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Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ship AOPS

Not to mention the navy AOP's are ill-suited for all of the CCG other missions like navaid work.

But, without wanting to become contentious, there is at least an element of the Canadian Coast Guard that is willing to sail in support of an armed Maritime Marine Security Team in cooperation with the RCMP.

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The Hero Class MSPVs are positioned to conduct maritime security, search and rescue, fisheries enforcement, anti-smuggling and maritime patrol missions on Canadian waters.

To be honest I am agnostic on who sails what and does what to whom.

But I am having difficulty understanding whether the Navy wants the AOPS and the AOPS Duty at all. If it doesn't, if it would rather be relieved of the financial and personnel costs associated with them then perhaps Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness is a better home for them.

And, politically, new dollars to support the hulls and crews in domestic operations would be, I believe, more saleable. The money and crews currently budgeted on AOPS operations by the RCN could then be reapportioned to the Navy's actual wants (Subs, Corvettes, CSCs).

Those Hero boats, (good, bad or indifferent) are being manned by the Coast Guard. They are not being used in Navaids taskings. They are being used to support the RCMP. The mounties, fisheries protection officers and Coast Guard seem to have come to some sort of Modus Vivendi.

Similar to the Leonard J. Cowley. Another, if larger, Fisheries Patrol Vessel.

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Not all of the CCG is consumed with NAVAIDs and SAR duties.

Heck, even the CBSA managed to find some members who were willing to accept fire-arms to accommodate an armed response capability alongside the rubber stamp brigade.

....

Again, I am not promoting this course of action. I am, as I said, agnostic on the issue. But given the existence of the Maritime Marine Security Enforcement Team and the Fisheries Protection patrols I suspect an opening.

....

Additionally, I have one eye on raising our defence commitment to 3% of GDP. If 2% is a stretch politically then 3% is a great leap. One way I can see making that more politically acceptable is to tie the additional 1% to the Paramilitary Activities endorsed by NATO as part of the budget - activities which could include enhanced Mountie and Coast Guard activities, Transport activities, Civil Defence/Disaster Assistance, Fire Suppression, even communications and surveillance activities. Even a large, standing, Public Order force for the RCMP that could be employed as a ready reserve in any emergency.

All of those could be sold as enhancing the quality of life for Canadians in Canada while both relieving the CAF of pressures and, at the same time, supplying basic logistics that could be exploited by the CAF on deployments and in time of war.
 
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The RCMP works closely with our partners on several border initiatives. These programs include:

  • Marine Security Enforcement Teams
  • Marine Security Operational Centres
  • Integrated Cross-Border Maritime Law Enforcement Operations (Shiprider)
  • Integrated Border Enforcement Teams
  • Border Technology Program

Border Integrity program​

As Canada's national police force, the RCMP helps protect our borders in: the air, on land, at sea, and in the Artic. This includes monitoring areas between official ports of entry, maritime ports and airports.

The Border Integrity program recognizes the importance of keeping pace with modern criminal threats and anticipating future challenges. It has a strategy in place to effectively monitor, assess and respond to threats at our border, and working with partners to deploy resources where they are needed most. This strategy is based on three priorities:

  1. Intelligence: gathering and synthesizing information from a variety of human and technological sources.
  2. Integration: enhancing collaboration with other RCMP programs to address sophisticated, borderless crime.
  3. Partnerships: strengthening and leveraging partnerships to ensure the RCMP has a complete threat picture at the border, informing an appropriate response.
This strategy is designed to strengthen the RCMP's ability to detect, deter, and disrupt cross-border criminal activity, and helps to ensure the safety and security of Canadians.

Note​

A "port of entry" refers to a location by which people and goods may enter a country legally.

Combatting cross-border crime​

Border integrity is a crucial piece of Canada's national security, protecting Canadians from a host of criminal threats. The RCMP works alongside government and law enforcement partners on both sides of the Canada-U.S. border.

The RCMP Border Integrity program tackles increasingly complex border investigations by:

  • securing the length of Canada's border between designated ports of entry
  • participating in joint operations with Canadian and American law enforcement partners, such as the United States Customs and Border Protection
  • enhancing operational awareness of border threats and emerging criminal trends
  • identifying, investigating and disrupting criminal activity at the Canadian border that threatens Canada and our allies
The RCMP takes an intelligence-led approach to border security, ensuring resources are directed to where they will have the greatest impact. We maintain a presence in the highest-risk regions between ports of entry, including along the border in British Columbia, Ontario and Quebec. At the ports of entry, we provide assistance and support to our partners to address inbound and outbound criminal threats.

Teams and resources for operations​

The RCMP contributes to various border enforcement teams, working closely with both Canadian and U.S. partners.

Integrated Border Enforcement Teams are comprised of officers from five core agencies:

  • RCMP
  • Canada Border Services Agency
  • United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (represented by Homeland Security Investigations)
  • United States Customs and Border Protection represented by the United States Border Patrol
  • United States Coast Guard
Marine Security Enforcement Teams are comprised of mid-shore patrol vessels that protect the eastern marine entrance to Canada. These teams gather intelligence and respond to threats on the water. They are led and operated by the Canadian Coast Guard, with enforcement support from the RCMP.

Marine Security Operational Centre consists of six Canadian partners who have a stake in maritime security:

  • RCMP
  • Canada Border Services Agency
  • Canadian Coast Guard
  • Department of National Defence
  • Transport Canada
  • Department of Fisheries and Oceans
These organizations work together to gather intelligence on border threats and determine which agency is best positioned to respond. There are Marine Security Operational Centres located on the east and west coasts, as well as on the Great Lakes. The coastal centres work closely with Five Eyes partners to identify suspicious vessels bound for Canada.

Integrated Cross-Border Maritime Law Enforcement Operations (Shiprider) involve vessels jointly crewed by specially trained and designated Canadian and U.S. law enforcement officers, including representatives from the RCMP, the United States Coast Guard, and other police forces. These officers are authorized to enforce the law on both sides of the international boundary line, securing our shared border without violating the sovereignty of either nation.

Border Technology Program develops short, medium and long-term technological solutions to crime at the border, helping inform a response from law enforcement.

Border integrity partners​

The RCMP Border Integrity program works with a number of domestic and international partners to maintain the security and integrity of the Canadian border. These partners include but are not limited to:

Domestic law enforcement partners​

  • Municipal police
  • Provincial and territorial police

Federal departments and agencies​

  • Canada Border Services Agency
  • Canada Revenue Agency
  • Canadian Coast Guard
  • Department of Justice
  • Department of National Defence
  • Global Affairs Canada
  • Health Canada
  • Immigration, Refugee and Citizenship Canada
  • Public Safety
  • Transport Canada

International law enforcement partners​

  • Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
  • Drug Enforcement Agency
  • United States Border Patrol
  • United States Coast Guard
  • United States Customs and Border Protection
  • United States Homeland Security Investigations
  • United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement

I note that DND is just one of many partners involved in securing Canada's borders.
 
But, without wanting to become contentious, there is at least an element of the Canadian Coast Guard that is willing to sail in support of an armed Maritime Security Element in cooperation with the RCMP.

View attachment 85106


To be honest I am agnostic on who sails what and does what to whom.

But I am having difficulty understanding whether the Navy wants the AOPS and the AOPS Duty at all. If it doesn't, if it would rather be relieved of the financial and personnel costs associated with them then perhaps Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness is a better home for them.

And, politically, new dollars to support the hulls and crews in domestic operations would be, I believe, more saleable. The money and crews currently budgeted on AOPS operations by the RCN could then be reapportioned to the Navy's actual wants (Subs, Corvettes, CSCs).

Those Hero boats, (good, bad or indifferent) are being manned by the Coast Guard. They are not being used in Navaids taskings. They are being used to support the RCMP. The mounties, fisheries protection officers and Coast Guard seem to have come to some sort of Modus Vivendi.

Similar to the Leonard J. Cowley. Another, if larger, Fisheries Patrol Vessel.

View attachment 85107

Not all of the CCG is consumed with NAVAIDs and SAR duties.

Heck, even the CBSA managed to find some members who were willing to accept fire-arms to accommodate an armed response capability alongside the rubber stamp brigade.

....

Again, I am not promoting this course of action. I am, as I said, agnostic on the issue. But given the existence of the Maritime Security Enforcement Team and the Fisheries Protection patrols I suspect an opening.

....

Additionally, I have one eye on raising our defence commitment to 3% of GDP. If 2% is a stretch politically then 3% is a great leap. One way I can see making that more politically acceptable is to tie the additional 1% to the Paramilitary Activities endorsed by NATO as part of the budget - activities which could include enhanced Mountie and Coast Guard activities, Transport activities, Civil Defence/Disaster Assistance, Fire Suppression, even communications and surveillance activities. Even a large, standing, Public Order force for the RCMP that could be employed as a ready reserve in any emergency.

All of those could be sold as enhancing the quality of life for Canadians in Canada while both relieving the CAF of pressures and, at the same time, supplying basic logistics that could be exploited by the CAF on deployments and in time of war.
Perhaps its time to take the element in the CG and roll that function into the RCN and have them put on RCN uniforms. Norways CG is part of their Navy and operates similar ships like the AOPS.

Having spent more than a few deployments tooling around in the Arctic in a Kingston Class I personally think its great we have these nice, clean modern vessels with a fair amount of training bunks which we desperately need now.
 
Perhaps its time to take the element in the CG and roll that function into the RCN and have them put on RCN uniforms. Norways CG is part of their Navy and operates similar ships like the AOPS.

Having spent more than a few deployments tooling around in the Arctic in a Kingston Class I personally think its great we have these nice, clean modern vessels with a fair amount of training bunks which we desperately need now.

That's a viable option too.

Could the RCN operate a domestic fleet on a manning schedule comparable to the Canadian Coast Guard and the Norwegians?

...

Could the ship be treated less like a home and more like a work station on to which the crew rotated in shifts? I believe the Norwegians manned their AOPS with three divisions of which two would be on board at any one time. And if the ships are operating close to home perhaps they could function more like oil rig workers - flying on and off while the ship continues on its scheduled course.

...

Would the Navy be comfortable with more emphasis on non-combatant roles - in the same manner as the RCAF flies its Yellow Fleets and its Transport Fleets?

...

I think one of the concerns I would have is that if the Navy got ahold of the MSET tasking it would promptly upgrade all the specs, reduce the number of hulls and start deploying them overseas in support of the USN.
 
That's a viable option too.

Could the RCN operate a domestic fleet on a manning schedule comparable to the Canadian Coast Guard and the Norwegians?

...

Could the ship be treated less like a home and more like a work station on to which the crew rotated in shifts? I believe the Norwegians manned their AOPS with three divisions of which two would be on board at any one time. And if the ships are operating close to home perhaps they could function more like oil rig workers - flying on and off while the ship continues on its scheduled course.

...

Would the Navy be comfortable with more emphasis on non-combatant roles - in the same manner as the RCAF flies its Yellow Fleets and its Transport Fleets?
Considering Norway and Germany approached Canada recently with some sort of proposal for Arctic defence placing some of the CG under the RCN may be a smart thing to do. Going to a crewing model similar to the CG or Norwegions at least in the Arctic maybe a way to attract more personnel to the RCN. AOPS is a non-combattant anyways, so fits right in but also still carries out other non Arctic roles such as Caribbe.
 
PS - As part of the effort to raise the budget to 3% of GDP

Properly outfit Nanisivik, Resolute, Cambridge Bay, Tuktoyaktuk, Rankin Inlet, Churchill, Iqaluit and Kuujuuaq as ports of call for the AOPS system.
 
Considering Norway and Germany approached Canada recently with some sort of proposal for Arctic defence placing some of the CG under the RCN may be a smart thing to do. Going to a crewing model similar to the CG or Norwegions at least in the Arctic maybe a way to attract more personnel to the RCN. AOPS is a non-combattant anyways, so fits right in but also still carries out other non Arctic roles such as Caribbe.

To be honest I would just as soon that we bought you half a dozen cheap OPVs designed for crews of 20 to 30 (kind of like the Aussie Armadales) and have you base them out of Bermuda or Jamaica and leave the AOPS working a standing patrol circuit from St John's to Tuk.

...

And I am a big fan of greater co-ordination in the Arctic with the Europeans. We are already co-operating with the Danes around Greenland and Hans Island.
 
To be honest I would just as soon that we bought you half a dozen cheap OPVs designed for crews of 20 to 30 (kind of like the Aussie Armadales) and have you base them out of Bermuda or Jamaica and leave the AOPS working a standing patrol circuit from St John's to Tuk.

...

And I am a big fan of greater co-ordination in the Arctic with the Europeans. We are already co-operating with the Danes around Greenland and Hans Island.

Port-au-Prince? A permanent Canadian presence on Haiti?
 
Kirkhill, Kuujuuaq is not a harbour. It is 20 NM upriver from Ungava Bay, in a river that is shallow, wont let ships in at low tide, is constantly shifting its banks and bottom and difficult to navigate at the best of times for anything bigger than a Rhib.
 
Kirkhill, Kuujuuaq is not a harbour. It is 20 NM upriver from Ungava Bay, in a river that is shallow, wont let ships in at low tide, is constantly shifting its banks and bottom and difficult to navigate at the best of times for anything bigger than a Rhib.
They seem to have no issue.

Screenshot 2024-05-11 194102.png
 
They do: I did specify high tide will let ships in. You have a six to seven hour window to get in, do what you have to do and get out. And there are no facilities, so for cargo ships, it's bring your own shallow barge and mini tug.

If you are interested on how it's done up there, a good primer is a CBC series called High Arctic Haulers. I highly recommend it to everyone.
 
They do: I did specify high tide will let ships in. You have a six to seven hour window to get in, do what you have to do and get out. And there are no facilities, so for cargo ships, it's bring your own shallow barge and mini tug.

If you are interested on how it's done up there, a good primer is a CBC series called High Arctic Haulers. I highly recommend it to everyone.
Quite aware of the sealift. Been to the Arctic many times.
 
Additionally, I have one eye on raising our defence commitment to 3% of GDP. If 2% is a stretch politically then 3% is a great leap. One way I can see making that more politically acceptable is to tie the additional 1% to the Paramilitary Activities endorsed by NATO as part of the budget - activities which could include enhanced Mountie and Coast Guard activities, Transport activities, Civil Defence/Disaster Assistance, Fire Suppression, even communications and surveillance activities. Even a large, standing, Public Order force for the RCMP that could be employed as a ready reserve in any emergency.
I realize that NATO funding is a bit of slippery target between the Alliance's partners, but lumping in activities like domestic fire suppression and domestic law enforcement, regardless of whether it is being performed by our federal police service, into our NATO commitment seems just wrong. If NATO endorses these types of activities as inclusive of national commitments, then they deserve the reduced actual military commitment it is receiving. Communications? Can we include CBC funding? Transportation: VIA?
 
Kirkhill, Kuujuuaq is not a harbour. It is 20 NM upriver from Ungava Bay, in a river that is shallow, wont let ships in at low tide, is constantly shifting its banks and bottom and difficult to navigate at the best of times for anything bigger than a Rhib.

Seen. Thanks for the correction. What is the nearest deepwater port in the area?
 
They do: I did specify high tide will let ships in. You have a six to seven hour window to get in, do what you have to do and get out. And there are no facilities, so for cargo ships, it's bring your own shallow barge and mini tug.

If you are interested on how it's done up there, a good primer is a CBC series called High Arctic Haulers. I highly recommend it to everyone.

That's interesting. That would make Kuujjuaq about as accessible as Bristol in England which also has to contend with a tidal bore equivalent to that on the Bay of Fundy. For centuries, from roughly 1200 to 1800 it served as the western terminus of English transatlantic trade until it was replaced by Liverpool. Scottish trade in the same era was focused on my hometown of Ayr and its strand until it was replaced by Glasgow about the same time that Liverpool was built.
 
I realize that NATO funding is a bit of slippery target between the Alliance's partners, but lumping in activities like domestic fire suppression and domestic law enforcement, regardless of whether it is being performed by our federal police service, into our NATO commitment seems just wrong. If NATO endorses these types of activities as inclusive of national commitments, then they deserve the reduced actual military commitment it is receiving. Communications? Can we include CBC funding? Transportation: VIA?

Defence is a whole of government exercise. That isn't just a slogan. That is a fact.

Internal Communications are a strategic necessity. The Ports of Halifax and Esquimalt, Quebec, Montreal and Kingston all had military value as well as commercial value. The Rideau, Trent-Severn and St Lawrence waterways were all built with military considerations in mind. The railways and telegraph. The Royal Mail. All of those are part of the defence infrastructure. The Mounties were raised as a military force to maintain public order.

The Alaska Highway and the CANOL pipelines were military ventures. Most of our northern airports were military ventures, generally American, that were taken over by Canadians and made available to civilians.

Satellites that generate pictures of farmers' fields, forests and icefields also generate military maps.

Governments subsidizing communications in the form of telegraph and telephone lines, Royal Mail planes, ships, trains, vans and bicycles and yes, even the CBC's national radio broadcasting hardware as well as satellites and cables, all of that is part of the defence effort.

Ferries and highways. Civilian aircraft and crews. All of them have a role in Defence.

....


This isn't new nor is it just a dodge.

Ships Taken Up From Trade in the Falklands.
Civilian Reserve Air Fleet in the States
Military Sea Lift Command
Royal Fleet Auxilliary
Point Class Ship Charters
Hitler's Autobahn's
Britain's Railways and Canals.
Wade's Roads in Scotland.
Roman Roads.
Cyrus's Persian Royal Road.


...


The Canadian crime is that defence and strategy are not baked into every domestic infrastructure decision.

Defence is not just Boots on Parade.


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Pet peeve

Herc's cost more to operate than most civilian aircraft. But they have greater utility militarily and in commercial logistics. Beyond the fact they are not built in Canada (although they use Canadian parts), why isn't the Canadian government picking up the operating cost differential to support a large, northern, civilian Hercules fleet?

Related

Pay ferry and northern logistics companies to maintain surplus capacity that can be diverted to military or government use when necessary and that can supply cheap transportation that will assist in exploiting frontier development. And that development will increase the number of potential FOBs and FOLs and OSBs available to support military activities.
 
PS - As part of the effort to raise the budget to 3% of GDP

Properly outfit Nanisivik, Resolute, Cambridge Bay, Tuktoyaktuk, Rankin Inlet, Churchill, Iqaluit and Kuujuuaq as ports of call for the AOPS system.

Looking at that list again I realized that I was missing two other bets. Neither Ontario nor Quebec had arctic ports and yet for a couple of centuries both of them generated considerable wealth from ports on the Bay.

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Fort George in Quebec is already accessible by road from the James Bay Hydro Project highways.
That would suggest that Rupert House is also readily accessible.

Moose Factory or Moosonee and Fort Albany, as well as Fort Severn are Ring of Fire Adjacent and Moosonee is served by the Polar Bear Express train which is being expanded southwards.

York Factory is closer to Winnipeg than Churchill.

If all of those ports were improved to accommodate AOPS navigation then they would also manage seasonal freight traffic like these -

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Ores, hydrocarbons, grain, lumber

Civilian jobs on shore and on the water tending those ships and their movements.
 
A very good video by Perun on the state of the global icebreaking fleet.

I was notably unimpressed with that video, the typical Wikipedia sourced AOPS jabs we've been hearing for years alongside basically ignoring the huge CCG icebreaker fleet replacement plans. In a good hour long video on the Arctic, Canada's fleet got a whole roughly two minute spotlight with effectively no even remotely detailed explanations.

I want to like Perun but if you have any idea yourself about a video topic he is covering, you quickly realize that his videos are as wide as a lake but as shallow as a puddle.
 
I was notably unimpressed with that video, the typical Wikipedia sourced AOPS jabs we've been hearing for years alongside basically ignoring the huge CCG icebreaker fleet replacement plans. In a good hour long video on the Arctic, Canada's fleet got a whole roughly two minute spotlight with effectively no even remotely detailed explanations.

I want to like Perun but if you have any idea yourself about a video topic he is covering, you quickly realize that his videos are as wide as a lake but as shallow as a puddle.
I don’t think we’re the target audience with detailed knowledge of the subjects. His audience is either folks with no knowledge, or military-adjacent folks without specific knowledge in that particular video subject.

It’s kind of like a “survey” course for whatever topic he is covering. Some of the multi-part series are pretty good and seem to delve deeper, such as the corruption series of videos. His specialty is defence economics so naturally that’s what he’ll know (and speak of) the most…but that’s not really something most YouTube audiences care about.
 
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