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Army Reserve Restructuring

FJAG,

Out of interest as you've been a big proponent of the 70/30 split argument which I've been following what would happen if there was a different split of classes:
Class A - full time regular force contract. Comes with priority for deployments and quarters
Class B - NEW - full time restricted contract. Comes with linkage to specific area only, may or may not fill a "70/30" slot if rank/training appropriate in lieu of Class A resource posted. No quarter allowance. Rank growth and career options limited.
Class C - Current reservist force and the "70" part of the 70/30 split

I would then ponder what happens if you split the units even further more along the lines of the US where you have the Regular Force units dominated as "Federal" Units and the remainder as a provincial unit more in keeping with US National Guard. The kicker is that for example in Alberta you'd have 4th PPCLI Loyal Edmonton Regiment, Calgary Highlanders + in Saskatchewan the North Saskatchewan Regiment and The Royal Regina Rifles. Between the 5 or 6 (Yellowknife) companies of reservists you have one unit pre-identified to augment the regular force unit on 6 month readiness rotations with the remainder focused on domestic response and rebuilding.

I'm sure I'm not addressing this 100% clearly but thinking the associated reserve units rotate through readiness focus rotations like the Regular force units currently do in case of major (i.e. entire unit) deployment along with full unit exercises (all 70/30). Once off peak readiness the unit has time for training new recruits/secondary mission local to their province similar to the USNG providing support (not primary response) to states as needed if not deployed to US Army roles.

Just random thinking after beer without realities like recruitment, budget, training time or facilities involved.
 
FJAG,

Out of interest as you've been a big proponent of the 70/30 split argument which I've been following ...
I've set out an extensive overview of a force restructure in my revised book "Unsustainable at Any Price: The Canadian Forces in Crisis. 2nd Edition" The first issue is that the 30/70 battalion concept is not based on a fixed ratio but represents the idea of hybrid units made up of RegF and ARes members in varying ratios. There are multiple other factors such as terms of service, subsidized training systems, fixed service contracts, obligatory and mandatory service, urban units, civilian employment protection etc etc.
... what would happen if there was a different split of classes:
Class A - full time regular force contract. Comes with priority for deployments and quarters
Class B - NEW - full time restricted contract. Comes with linkage to specific area only, may or may not fill a "70/30" slot if rank/training appropriate in lieu of Class A resource posted. No quarter allowance. Rank growth and career options limited.
Class C - Current reservist force and the "70" part of the 70/30 split
I put forward five classes of service: 3 ResF and 2 RegF.

ARes Class C - identical to today's system - ARes personnel on an operational tour whether as a volunteer or called out on service or active service
ARes Class M - mandatory service that every ARes member must attend - this has two aspects. First, training required to be fully DP 1 trained and second, after DP1, annual training of a 2.5 day weekend per month for ten months of the year and a 16.5 day (two week) summer exercise each year (total 41.5 days annually that the individual must attend)
ARes Class V - voluntary service that an ARes member may agree to take regardless of length (this subsumes both Thurs day night parading - if offered - or a contract for any duration such as several months of DP2 etc summer training or even what we look at as Class B contracts today.

RegF Class Unrestricted - essentially same as today's RegF terms of service
RegF Class Restricted - effectively like todays RegF but the individual joins up to serve in a specific geographic region (like a large urban centre) and cannot be posted without his consent. The aim is to facilitate and guarantee geographic career stability such as is required for urban units in expensive urban centres and two career families. Qualified individuals can still be promoted, if qualified, but only into a vacancy within their geographic area unless they consent to be posted to where a rank vacancy exists. They would still be liable for operational tours just like the Unrestricted Class.

I would then ponder what happens if you split the units even further more along the lines of the US where you have the Regular Force units dominated as "Federal" Units and the remainder as a provincial unit more in keeping with US National Guard. The kicker is that for example in Alberta you'd have 4th PPCLI Loyal Edmonton Regiment, Calgary Highlanders + in Saskatchewan the North Saskatchewan Regiment and The Royal Regina Rifles. Between the 5 or 6 (Yellowknife) companies of reservists you have one unit pre-identified to augment the regular force unit on 6 month readiness rotations with the remainder focused on domestic response and rebuilding.
This would require a constitutional amendment but more importantly, there is no benefit to a federal/provincial split in the military. You can accomplish everything, including support to the provinces, under our current structure. One of the underlying concepts of a 30/70 battalion system is that the number of administrative headquarters (the current div hqs and 10 ARes bdes are exchanged for roughly 2 divisional and 6 additional bde headquarters that, like the CMBGs are fully deployable. Similarly, the number of deployable battalion or regimental headquarters are nearly tripled. A caution here though is that the number of RegF company-sized subunits stay roughly the same. The tripling of the coy-sized subunit strength comes by way of a better trained, equiped and led ARes who will continue to be relied on to round out follow up rotos.

I'm sure I'm not addressing this 100% clearly but thinking the associated reserve units rotate through readiness focus rotations like the Regular force units currently do in case of major (i.e. entire unit) deployment along with full unit exercises (all 70/30). Once off peak readiness the unit has time for training new recruits/secondary mission local to their province similar to the USNG providing support (not primary response) to states as needed if not deployed to US Army roles.
I see a rotational readiness system for the ARes components in a fashion similar to Guard 4.0, i.e. a multi-year army-directed readiness training program where every one of the 41.5 annual days is sequenced, let's say over three years or 123.5 training days, into one full "prepare" cycle followed by a one year "ready" cycle.

I should point out that I generally do not see the ARes elements of a 30/70 battalion training as a full unit as a common thing. This is because ARes are basically only available to train collectively during the summer when RegF pers need to go on leave and other things and because of equipment shortfalls. The two components do not mesh easily. What I see is that a given 30/70 battalion primarily trains its RegF company and CS and CSS platoons from September to April (including with other RegF companies squadrons and batteries from other battalion) and then for May to Aug inclusive turns heavily to training the ARes components including its two ResF companies, CS and CSS elements. There may be opportunities throughout the year to have officers and senior NCMs from both components do a weekend TEWT together but that's about it.

One of the key elements of the 30/70 concept is to take today's personnel strength and equipment holdings and distributed them in such a way that ARes companies benefit from stable and professional RegF leadership and have access to RegF equipment in their day to day training.

Just random thinking after beer without realities like recruitment, budget, training time or facilities involved.
It's a big issue. If it were easy the ARes / RegF problems would have been solved long ago.

🍻
 
...like a "shop" [ Maple Leaf Services](CANEX wasn't even a thing then) and a bowling alley and a swimming pool and theatre and a "dry canteen" all in one complex [General Strange Hall] and a "wet canteen" [across the street]....
 
I've set out an extensive overview of a force restructure in my revised book "Unsustainable at Any Price: The Canadian Forces in Crisis. 2nd Edition" The first issue is that the 30/70 battalion concept is not based on a fixed ratio but represents the idea of hybrid units made up of RegF and ARes members in varying ratios. There are multiple other factors such as terms of service, subsidized training systems, fixed service contracts, obligatory and mandatory service, urban units, civilian employment protection etc etc.

I put forward five classes of service: 3 ResF and 2 RegF.

ARes Class C - identical to today's system - ARes personnel on an operational tour whether as a volunteer or called out on service or active service
ARes Class M - mandatory service that every ARes member must attend - this has two aspects. First, training required to be fully DP 1 trained and second, after DP1, annual training of a 2.5 day weekend per month for ten months of the year and a 16.5 day (two week) summer exercise each year (total 41.5 days annually that the individual must attend)
ARes Class V - voluntary service that an ARes member may agree to take regardless of length (this subsumes both Thurs day night parading - if offered - or a contract for any duration such as several months of DP2 etc summer training or even what we look at as Class B contracts today.

RegF Class Unrestricted - essentially same as today's RegF terms of service
RegF Class Restricted - effectively like todays RegF but the individual joins up to serve in a specific geographic region (like a large urban centre) and cannot be posted without his consent. The aim is to facilitate and guarantee geographic career stability such as is required for urban units in expensive urban centres and two career families. Qualified individuals can still be promoted, if qualified, but only into a vacancy within their geographic area unless they consent to be posted to where a rank vacancy exists. They would still be liable for operational tours just like the Unrestricted Class.


This would require a constitutional amendment but more importantly, there is no benefit to a federal/provincial split in the military. You can accomplish everything, including support to the provinces, under our current structure. One of the underlying concepts of a 30/70 battalion system is that the number of administrative headquarters (the current div hqs and 10 ARes bdes are exchanged for roughly 2 divisional and 6 additional bde headquarters that, like the CMBGs are fully deployable. Similarly, the number of deployable battalion or regimental headquarters are nearly tripled. A caution here though is that the number of RegF company-sized subunits stay roughly the same. The tripling of the coy-sized subunit strength comes by way of a better trained, equiped and led ARes who will continue to be relied on to round out follow up rotos.


I see a rotational readiness system for the ARes components in a fashion similar to Guard 4.0, i.e. a multi-year army-directed readiness training program where every one of the 41.5 annual days is sequenced, let's say over three years or 123.5 training days, into one full "prepare" cycle followed by a one year "ready" cycle.

I should point out that I generally do not see the ARes elements of a 30/70 battalion training as a full unit as a common thing. This is because ARes are basically only available to train collectively during the summer when RegF pers need to go on leave and other things and because of equipment shortfalls. The two components do not mesh easily. What I see is that a given 30/70 battalion primarily trains its RegF company and CS and CSS platoons from September to April (including with other RegF companies squadrons and batteries from other battalion) and then for May to Aug inclusive turns heavily to training the ARes components including its two ResF companies, CS and CSS elements. There may be opportunities throughout the year to have officers and senior NCMs from both components do a weekend TEWT together but that's about it.

One of the key elements of the 30/70 concept is to take today's personnel strength and equipment holdings and distributed them in such a way that ARes companies benefit from stable and professional RegF leadership and have access to RegF equipment in their day to day training.


It's a big issue. If it were easy the ARes / RegF problems would have been solved long ago.

🍻
Well written and an interesting concept. A couple questions though, as I'm trying to fully understand your concept.

How do you envision infrastructure? Build new super armouries or use the existing reserve armouries?

Where do you see reserve rank progression going, I know a lot of people on this forum seem to conceptualize ResF pers being limited to Sgt/WO or Capt. Where do you stand on that topic?

What kind of roles do you see ResF members filling in these regiments? Do you fully integrate them? For example, we have the 13th Lord Bloggins Dragoons (RCAC) and the 30% Reg element are Leo 2 crewmen/Armd Ech crewmen. Do you envision the reservists filling the same roles or would they take more specialized, less maintenance heavy roles? For example regimental recce troop (6-0), assault troop, echelon force protection troop, UAS troop, maybe a Light Wheeled Cav Sqn, etc etc etc.
 
How do you envision infrastructure? Build new super armouries or use the existing reserve armouries?
While not @FJAG I don’t think one needs ‘super armories’ mainly as it somewhat defeats the purpose of having units close to people. You will end up with the those bases on the edge of large cities and being an hour or so commute for many.


Where do you see reserve rank progression going, I know a lot of people on this forum seem to conceptualize ResF pers being limited to Sgt/WO or Capt. Where do you stand on that topic?
Again not @FJAG but to me the more senior roles tend to require experience that is usually beyond what the average reservist can obtain.
What kind of roles do you see ResF members filling in these regiments? Do you fully integrate them? For example, we have the 13th Lord Bloggins Dragoons (RCAC) and the 30% Reg element are Leo 2 crewmen/Armd Ech crewmen. Do you envision the reservists filling the same roles or would they take more specialized, less maintenance heavy roles? For example regimental recce troop (6-0), assault troop, echelon force protection troop, UAS troop, maybe a Light Wheeled Cav Sqn, etc etc etc.
The ARNG does pretty much any role that the regular army does, outside of the SMU’s. I don’t see why the CA Res would be trade limited.

Frankly I think the heavier armor roles are (beyond pre deployed forces) best suited for Reservists.
 
Again not @FJAG but to me the more senior roles tend to require experience that is usually beyond what the average reservist can obtain.

Currently the more senior roles tend to be filled by 1) whoever happens to be available, and 2) has completed the courses, as opposed to any responsibly competitive process that is familiar to any other large business.

The results tend to speak for themselves, sadly ;)
 
Currently the more senior roles tend to be filled by 1) whoever happens to be available, and 2) has completed the courses, as opposed to any responsibly competitive process that is familiar to any other large business.

The results tend to speak for themselves, sadly ;)
I tend to believe the only reason the ARNG functions to the degree it does, is that GWOT provided a great deal of active duty time for the bulk of the guard. Additionally the up or out policy in Officer promotions combined with the limited number of Regular Army commissioned officers leads to a lot of experienced Army Reserve officers (all ARNG officers hold a Army Res commission) as well as the great number of active duty reserve officers gives the ARNG a large pool. Then combined with the Active duty requirements for both E’s and O’s, the ARNG is an attractive choice for those leaving full time active duty.

OFC the ARNG (and Air Guard etc) all have front line equipment too.
 
I tend to believe the only reason the ARNG functions to the degree it does, is that GWOT provided a great deal of active duty time for the bulk of the guard. Additionally the up or out policy in Officer promotions combined with the limited number of Regular Army commissioned officers leads to a lot of experienced Army Reserve officers (all ARNG officers hold a Army Res commission) as well as the great number of active duty reserve officers gives the ARNG a large pool. Then combined with the Active duty requirements for both E’s and O’s, the ARNG is an attractive choice for those leaving full time active duty.

OFC the ARNG (and Air Guard etc) all have front line equipment too.

The lack of depth, quality, consistency and resilience in the ARes leadership succession structure - over the rank of Lieutenant - is likely one of the greatest weaknesses in the whole system.
 
Well written and an interesting concept. A couple questions though, as I'm trying to fully understand your concept.

How do you envision infrastructure? Build new super armouries or use the existing reserve armouries?

Where do you see reserve rank progression going, I know a lot of people on this forum seem to conceptualize ResF pers being limited to Sgt/WO or Capt. Where do you stand on that topic?

What kind of roles do you see ResF members filling in these regiments? Do you fully integrate them? For example, we have the 13th Lord Bloggins Dragoons (RCAC) and the 30% Reg element are Leo 2 crewmen/Armd Ech crewmen. Do you envision the reservists filling the same roles or would they take more specialized, less maintenance heavy roles? For example regimental recce troop (6-0), assault troop, echelon force protection troop, UAS troop, maybe a Light Wheeled Cav Sqn, etc etc etc.
In most conceptual 30/70 structures we’ve discussed the 30 would be those positions that keep the lights on and run the shop. So the Sqn Lesdership and QM, and probably some of the senior NCOs, the rest, give or take, would be reservists. Possibly 1 full crew per troop, so allow for daily maintenance tasks to be completed. That or you have a full Tp, and 2-3 reserve troops that fall onto their kit.
 
I've set out an extensive overview of a force restructure in my revised book "Unsustainable at Any Price: The Canadian Forces in Crisis. 2nd Edition" The first issue is that the 30/70 battalion concept is not based on a fixed ratio but represents the idea of hybrid units made up of RegF and ARes members in varying ratios. There are multiple other factors such as terms of service, subsidized training systems, fixed service contracts, obligatory and mandatory service, urban units, civilian employment protection etc etc.

I put forward five classes of service: 3 ResF and 2 RegF.

ARes Class C - identical to today's system - ARes personnel on an operational tour whether as a volunteer or called out on service or active service
ARes Class M - mandatory service that every ARes member must attend - this has two aspects. First, training required to be fully DP 1 trained and second, after DP1, annual training of a 2.5 day weekend per month for ten months of the year and a 16.5 day (two week) summer exercise each year (total 41.5 days annually that the individual must attend)
ARes Class V - voluntary service that an ARes member may agree to take regardless of length (this subsumes both Thurs day night parading - if offered - or a contract for any duration such as several months of DP2 etc summer training or even what we look at as Class B contracts today.

RegF Class Unrestricted - essentially same as today's RegF terms of service
RegF Class Restricted - effectively like todays RegF but the individual joins up to serve in a specific geographic region (like a large urban centre) and cannot be posted without his consent. The aim is to facilitate and guarantee geographic career stability such as is required for urban units in expensive urban centres and two career families. Qualified individuals can still be promoted, if qualified, but only into a vacancy within their geographic area unless they consent to be posted to where a rank vacancy exists. They would still be liable for operational tours just like the Unrestricted Class.


This would require a constitutional amendment but more importantly, there is no benefit to a federal/provincial split in the military. You can accomplish everything, including support to the provinces, under our current structure. One of the underlying concepts of a 30/70 battalion system is that the number of administrative headquarters (the current div hqs and 10 ARes bdes are exchanged for roughly 2 divisional and 6 additional bde headquarters that, like the CMBGs are fully deployable. Similarly, the number of deployable battalion or regimental headquarters are nearly tripled. A caution here though is that the number of RegF company-sized subunits stay roughly the same. The tripling of the coy-sized subunit strength comes by way of a better trained, equiped and led ARes who will continue to be relied on to round out follow up rotos.


I see a rotational readiness system for the ARes components in a fashion similar to Guard 4.0, i.e. a multi-year army-directed readiness training program where every one of the 41.5 annual days is sequenced, let's say over three years or 123.5 training days, into one full "prepare" cycle followed by a one year "ready" cycle.

I should point out that I generally do not see the ARes elements of a 30/70 battalion training as a full unit as a common thing. This is because ARes are basically only available to train collectively during the summer when RegF pers need to go on leave and other things and because of equipment shortfalls. The two components do not mesh easily. What I see is that a given 30/70 battalion primarily trains its RegF company and CS and CSS platoons from September to April (including with other RegF companies squadrons and batteries from other battalion) and then for May to Aug inclusive turns heavily to training the ARes components including its two ResF companies, CS and CSS elements. There may be opportunities throughout the year to have officers and senior NCMs from both components do a weekend TEWT together but that's about it.

One of the key elements of the 30/70 concept is to take today's personnel strength and equipment holdings and distributed them in such a way that ARes companies benefit from stable and professional RegF leadership and have access to RegF equipment in their day to day training.


It's a big issue. If it were easy the ARes / RegF problems would have been solved long ago.

🍻
Thanks FJAG,

I tend to agree with the modular split of the 70/30. Heck if anything my untrained eyes are seeing that small unit tactics and leadership are even more critical than previously emphasized in the Ukraine with company and section level attacks which also would align with smaller training (aka Reserve units) being possible. However as also shown in the Ukraine that small bite sized attacks are also only successful if part of larger/wider front pushes and integrated force generation (hello artillery) which means that large scale training also needs to be done which also aligns with the readiness rotation cycles you're thinking of as well.

Appreciate the clarity on the different types of contracts offered. That was part of the discussion that I couldn't recall much off hand and also explains better some of the options existing under your proposed set up.

The provincial/federal split would be ugly...and legal basis for the split aside I think of how different the desires and geography of each part of Canada I've lived in or visited is and fully support the current "federal" jurisdiction.
 
Well written and an interesting concept. A couple questions though, as I'm trying to fully understand your concept.

How do you envision infrastructure? Build new super armouries or use the existing reserve armouries?
Primarily on existing infrastructure albeit some new infrastructure is needed. I'm against "super armouries." As an example. Toronto has a complex at Dennison that could house a brigade headquarters, a battalion headquarters and at least one full-time rifle company. While Fort York and Moss Park could each house a battalion headquarters and up to three ARes companies each. With a target of Class M service of one weekend per month, there is much "unused time" for facilities. This should be developed to a more efficient time sharing of facilities.

Housing/quarters can be addressed in several ways but primarily through a housing agency program which is designed to construct, maintain and rent out multi-unit housing to personnel who do not already live on the economy. I anticipate that much of the RegF component of urban battalions will come from the restricted RegF class who already have access to housing in the area through family or want to have their own non-military housing to climb the property ladder like civilians do.
Where do you see reserve rank progression going, I know a lot of people on this forum seem to conceptualize ResF pers being limited to Sgt/WO or Capt. Where do you stand on that topic?
Rank progression depends on two things. 1) career training needs to be trimmed, modularized and localized as much as possible. Training and education of DP 2 and beyond should be divided into "operational" and "defence management". The former teaches essential skills needed for operational deployments the latter for broad defence management for upper officer and NCM levels. 2) To career progress ARes and RegF members need to take identical "operational" training delivery of which should be decentralized as much as possible. "Defence management" training/education is limited to those going into "full-time" service and considered as good candidates for senior leadership positions.

I expect that most ARes will top out at the captain/major level and the WO/MWO level. This is because at higher levels what is needed is not just the training/education but the full-time service needed to build the experience base for further rank progression.
What kind of roles do you see ResF members filling in these regiments?
Potentially all but the most senior. If "operational" training and education is identical then, IMHO, most jobs up to Coy comd and Coy Sgt major can be performed by ARes on a part time basis so long as there is full-time staff to do the administrative work needed. I see an ARes coy having a full-time clerk and quartermaster sergeant dedicated to the company as well as a full-time company 2/ic, and appx 10 individuals at the sergeant, MCpl and Cpl levels who provide the core leadership within the company but are also the training cadre for the battalion as a whole. This group of some 25 or so full-timers do everything from recruiting, DP1 and DP2 training for the battalion's RegF and ARes NCMs, as well as provide the leadership core of each ARes coy.

While ARes companies will have a small RegF core, battalion headquarters and CS companies have a higher RegF ratio of between 30 to 70% depending on function.

Note that I'm a firm believer in the US Brigade Support Battalion concept. BSBs also hold the Forward Support Companies which provide CSS to individual line battalions. IMHO this system provides for better technical leadership of all CSS in the brigade and is much more flexible in providing the CSS needed within a 30/70 concept. In effect CSS is fully concentrated within the BSB but operates on a decentralized system once operationally deployed.
Do you fully integrate them? For example, we have the 13th Lord Bloggins Dragoons (RCAC) and the 30% Reg element are Leo 2 crewmen/Armd Ech crewmen. Do you envision the reservists filling the same roles or would they take more specialized, less maintenance heavy roles? For example regimental recce troop (6-0), assault troop, echelon force protection troop, UAS troop, maybe a Light Wheeled Cav Sqn, etc etc etc.
I do not fully integrate them. To an extent it depends on function, but a typical 30/70 infantry, armour/recce, artillery, engineer battalion would have a headquarters of roughly 60-70% full-time RegF, one complete and fully equipped 100% RegF sub unit, two or three ARes subunits with appx 90 % ARes and a 10% RegF core, and a CS coy (where appropriate) of roughly 30% RegF and 70% ARes.

The primary purposes of the 100% RegF subunit is to a) provide a fully formed, equipped and manned ready force element as required and b) to provide the full scope of career development experience needed for RegF members to progress to higher leadership roles.

The 60-70% RegF headquarters provides for the full-time leadership and management of the battalion as a whole and the core of a deployable battalion headquarters which, if deployed and depending on the type of mission, may require augmentation from other sources (including its own battalion, sister battalions in the brigade or from the army as a whole).

The 30/70 CS company has sufficient full-timers to adequately develop whatever CS skills and career progression in those CS skills is required by the battalion and to provide a leadership and skilled core on deployment which can be augmented by other sources.

The 10/90 ARes line companies are designed as a) provide individual volunteer augmentees for operational missions during peacetime, b) form a mobilizable line company in an emergency (subject to equipping) and c) to be spun off by the battalion to provide the training and leadership core for a new battalion of newly enlisted civilians in the case of a major war requiring significant force expansion.

Much of how ARes personnel are utilized within the battalion is dependent on the fact that the "operational" training for RegF and ARes members is identical to the DP1 level and is completed before they occupy positions within the battalion organization. Thereafter it depends on the DP 2 and 3 training each individual ARes takes. Conceivably some take nothing but their mandatory DP1 training and annual training and therefore are only employable as a basic rifleman, gunner or crewman while others progress up the ranks. However, even the DP1 riflemen are as fully trained as their RegF counterparts, albeit lacking the experience their RegF counterparts will have through their full-time service. The same is true for each further DP step. The training is identical but the experience level is not as extensive and possible only extends to the 41.5 days of mandatory training they take each year.
Currently the more senior roles tend to be filled by 1) whoever happens to be available, and 2) has completed the courses, as opposed to any responsibly competitive process that is familiar to any other large business.

The results tend to speak for themselves, sadly ;)
I don't think one will ever fully escape the gene-pool dilemma which also exists in RegF units. RegF units have a bit more flexibility to place their problem children into jobs where they can, at least, not harm the unit. I tend to think in fixed term contracts (rather than indefinite contracts) where the problem children can be easily terminated and a replacement started into the training scheme without having to go through lengthy release proceedings. I also tend to believe in BTLs and ATLs which can be adjusted to hold problem children for the remainder of their contract in excess to the units "paid strength" so that immediate action for filling a vacancy can begin.

🍻
 
I tend to believe the only reason the ARNG functions to the degree it does, is that GWOT provided a great deal of active duty time for the bulk of the guard. Additionally the up or out policy in Officer promotions combined with the limited number of Regular Army commissioned officers leads to a lot of experienced Army Reserve officers (all ARNG officers hold a Army Res commission) as well as the great number of active duty reserve officers gives the ARNG a large pool. Then combined with the Active duty requirements for both E’s and O’s, the ARNG is an attractive choice for those leaving full time active duty.
I understand the concepts of both ARNG with active duty experience (akin to our Class B) and Active Guard and Reserve positions (also akin to our Class B but with differences) I see much of the Class B jobs go by the wayside as people are recruited into restricted RegF positions and so can meet their desire for full-time service but in a limited geographic area (but yet subject to operational deployments) Much of that the transferability depends on 1) standard training for RegF and ARes at least to the DP 3 level and b) a system which allows for easy component transfer from the ARes to the RegF and within the RegF from between restricted and unrestricted RegF class of service.
OFC the ARNG (and Air Guard etc) all have front line equipment too.
As far as I'm concerned equipment is the sine quo non of an ARes. Two of the major factors in going to a 30/70 system are that a) you can do it with the limited equipment we have and still properly lead the Ares component and train them on the equipment they need to know to operate for rapid augmentation roles. In effect, a 30/70 battalion commander is responsible and accountable for the proper training and career development of both his RegF and ARes components and has sufficient equipment and leadership available to do the job.

Canada cannot, as it sands go to an ARNG system because it has neither the equipment nor the leadership in place to advance the quality of its training beyond where it is now. Given enough time and the equipment one may be able to reduce the RegF component to that of ARNG levels, but that is at least a generation away and cannot be achieved without something in the nature of a 30/70 concept in the interim to put the proper building blocks into place.

🍻
 
In most conceptual 30/70 structures we’ve discussed the 30 would be those positions that keep the lights on and run the shop. So the Sqn Lesdership and QM, and probably some of the senior NCOs, the rest, give or take, would be reservists. Possibly 1 full crew per troop, so allow for daily maintenance tasks to be completed. That or you have a full Tp, and 2-3 reserve troops that fall onto their kit.
I think that you need at least one full RegF company and a good slice of the CS platoons (at least a platoon leader or 2i/c and one full section for each platoon) per battalion to ensure that all the requisite career points and internal training from rifleman to battalion commander can be exercised and that at least rifle company-sized building blocks can be rapidly generated for missions.

I agree that you need full-time coy/sqn/bty leadership to keep the lights on for the 10/90 ARes companies. I see that generally as a senior captain coy 2i/c, a CQMS sgt, a clerk, a sigs sgt, maybe a transport sgt and a number of MCpls and Cpls. For me what matters is that having that many personnel, which are needed for proper leadership, leaves most of them grossly underemployed for much of the year on a 41.5 day Class M service for the ARes folks in the company. That's why I don't consider them or want to use them as RSS. They replace the RSS staff (in fact many of the PYs for them come from the RSS) and are part of the full-time training resource that the battalion CO has to train both his RegF and ARes people as well as fulfilling other functions within the battalion when not engaged in those 41.5 days their ARes companies actually parade.

🍻
 
I don't think one will ever fully escape the gene-pool dilemma which also exists in RegF units. RegF units have a bit more flexibility to place their problem children into jobs where they can, at least, not harm the unit. I tend to think in fixed term contracts (rather than indefinite contracts) where the problem children can be easily terminated and a replacement started into the training scheme without having to go through lengthy release proceedings. I also tend to believe in BTLs and ATLs which can be adjusted to hold problem children for the remainder of their contract in excess to the units "paid strength" so that immediate action for filling a vacancy can begin.

🍻

The ARes supply chain of qualified people depends on faint hopes, more often than not, while the Reg F enjoys - in contrast - a more or less endless supply of freshly trained/qualified/selected and trained leaders at all levels.

Problem children or not A Res Units should not be 'one course failure', or one job related move out of town, away from an intact leadership structure.
 
Thanks FJAG,

I tend to agree with the modular split of the 70/30. Heck if anything my untrained eyes are seeing that small unit tactics and leadership are even more critical than previously emphasized in the Ukraine with company and section level attacks which also would align with smaller training (aka Reserve units) being possible. However as also shown in the Ukraine that small bite sized attacks are also only successful if part of larger/wider front pushes and integrated force generation (hello artillery) which means that large scale training also needs to be done which also aligns with the readiness rotation cycles you're thinking of as well.

Appreciate the clarity on the different types of contracts offered. That was part of the discussion that I couldn't recall much off hand and also explains better some of the options existing under your proposed set up.

The provincial/federal split would be ugly...and legal basis for the split aside I think of how different the desires and geography of each part of Canada I've lived in or visited is and fully support the current "federal" jurisdiction.
I'm still using some old statistics on the strength of the ten ARes brigades although I don't think it has changed significantly since then.

What is obvious to me is that southern Ontario and southern Quebec are the core of the ARes strength, that BC is underperforming, that the Prairies are weak as a result of their low population density and distances and that the Maritimes are punching a bit above their weight but are also population poor.

Provinces as political divisions do not matter. Geography, however, does. You can't change Canada's geography. All you can do is adjust to it. To me that means taking maximum advantage of the dense population centres while ensuring that people in lightly populated areas are still able to serve their country.

I'm also a believer in making use of whatever resources are in place and for me the existing ARes infrastructure and organization should be a starting point to build on. Don't get me wrong. It needs major modification and quickly too. Gradual "improvement" of the ARes has gotten us to where we are over the last 75 years since WW2; with a greatly underperforming organization. There is a need to rip the band aid off which will impress neither the RegF - as they will need to do some heavy lifting and share their people and toys - nor the ARes as they will lose some prestigious leadership roles (over 200 of their CO and RSM positions and over 100 honourary colonels [I'm leaving a modified honourary LCol system in place). They will also have to modify their attendance culture from one that is pure voluntary to one that is a mix of minimal mandatory and voluntary.

The ARes supply chain of qualified people depends on faint hopes, more often than not, while the Reg F enjoys - in contrast - a more or less endless supply of freshly trained/qualified/selected and trained leaders at all levels.

Problem children or not A Res Units should not be 'one course failure', or one job related move out of town, away from an intact leadership structure.
Agreed. To me that is a hard problem to solve without an adequate supply of full-time leadership that can be co-opted to fill the ARes leadership vacuum. By generally limiting ARes leadership to company level you need to fill the battalion's three or four ARes major positions from an internal pool of some 20 or so capt/lt platoon commander positions from within the battalion and from ARes brigade staff. In a pinch, the RegF coy 2i/c can fill in.

I also see a potential to have several part-time LCol ARes positions on the brig and div staff to be filled by ARes personnel who are prepared to take the requisite "operational" training for the rank.

🍻
 
Primarily on existing infrastructure albeit some new infrastructure is needed. I'm against "super armouries." As an example. Toronto has a complex at Dennison that could house a brigade headquarters, a battalion headquarters and at least one full-time rifle company. While Fort York and Moss Park could each house a battalion headquarters and up to three ARes companies each. With a target of Class M service of one weekend per month, there is much "unused time" for facilities. This should be developed to a more efficient time sharing of facilities.
A massive amount of Moss Park is wasted on all the different messes it has. The upper level is almost all messes and the main level has a mess specifically for a unit band. There is lots of room that could be reallocated as it absolutely has unused time. You have a lot of rooms that are used for the most part one or two nights a week for a few hours during the Sep - Jun period of training. There should be at most 3 messes - Officers, SNCMs and JRs. Each unit does not need their own. So many push that they need a mess for their historical items. Give each unit a display case in the mess and the rest of their items they can keep in their offices or along the walls of their lines. Then they could use the newly freed up rooms for classrooms which are in short supply there. I suspect this is not just an issue for Moss Park and there are others that have the same issue.
 
A massive amount of Moss Park is wasted on all the different messes it has. The upper level is almost all messes and the main level has a mess specifically for a unit band. There is lots of room that could be reallocated as it absolutely has unused time. You have a lot of rooms that are used for the most part one or two nights a week for a few hours during the Sep - Jun period of training. There should be at most 3 messes - Officers, SNCMs and JRs. Each unit does not need their own. So many push that they need a mess for their historical items. Give each unit a display case in the mess and the rest of their items they can keep in their offices or along the walls of their lines. Then they could use the newly freed up rooms for classrooms which are in short supply there. I suspect this is not just an issue for Moss Park and there are others that have the same issue.
Damn, unit messes? I agree with the premise of rank segregated messes but that's just silly.
 
Damn, unit messes? I agree with the premise of rank segregated messes but that's just silly.

Until you're rubbing elbows at the bar with someone you sent to jail, or fined, or are otherwise dealing with for disciplinary/ performance issues of course ;)
 
A massive amount of Moss Park is wasted on all the different messes it has. The upper level is almost all messes and the main level has a mess specifically for a unit band. There is lots of room that could be reallocated as it absolutely has unused time. You have a lot of rooms that are used for the most part one or two nights a week for a few hours during the Sep - Jun period of training. There should be at most 3 messes - Officers, SNCMs and JRs. Each unit does not need their own. So many push that they need a mess for their historical items. Give each unit a display case in the mess and the rest of their items they can keep in their offices or along the walls of their lines. Then they could use the newly freed up rooms for classrooms which are in short supply there. I suspect this is not just an issue for Moss Park and there are others that have the same issue.
This is broadly true at many (but not all) ARes armouries.

If it was built before 1939, there is an excellent chance that 90% of the square footage is allocated to messes and a parade square. Classrooms and office space were not significant considerations in designing armouries at the time.
 
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