as, a middle power a core national interest. Middle power diplomacy – and even the mantle of “middlepowermanship” – has arguably been an instrumental means to an end over the past seven decades, but at times Canadian policy makers have treated this means as if it were an end in itself. From a restraint perspective, this is flawed in two ways. First, it is a category error: it confuses ends for means. And second, the pursuit of middle power status encourages the kind of overreach and overextension that is the antithesis of the restraint approach.

…..


Canada is really only an organic, full-fledged member of two regions: North America and the Arctic. With respect to the first of these, given that it shares that space with the United States, it has little space to operate as a regional middle power. With respect to the second, it has more latitude to act as a regional middle power, but given the overlap between the North American, European and Arctic regional security complexes, probably less potential than, say, Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf or Australia in the Indo-Pacific.


…

Developing a Canadian grand strategy of restraint in this context requires adopting a less romantic understanding of what Canada can hope to accomplish on the world stage. Practically, it involves eschewing the ethos that “Ottawa has to be a helpful fixer everywhere or the sky will fall.” And it involves a clear and realistic understanding of the limits of Canadian power and influence.

Perhaps the most obvious limitation on what Canada can do to address the potential threats to its core geopolitical interests is its relative paucity of military power. Canada spends only about 1.3% of its GDP on defence and has seen its military capability and preparedness decline precipitously since the end of the Cold War. While sustained reinvestment in the Canadian Armed Forces is possible, no reasonably foreseeable degree of investment is going to result in Canada having the kind of naval, air or ground forces necessary to affect the balance of power in any of the regions that are key to Canada’s core national interests (with the exception of North America and the Arctic).

Beyond relative military weakness, in recent decades Canadian diplomatic power has also declined. As one recent report put it: “Canada consistently pretends to stand for values but the record shows that the world has had enough of listening to Canada’s empty virtue signalling. This was obvious when Canada’s bids to win elections to the United Nations Security Council were rejected by the world community in 2010 and 2020, but it is equally evident in its bilateral relations.” The report goes on to cite lacklustre ministers as well as inattentive prime ministers as compounding factors, concluding that as a result of these dysfunctions “Ottawa’s foreign policy machinery has grown deaf and unable to communicate with the world and as a result, Canada’s strength has waned.” Perhaps this dynamic could be reversed with sufficient time, focus and investment. But the sad reality is that no reforms realistically on the table will propel Canada into the ranks of the diplomatic great powers.

Canada’s scope for effective action on the world stage is also limited by the fact that, in addition to falling short on the objective measures of middle power status, the currency of Canadian-style “global middle power” diplomacy is in terminal decline. Beyond the fact that the spaces within which Canada played its traditional middle power role are shrinking, the world truly has had enough of Canadian moral preening and is less and less receptive to efforts on the part of middle powers like Canada to promote liberal norms and values and scold those states that don’t adopt them with sufficient vigour.

 

[Cloud Cover]

Does Canada, as a nation with decades of inattentive, lacklustre Prime Ministers and cabinet ministers, understand our own position in our own continent? I think the answer is a resounding “no”.
Does Canada understand that all of the limp wristed, moral preening that has been adopted as fake foreign policy for a fake middle power in a pretend utopian world where in fact other countries and cultures actually want less of our bullshit and desire Canada to simply shut up and go away from their regions? No >> Ottawa doesn’t understand that.

We have to adopt strategies, alliances, policies, build military forces that put Canada first, recognizing our European heritage and our geographical position and the country we are most closely tied to. Whether or not it is a declining, immoral power we are wedded to them a nd that won’t change. When domiciled with a nut job, arm yourself and prepare to appear to get along while pushing practical national objectives to preserve the state until the world simply detonates.
Carrying on like a stoned teenager in a junk food store has to end or we will end.

 

[Kirkhill]

So does that mean leave NATO?

What does 'focus on Canada' really mean?

As others have pointed out, and I agree with, Canada is in essence an 'island' that heavily depends on the concept of 'Open Seas'. So pulling on this string a bit further means, that Canada must have alliances with like minded nations around the world who's 'sea lanes' overlap, intersect or are the same. This means the US, the Europeans (EU), Japan, Australia/NZ, South Korea, (and maybe down the road The Philippines, Vietnam?).
So focusing 'on Canada' means we continue the course with NATO/NORAD and we strengthen relations with Japan/Australia/NZ/SK. I would interpret this to means a strong, capable, robust 'blue water' Navy that has depth, redundancy, stealth and packs a mean left hook. In addition, the same argument could be added to the RCAF, it must have all of the above. The Army falls into the 'what do we want it to be capable of' category under the 'focus on Canada' approach.

Just my 2 cents.

I don't think it means leaving NATO at all. I think it means ensuring that Canada is firm ground on which the back foot can be safely planted which can support pivoting from Atlantic to Pacific and launching useful thrusts without overbalancing.

Canada is the shortest distance between NATO troops in contact with Russian troops in the Atlantic Arctic (Finns, Norwegians and Danes) and NATO allies in contact with Russian troops in the Pacific Arctic (US and Japanese).

If Russia and China were to secure the Archipelago that we claim then they would divide Europe from Asia.

The Greater Arctic Archipelago includes the Canadian Archipelago, Danish Greenland, Norwegian Svalbard Archipelago, Russian Zemlya Islands - Franz Josef Land and New Siberian Islands.

Kola/Nordkapp to Nova Zemlya - 750 km
Kola/Nordkapp to Svalbard - 1100 km
Kola/Nordkapp to Franz Josef - 1300 km

Nova Zemlya to Severnaya Zemlya - 600 km
Nova Zemlya to Franz Josef - 400 km
Nova Zemlya to Svalbard - 900 km

Svalbard to Greenland - 500 km

Greenland to Alert - 50 km




....

Russian arctic bases (note the map does not include the Russian mining camp at Barentsburg on Norwegian Svalbard.

Russian Arctic Military Bases

Russia has been quietly investing in Arctic military and industrial infrastructure for the last decade. Russia’s expanded Arctic presence is part of President Vladimir Putin’s efforts to elevate Russia’s position on the world stage.

www.americansecurityproject.org

....

I think our friends are asking us to secure our own backyard first.

They have lots of people to secure a lot of small, rich countries.

We have a very few people to secure a ridiculously large, but potentially very rich country.

They don't want another Afghanistan on their northern flank, a mineral rich country that can be used as an aircraft carrier.

 

[Kirkhill]

Does Canada, as a nation with decades of inattentive, lacklustre Prime Ministers and cabinet ministers, understand our own position in our own continent? I think the answer is a resounding “no”.
Does Canada understand that all of the limp wristed, moral preening that has been adopted as fake foreign policy for a fake middle power in a pretend utopian world where in fact other countries and cultures actually want less of our bullshit and desire Canada to simply shut up and go away from their regions? No >> Ottawa doesn’t understand that.

We have to adopt strategies, alliances, policies, build military forces that put Canada first, recognizing our European heritage and our geographical position and the country we are most closely tied to. Whether or not it is a declining, immoral power we are wedded to them a nd that won’t change. When domiciled with a nut job, arm yourself and prepare to appear to get along while pushing practical national objectives to preserve the state until the world simply detonates.
Carrying on like a stoned teenager in a junk food store has to end or we will end.

Militarily I like the focus on the Air Force and the Navy, on NORAD and Submarines. I would exploit technology up the yin-yang domestically. And that would include a reversion to 1960s BOMARC style ground defences, supplemented by Very Long Range Precision Fires (missiles and UAVs).

From the Army side, I like the notion of a 2 division army. One that can deploy overseas when and if, in association with any partners, while the other maintains its focus on the Arctic, broadly defined. Lots of exercises with Japanese, Americans, Danes, Norwegians, Swedes and Finns. (The Brits and Dutch can come along for the ride if they are in the neighbourhood).

Four permanent brigades - 3 small, light brigades similar to the 11th Abn structure and 1 large, heavy brigade. The heavy brigade would be the home of the divisional support troops.

Lots of transport aircraft and helicopters. Lots of comms.

Lots of reliance on smart, long-range weapons.

....

Militia.....? TBD. (too many arguments and too little time).

 

[Underway]

So does that mean leave NATO?

What does 'focus on Canada' really mean?

It means stop worrying about other peoples geopolitical issues (Ukraine, Israel etc...) and focus on Canada's geopolitical issues.

It doesn't mean insular either. Forces that are used in Canada for Canadian Security are easily repurposed in many cases for expeditionary roles. Aircraft and ships are the main examples here.

We have to adopt strategies, alliances, policies, build military forces that put Canada first, recognizing our European heritage and our geographical position and the country we are most closely tied to.

Deleted what doesn't make sense. The rest of this is great. Heritage has no place in geopolitics and only leads to incorrect identification of issues as important when they are not relevant to Canada's security situation.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I don't think it means leaving NATO at all. I think it means ensuring that Canada is firm ground on which the back foot can be safely planted which can support pivoting from Atlantic to Pacific and launching useful thrusts without overbalancing.

Canada is the shortest distance between NATO troops in contact with Russian troops in the Atlantic Arctic (Finns, Norwegians and Danes) and NATO allies in contact with Russian troops in the Pacific Arctic (US and Japanese).

If Russia and China were to secure the Archipelago that we claim then they would divide Europe from Asia.

The Greater Arctic Archipelago includes the Canadian Archipelago, Danish Greenland, Norwegian Svalbard Archipelago, Russian Zemlya Islands - Franz Josef Land and New Siberian Islands.

Kola/Nordkapp to Nova Zemlya - 750 km
Kola/Nordkapp to Svalbard - 1100 km
Kola/Nordkapp to Franz Josef - 1300 km

Nova Zemlya to Severnaya Zemlya - 600 km
Nova Zemlya to Franz Josef - 400 km
Nova Zemlya to Svalbard - 900 km

Svalbard to Greenland - 500 km

Greenland to Alert - 50 km


View attachment 88209

....

Russian arctic bases (note the map does not include the Russian mining camp at Barentsburg on Norwegian Svalbard.

Russian Arctic Military Bases

Russia has been quietly investing in Arctic military and industrial infrastructure for the last decade. Russia’s expanded Arctic presence is part of President Vladimir Putin’s efforts to elevate Russia’s position on the world stage.

www.americansecurityproject.org

....

I think our friends are asking us to secure our own backyard first.

They have lots of people to secure a lot of small, rich countries.

We have a very few people to secure a ridiculously large, but potentially very rich country.

They don't want another Afghanistan on their northern flank, a mineral rich country that can be used as an aircraft carrier.

What? Canada as another Afghanistan? What are you talking about? Severing Europe from Asia? Putting aside that there are many other better ways to get between Europe and Asia than going through the Canadian arctic, who do you think asked us to be in Latvia? The Transatlantic Bond is one of the key NATO principles. NATO is worried about Russia being able to hamper communications from North America to Europe in the North Atlantic by way of the high arctic, but that is not based on the possession of given islands in the Canadian arctic archipelago. Stationing Canadian troops in the arctic is not going to prevent Backfires from trying to interdict forces moving across the Atlantic.

A joint Chinese-Russian seizure of an island in the Canadian high arctic is an interesting play. How do they get there and then what do they do once they are there? What size force would they place there?

All that being said, our first priority is Canada, then North America and then the world. Regarding the world, NATO has primacy. Our allocation of resources is guided by credible threats. That is why we have troops in Latvia as part of a deterrence mission. This does not mean that we ignore Canada - indeed we do not.

Regarding the article you posted, Canada can certainly be overstretched. We should be careful before making each commitment - which we are. This doesn't mean we bring everything home to look after the patrol base.

 

[daftandbarmy]

What? Canada as another Afghanistan? What are you talking about? Severing Europe from Asia? Putting aside that there are many other better ways to get between Europe and Asia than going through the Canadian arctic, who do you think asked us to be in Latvia? The Transatlantic Bond is one of the key NATO principles. NATO is worried about Russia being able to hamper communications from North America to Europe in the North Atlantic by way of the high arctic, but that is not based on the possession of given islands in the Canadian arctic archipelago. Stationing Canadian troops in the arctic is not going to prevent Backfires from trying to interdict forces moving across the Atlantic.

A joint Chinese-Russian seizure of an island in the Canadian high arctic is an interesting play. How do they get there and then what do they do once they are there? What size force would they place there?

All that being said, our first priority is Canada, then North America and then the world. Regarding the world, NATO has primacy. Our allocation of resources is guided by credible threats. That is why we have troops in Latvia as part of a deterrence mission. This does not mean that we ignore Canada - indeed we do not.

Regarding the article you posted, Canada can certainly be overstretched. We should be careful before making each commitment - which we are. This doesn't mean we bring everything home to look after the patrol base.

I recall a quote from someone smarter than me that went something like 'All national power projection is Naval based'.

An extra 12 submarines for Canada shows an uncommon amount of common sense breaking out, somehow and somewhere, based on that principle I would say.

 

[Underway]

I recall a quote from someone smarter than me that went something like 'All national power projection is Naval based'.

An extra 12 submarines for Canada shows an uncommon amount of common sense breaking out, somehow and somewhere, based on that principle I would say.

I think it's related but the opposite.

Diesel subs can do power projection, but where they shine is in sea denial and in contesting sea control. Particularly when close to their operating bases.

I see Canadian Subs being used to stop power projection into Canadian areas and to assist allies in the same from host basing.

What we need to start doing is having a conversation about integrating effects. Is the airforce even equipped or train for naval strike? Is that even part of their mission set?

And if it isn't it should be, as well as sense to strike integration across naval and air force assets so that coordinated strikes can happen. And then integrate this into USN and NORAD responses/toolkit.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

In the current geopolitical context, I've been coming slowly to the conclusion that we need (need: not would be nice!) one, perhaps even two aircraft carrier(s). Not Supercarriers like the US, but something like the Italian Navy's Cavour, or even the UK's QUEEN ELIZABETH class. Something that would let us move around 25 to 30 F35-B's and some helicopters where our needs require, but would be reasonable on manpower with around 650 to 750 sailors and about 400 to 500 persons air group.

I made a back of the envelope calculation on this, with a 12 to 14 years time line from inception of the project to flight certification of the first such ship and the second one - if selected - coming four years later. My calculations show that (if bought offshore, i.e. in the UK, Spain or Italy) including the build up of naval and air personnel, the first one would need an increase of annual defense budget of 8b$ Canadian on a constant dollars basis, and the second one an extra 6b$ Canadian, same basis. This means basically a 50% increase in the defense budget, which still doesn't get us to the 2% of GDP figure.

Starting something like that now would (1) hopefully attract lots of young Canadian to the Navy and the Air Force and (2) put the entry into operational service of the first such ship smack in the middle of delivery of the CSC's and somewhere near the end of the entry into service of the submarines (should this actually occur on the currently advertised timeline).

 

[dimsum]

I think it's related but the opposite.

Diesel subs can do power projection, but where they shine is in sea denial and in contesting sea control. Particularly when close to their operating bases.

I see Canadian Subs being used to stop power projection into Canadian areas and to assist allies in the same from host basing.

What we need to start doing is having a conversation about integrating effects. Is the airforce even equipped or train for naval strike? Is that even part of their mission set?

And if it isn't it should be, as well as sense to strike integration across naval and air force assets so that coordinated strikes can happen. And then integrate this into USN and NORAD responses/toolkit.

The P-8 can do anti-surface warfare. Technically the P-3 could too, but we took away the wing pylons.

P-8 LRASM testing expected to wrap this summer, Boeing official says - Breaking Defense

Boeing will also soon begin flight testing a multimission pod developed with internal funds, according to company official Jon Spore.

breakingdefense.com

 

[dapaterson]

The P-8 can do anti-surface warfare. Technically the P-3 could too, but we took away the wing pylons.

P-8 LRASM testing expected to wrap this summer, Boeing official says - Breaking Defense

Boeing will also soon begin flight testing a multimission pod developed with internal funds, according to company official Jon Spore.

breakingdefense.com

The Canadian P3 still can be used for anti-surface warfare.

 

[Underway]

The P-8 can do anti-surface warfare. Technically the P-3 could too, but we took away the wing pylons.

P-8 LRASM testing expected to wrap this summer, Boeing official says - Breaking Defense

Boeing will also soon begin flight testing a multimission pod developed with internal funds, according to company official Jon Spore.

breakingdefense.com

F35s can each carry 6 Joint Strike Missiles (2 internal 4 external) and recent photos have show they could instead carry 2 Long Range Anti Ship Missiles (much more powerful warhead and longer range). I expect a P8 would only use LRASM as they don't have stealth to get closer like JSMs require. They carry 4 LRASM.

MQ 9Bs recently carried LRASMs at RIMPAC and were seen carrying JSM in 2023.

This should be a task the airforce is assigned. Also I expect that if that's added to their tasks they may need more aircraft, likely F35s as some will be carrying strike payloads on a mission and others will be used to escort the strike.

Making some assumptions a strike package of 16 F35s with JSM plus 4 P8s could put out 96 JSM and 16 LRASM to oversaturate a enemy naval task groups defenses.

 

[Cloud Cover]

In the current geopolitical context, I've been coming slowly to the conclusion that we need (need: not would be nice!) one, perhaps even two aircraft carrier(s). Not Supercarriers like the US, but something like the Italian Navy's Cavour, or even the UK's QUEEN ELIZABETH class. Something that would let us move around 25 to 30 F35-B's and some helicopters where our needs require, but would be reasonable on manpower with around 650 to 750 sailors and about 400 to 500 persons air group.

I made a back of the envelope calculation on this, with a 12 to 14 years time line from inception of the project to flight certification of the first such ship and the second one - if selected - coming four years later. My calculations show that (if bought offshore, i.e. in the UK, Spain or Italy) including the build up of naval and air personnel, the first one would need an increase of annual defense budget of 8b$ Canadian on a constant dollars basis, and the second one an extra 6b$ Canadian, same basis. This means basically a 50% increase in the defense budget, which still doesn't get us to the 2% of GDP figure.

Starting something like that now would (1) hopefully attract lots of young Canadian to the Navy and the Air Force and (2) put the entry into operational service of the first such ship smack in the middle of delivery of the CSC's and somewhere near the end of the entry into service of the submarines (should this actually occur on the currently advertised timeline).

Correct me if I’m wrong, but this is quite a change in thought about naval capability for you? A carrier requires several large support ships, air defence destroyers, frigates and ASW screens, and an aircraft type and doctrine we haven’t even thought about since the early 1960’s with the Banshee. Is this a capability in lieu of a larger submarine force?